A SEASON OF UNCERTAINTY IN EGYPTIAN POLITICS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 CAIRO 003424 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KISL EG SUBJECT: A SEASON OF UNCERTAINTY IN EGYPTIAN POLITICS REF: A. CAIRO 3239 ¶B. CAIRO 3089 ¶C. CAIRO 3086 ¶D. CAIRO 2536 ¶E. CAIRO 2506 ¶F. CAIRO 2433 ¶G. CAIRO 1413 ¶H. 04 CAIRO 8353 ¶I. 04 CAIRO 8146 Classified by A/DCM Michael Corbin for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) As Cairo's weather warms up this spring, Egyptian intellectuals and observers are preoccupied by a growing sense of anticipation and uncertainty about Egypt's political future. Contacts are focused on a series of "unprecedented" recent developments which, in combination, are charging the country's political atmosphere. These include: -- President Mubarak's constitutional reform initiative and the impending "competition" for the nation's highest office; -- The continuing controversy surrounding opposition figure Ayman Nour and his impending trial; -- Mubarak's nine-hour interview aired on prime time (alternatively interpreted as masterful and historic or desperate and pathetic); -- The "revolt" of judges demanding greater autonomy in supervising ballot stations; -- Protests by academics at state security's interference in campus affairs; -- The reemergence of domestic terrorism after a seven year hiatus; -- The continuation of demonstrations by the "Kifaya" (Enough) movement, an umbrella movement encompassing a broad spectrum of regime opponents; and -- An increasingly assertive Muslim Brotherhood, which is working to recast itself as a force for political reform. ¶2. (C) While the GOE has dealt in the past, individually, with challenges of comparable magnitude, there is a sense that the convergence of these factors this spring poses an unprecedented challenge to the Mubarak regime, with the potential to change the prevailing political dynamic in ways that are still unclear. These factors, in accumulation, will certainly have GOE policy circles working overtime and will test conjectures on the degree to which Mubarak and his inner circle have a master plan to shape and drive developments, rather than just react to them. End summary. -------------- Presidency in Flux (?) -------------- ¶3. (C) President Mubarak, by his own confession a man of cautious and conservative tendencies, followed up on his decisive cabinet shuffle in the summer of 2004 with an even bigger surprise in February, when he announced that he would support a constitutional amendment to allow for the first direct, competitive elections for head of state in the 5,000 year history of the Egyptian state (ref D). ¶4. (C) More than two months after the announcement, the modalities of the new presidential election system remain undetermined, but there is general agreement that there is no figure currently on the political stage capable of effectively challenging Mubarak. As the implications of this major systemic change were debated in March, many, including (privately) Mubarak himself, expressed frustration at the lack of viable competition. Finally, in mid-April, Khaled Mohieldin, president of the leftist Tagammu' Party, began sending clear signals that he was prepared to step into the race (though he indicated that no formal announcement would be made until parliament had finished preparing the amendment). ¶5. (C) Mohieldin's apparent entry into the race was greeted by most of our contacts, and a number of commentators, with sadness. The 84 year-old political veteran, a core member of the free officers' movement that deposed King Farouk in 1952, is respected by many Egyptian political elites. (Note: He is also the paternal uncle of current Minister for Investment Mahmoud Mohieldin. End note.) Wafd Party Vice President Mahmoud Abaza described him to poloff as "the only one of the free officers truly committed to democracy." However, the consensus among our contacts was that Mohieldin, in entering the race, was allowing himself to be used as a prop. Some of our contacts claim he is barely ambulatory, hard of hearing, and perhaps even showing signs of senility. One of our contacts quipped that Mohieldin was probably a favorite of the palace to challenge Mubarak because he makes the President (who turned 77 on May 4) look young and sprightly by contrast. Prominent columnist Salama Ahmed Salama called Mohieldin's decision to run "hasty" in the absence of clarity about the modalities for the race, while another prominent editorialist, Magdy Mehanna, predicted that Mohieldin's participation in this "charade" would tarnish his reputation. -------------- Ayman Nour Controversy -------------- ¶6. (C) Also running for president is Ayman Nour, the embattled leader of the opposition Ghad (Tomorrow) Party, even as his lawyers prepare for his criminal trial on forgery charges, set to begin June 28 (Ref E). Nour continues to take an aggressive and defiant