IRAQ POLICY COORDINATOR JONES'S MEETINGS WITH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 002852

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2030
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS ASEC EG IZ OVIP
SUBJECT: IRAQ POLICY COORDINATOR JONES'S MEETINGS WITH
EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE CHIEF AND FOREIGN MINISTER

Classified by Charge Gordon Gray for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (S) During an April 11 visit to Egypt, Iraq Policy
Coordinator and Senior Advisor (S/I) Richard Jones met
separately with Egyptian Intelligence Chief Omar Soliman and
Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit. They expressed interest in
hosting a preparatory meeting of senior officials ahead of an
international conference on Iraq, but sought additional
details. Aboul Gheit proposed that the international
conference in Europe be held June 1, immediately following a
ministerial meeting in Barcelona. Soliman pressed on the
need to strengthen Iraq's security and intelligence services,
while Aboul Gheit repeated Egypt's open invitation to train
Iraqis in any field. Aboul Gheit said that the GOE could
offer training to Iraqi judges. Both Soliman and Aboul Gheit
expressed general concerns over Iran's influence in Iraq. To
a request that Egypt forgive the relatively small amount of
Iraqi debt on its books, Aboul Gheit showed interest in the
details of Iraq's debt but did not offer a definitive reply.
End summary.


2. (U) S/I Jones was accompanied by Colonel Phil Smith of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Larry McDonald of the Treasury
Department, and Staff Assistant Matthew Fuller. The Charge
and poloff (notetaker) also joined the meetings.

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Meeting with Egyptian Intelligence Chief Soliman
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3. (S/NF) Soliman told Jones that Egypt considered the
strengthening of Iraq's security and intelligence
capabilities as the crucial element in ensuring stability
there. A clear, obvious plan should be put in place
promptly, he suggested, to recruit, train, and arm Iraq's
security services over the next two or three years. It was
also important, he added, that the focus of such training be
on units rather than individuals and that these units be well
equipped to carry out their responsibilities. The Iraqi
intelligence forces, he continued, require training and
independence from the Coalition as well as clearly-defined
missions. Only with a strengthened intelligence capability
would the Iraqis be able to stop infiltrations from across
the borders of weapons and insurgents and control the
domestic security situation. Such moves would permit a
decrease in the number of U.S. troops in Iraq. Soliman also
counseled that new faces be brought into the political
leadership in order to convince Iraqis that a new political
era is truly at hand and the insurgency is "a cancer in the
society."


4. (C) Jones described for Soliman USG policy priorities in
Iraq, including a detailed description of Coalition training
efforts for Iraqi security personnel and a readout on the
political timetable for the new government in Baghdad.
Stressing the USG goal of handing off security responsibility
to the Iraqi government, Jones gave a progress report on
training efforts for Iraqi forces and on the political
process. Describing Iraq's political timetable, Jones
explained USG plans to co-host with the Europeans an
international conference on Iraq to build on what had been
accomplished last November in Sharm El Sheikh. The goal, he
stressed, was to build further international support for Iraq
in the political, security, and economic realms. Egypt,
Jones added, might hold a preparatory meeting of senior
officials in May to prepare for the conference, to be held in
either Brussels or Luxembourg. Soliman immediately expressed
interest and support, noting that he would explore the
subject with President Mubarak and Foreign Minister Aboul
Gheit. Jones also suggested that Egypt might consider
forgiving the remaining, relatively small amount of debt owed
it by Iraq as a symbolic show of political support at the
conference.


5. (S/NF) Changing direction, Soliman said that his
organization had been approached recently by various Iraqis
who considered themselves part of the resistance. The GOE
was willing to deepen such contacts should the USG concur via
intelligence channels. Specifiying that these Iraqis were a
mixture of Sunni tribal and former-regime elements interested
in political participation, Soliman said that he would raise
the topic with Director of Central Intelligence Goss during
his late-April visit to Washington. Soliman, while
acknowledging that the opposition figures would make demands
in return for engaging with Egypt, believed that it was
important to engage them to bring them into the political
process and to isolate foreign terrorists.


6. (S/NF) Expressing GOE willingness to provide training to
Iraqis, Soliman suggested Egypt could send moderate Islamic
figures to Iraq to preach a message of non-violence.
Responding to Ambassador Jones's interest in the idea,
Soliman further suggested Egypt could provide cultural and
entertainment programming to Iraq's television and other
media outlets to push a non-violent, tolerant, and moderate
interpretation of Islam. Soliman also offered that the Iraqi
government should link the apportionment of its regional
development and construction financing to each province's
security status. In other words, he argued, should attacks
and violence continue in a specific region, that region would
not receive funding from the central government. Iran,
Soliman added, was also a major concern and should be
prevented from spreading its influence into Iraq and
jeopardizing the security situation there.

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Meeting with Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit
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7. (C) During their 45-minute meeting April 11, Aboul Gheit
peppered Jones with questions on U.S. efforts on the ground
in Iraq, and pressed on the need to rebuild Iraqi security
forces and promote self-sufficiency for Iraqi society.
Responding to Jones's assertion that training of Iraqi forces
was progressing well, Aboul Gheit queried why Egypt's offer
to train Iraqi forces had not been taken up more robustly.
Responding to Jones's assertion that high training costs in
Egypt was a concern, Aboul Gheit proposed the issue be
discussed between the respective officials involved.
Similarly, the Minister offered Egypt as a venue for legal
and judicial training, given that Iraq's needs are
substantial and the USG considers this area a priority ("send
us 2,000 judeges, and we'll train them"). Egypt can do any
sort of training and will do it cheaper and in line with the
Iraqi mentality which "we understand very well," Aboul Gheit
pressed.


8. (C) Raising the issue of an upcoming international
conference on Iraq to be co-hosted in Europe by the United
States and the Europeans, Jones requested that Egypt host a
preparatory meeting of senior officials to prepare for that
conference. Such a meeting would offer a connection to the
Sharm El Sheikh ministerial hosted by the Egyptians last
November, Jones said. Aboul Gheit sought additional details
but offered a positive initial reaction. First clarifying
that the conference was not a pledging conference, he
requested that the Embassy pursue the issue further, but
noted that it was crucial that there first be a government in
Baghdad before scheduling the meeting. (Note: The Embassy
met on April 12 with a working level official on Aboul
Gheit's staff and will report separately on the results. End
note) Aboul Gheit suggested that the international
conference be held June 1, immediately following a
previously-scheduled Euro-Mediterranean Partnership meeting
of foreign ministers in Luxembourg which he and other
regional players would attend.


9. (C) Aboul Gheit offered his personal view on societal
changes in Iraq, highlighting his negative impression that
Iraqi society was becoming "Islamicized," evidenced, he said,
by the larger number of veiled Iraqi women. His concerns
were amplified by what he perceived as a worrying trend of
growing Iranian influence in Iraq. The U.S. must do more, he
asserted, to prevent such influence.


10. (C) Jones and Treasury official McDonald requested that
the GOE consider forgiving sovereign debt owed by Iraq as a
symbolic gesture to help Iraq's financial situation. Aboul
Gheit sought clarification on the amount of debt Iraq owed
within the region and to Paris Club countries, and said he
understood the importance of allowing Iraq to write off its
debts in order to access new loans on the international
financial markets.


11. (U) S/I Jones did not have the opportunity to clear this
message prior to his departure.


12. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.


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GRAY