approach to his campaign, hurling scathing criticism on Mubarak and the GOE. He claimed to poloff in early May that the ruling party and the State Security apparatus was hiring thugs to disrupt his campaign rallies, particularly in the Nile Delta provinces, pelting him and his entourage with garbage, insults, and threats. (Comment: Nour's attempts to campaign outside his own district are groundbreaking in Egypt and bound to engender at least some hostility among local politicians and their constituents. Nonetheless, we deem credible his claims of GOE/NDP involvement in hiring thugs to make his campaigning as unpleasant as possible. However, to the extent that the GOE is behind this harassment, the GOE appears to be trying to put some distance between itself and his tormentors. End comment.) Nour also confirmed to poloff in early May reports that "private citizens" had been filing various complaints against him, which he described as part of a campaign of harassment, requesting permits to demolish his apartment for zoning violations, to demolish the social services center he funded in his parliamentary district, and even a motion to have him arrested for insulting the head of state after a journalist claimed to have witnessed him tearing up a picture of President Mubarak. ¶7. (C) Nour remains confident (and probably has an exaggerated view) of his popularity on the Egyptian street, and told poloff that, in a truly open electoral campaign, the "real contest" would be not between his Ghad party and the ruling NDP but between the Ghad and the Muslim Brothers. Nour has many enemies, including many among regime opponents, who believe he is "slick" a "phoney," or a "lightweight." Some of our contacts are bemused by the fame and support he has acquired in western capitals as a champion of democracy. While it is difficult to quantify Nour's actual support on the street, his ongoing presidential campaign and controversial legal case are clearly additional complicating factors in this year's political climate. -------------- Hosni Up Close and Personal -------------- ¶8. (C) Meanwhile, back at the presidential palace, Egypt TV aired on prime time, for three consecutive nights beginning April 23, a nine-hour interview with President Mubarak (refs A and C). The teasers aired to promote the interview series, humbly entitled "Witness to History," claimed that Mubarak would be making many revelations and at least one major announcement. The interview was conducted by the celebrated presenter (and satellite TV tycoon) Emad Eddin Adeeb and produced by a prominent cinematic director. The result, it was generally agreed, was anti-climactic: The interview dealt extensively with Mubarak's recollections of his military career, his observations about Egypt under Nasser and Sadat, and his heroic role in the war of 1973. During one of the brief references to the current political situation and the issue of reform, the President told Adeeb he had "never" been told directly by any USG official that Egypt needed to undertake political reforms. ¶9. (C) After the interviews, a surprisingly broad range of media commentators and Embassy contacts delivered a similar verdict: The President dwelt too extensively on the past and was far too vague in discussing his vision for the future of the country and solutions to its various problems. Contacts from reformist/civil society circles termed Mubarak's performance "terrible" and "pathetic" and the act of a man "out of ideas." Even Mustafa Bakry, editor of the reckless and sensationalist tabloid al-Osboa, usually seen to be doing the GOE's bidding by regularly and systematically defaming its critics through innuendo and name calling, termed Mubarak's interview "a big disappointment." ¶10. (C) Not all were critical of Mubarak's performance - editors of the three principal pro-government papers all praised Mubarak's statesman-like demeanor, maturity, and wisdom. One contact told poloff that the Egyptian masses, rather than its skeptical intellectuals, were the targeted audience for the interview, and it was for their benefit that Mubarak postured both as a great man of history and a patron of stability and order. It appeared to most observers that Mubarak's interview was a de facto launch of his reelection campaign, though an anticipated announcement of his intentions has yet to come, and will probably wait until after parliament completes the legislation on the constitutional amendment. -------------- The Judicial "Intifada" -------------- ¶11. (C) We continue to hear received mixed interpretations of the significance of the April 15 declaration of 1000 Egyptian judges who met in Alexandria (out of a total of 7000 judges nationwide) in which they highlighted flaws in the current system of judicial supervision of elections and demanded passage of new legislation to expand guarantees of judicial independence and threatened to sit out the next elections if ignored (Ref B). Democracy advocates in Egypt and abroad were stunned and elated at the judge's "unprecedented" and "audacious" move and predicted it would put serious pressure on the GOE to rethink its approach to elections, widely acknowledged to be tarnished by various forms of fraud and intimidation. ¶12. (C) The GOE has not taken the matter sitting down. The Minister of Justice told the press his ministry would act quickly to address the judges' concerns, while he reportedly called the judges' bluff by circulating a form requesting that they confirm their intent to fulfil their duties as electoral supervisors. Assistant Minister of Justice Iskandar Ghattas told poloff in early May that "every judge" has already signed this pledge and was aggressively dismissive of the effort, saying the organizers of the "revolt" were gadflies cynically drawing on political reform rhetoric to advance their "Islamist" agenda. (Comment: We found Ghattas' dismissal of the organizers as crypto-Islamists to be dubious. His very defensive reaction was probably a sign of the actual significance of the judges' action. End comment.) However, as noted in ref B, even a decidedly liberal and reformist senior judicial contact told poloff that the "democratic" effort was actually a stealthy means of shaming the GOE into giving judges a pay raise. A follow up to the April 15 meeting, tentatively set for May 13, may provide clarity on the resolve and resonance of the judges' efforts. -------------- --- Academics Want State Security to Move off Campus -------------- --- ¶13. (C) Another of the "unprecedented" recent developments was the April 19 demonstration, held simultaneously at public university campuses in Cairo, Minya, and Assiyut, in which dozens of university faculty members staged a one hour silent protest at the presence, and interference, of Egyptian State Security in Egyptian academic life. State Security has long maintained a significant presence on Egyptian university campuses, particularly focused on containing and thwarting recruitment and organization of students by Islamist groups. As described in Ref I, State Security intervenes annually in student union elections to preempt, by heavy-handed tactics if necessary, the election of Islamists to student government positions, but is also accused of stiffling the general academic climate and harassing students and faculty who challenge orthodoxy on various issues. ¶14. (C) During the April 19 protest, organized by a group known as "Professors for Change," dozens of faculty members on the three campuses donned black academic robes and stood silently in front of university administration buildings for an hour, carrying banners with slogans such as "No to security interference in universities;" "Yes to free and independent universities;" and "No future for Egyptian students without freedom." An organizer, journalism professor Awatef Abdel Rahman told the press that the protests had been inspired by the growing calls and activism in the country for political reform. Prominent intellectual and Shura Council member Usama Ghazaly Harb (protect) told poloff in late April that the faculty protests against State Security were "very important" because they had "shattered the fearful silence" of professors and openly expressed views widely held among Egyptian academics. -------------- "Enough" Flexes Muscles -------------- ¶15. (C) Clearly one of the most significant developments of early 2005 has been the sustained emergence of the protest movement Kifaya ("Enough") - a loose coalition of political groupings and individuals united by their opposition to the Mubarak regime (ref G). The group, which has captured the attention of the international media, as well as a growing number of Egyptians, has surprised observers by its ability to repeatedly defy bans on its demonstrations and turn out on the streets for a series of protests this spring. While the numbers Kifaya turns out at demonstrations are modest by international standards (usually around 200-500),their pluck and resolve is undeniable and they can probably be credited with having made routine previously unutterable slogans such as "Mubarak must go," "No to a fifth term," "No to bequeathment of power (to son Gamal)," etc. ¶16. (C) Kifaya's latest feat was staging simultaneous demonstrations in 11 Egyptian cities on April 27, explicitly unauthorized by the government, which led to 75-120 arrests, (most were released within several hours). The Ministry of Interior has openly lost patience with the movement and its activities, but has so far refrained from either the arrest and prosecution of Kifaya's leaders or authorizing a "head cracking" approach by the riot police deployed to contain the demonstrations - no doubt mindful of the domestic and international fallout that would likely ensue. The movement's strength - its simple, "unifying" message, will also limit its development as a political force. As one Internet commentator, and acknowledged supporter of Kifaya concedes, the movement "binds together all sorts of contradictory groups, organizations, ideologies, and visions. The only consensus is that Mubarak must go; everything else is up for debate." -------------- Emboldened Brothers -------------- ¶17. (C) For their part, Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which is banned but tolerated by the GOE within certain parameters, and which claims to be the nation's most popular political movement, has also seized perceived opportunities in Egypt's changing political atmosphere - by adopting political reform as their mantra in place of their traditional calls for the implementation of Shari'a Law. As discussed in ref H, the MB in the past year adopted its own "blueprint for political reform," established its own "human rights" organization, and adopted a generally more strident (though enigmatic and often contradictory) political discourse. In late April, for example, MB Supreme Guide Mahdy Akef pledged the group's loyalty to President Mubarak (while continuing to demand the dissolution of the Emergency law),but then subsequently qualified his comments as "respect and support for the office of the President," while in a statement posted on the group's website in early May, Akef's deputy, Mohammed Habib, called on Egyptians to boycott the coming Presidential elections. ¶18. (C) In the past two months, the MB, likely inspired by Kifaya's activities (in which it has conspicuously participated),has shown a greater willingness than at any time in the recent past to defy government bans on demonstrations: Their March 27 demonstration (ref F),was successfully thwarted by the GOE, but the massive security deployments paralyzed central Cairo for hours and prompted much criticism of the GOE in the independent press. The MB appeared to up the ante with demonstrations it staged on May 4 in Cairo and six provinces, reportedly attended by thousands of MB cadres and sympathizers. The GOE responded, according to an MOI statement with 400 arrests - the largest number of MB arrests in a single day that we can recall. The demonstrations reportedly devolved into clashes with police in some spots, the worst probably being in Fayyoum, where 43 demonstrators were injured (according to the MB),while the MOI claimed that an undisclosed number of police were injured. -------------- Domestic Terror Reemerges -------------- ¶19. (C) The apparent reemergence, however tentative, of domestic terrorism, is an additional factor that has added to the mood of uncertainty and concern in Egypt this spring. The calm that had prevailed since the infamous Luxor massacre of 1997 was first shattered in October 2004, when a group of Egyptians, reportedly led by a disaffected Palestinian, detonated several explosives at several tourist sites frequented by Israelis on the east coast of the Sinai peninsula (septels). The GOE was quick to emphasize that the group that conducted the attack had been identified and quickly captured, and that the perpetrators had no connections to wider terror networks. Though the GOE's public analysis had some clear flaws, it was effective in forestalling any major impact on the country's tourist industry. However, three other terrorist incidents which occurred in Cairo in April 2005 (septels) have undermined the public mood and raised fears that Egypt's victory against the terrorism of the 1980s and 1990s might be eroding. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶20. (C) The GOE has considerable experience dealing, in one form or another, with each of the issues and areas discussed above. However, contacts and observers cannot recall a time in which so many significant and sensitive issues have converged at the same time. Usama Ghazaly Harb (protect), the prominent intellectual, told poloff that Egypt has "arrived at one of the most sensitive moments in its modern history" and confided that he was unable to predict with confidence "what will happen next month, let alone six months from now." These various developments, in accumulation, will certainly have GOE policy circles working overtime and will test conjectures on the degree to which Mubarak and his inner circle have a master plan to shape and drive developments, rather than just react to them. ¶21. (C) With so many variables in play, we cannot rule out the possibility that the GOE may feel compelled to crack down on one or more of the groups challenging its legitimacy as elections draw closer. Conversely, we would not be surprised if additional strands of opposition emerge, or if the existing strands continue to seek opportunities to make common cause with each other in an effort to challenge the GOE more effectively. Visit Embassy Cairo's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/cairo You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. GRAY