Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05CAIRO2744
2005-04-08 13:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Cairo
Cable title:  

APRIL 7 CAIRO BOMBING: EMERGENCY ACTION COMMITTEE

Tags:  PTER ASEC CASC KCRM EG 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 002744 

SIPDIS

NEA FOR DAS DIBBLE, AND FOR NEA/ELA;
DS FOR JOE MORTON AND FOR DSS AND IP/NEA;
ALSO FOR CA AND S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2015
TAGS: PTER ASEC CASC KCRM EG
SUBJECT: APRIL 7 CAIRO BOMBING: EMERGENCY ACTION COMMITTEE
MEETING

REF: CAIRO 2743

Classified by Charge Gordon Gray for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 002744

SIPDIS

NEA FOR DAS DIBBLE, AND FOR NEA/ELA;
DS FOR JOE MORTON AND FOR DSS AND IP/NEA;
ALSO FOR CA AND S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2015
TAGS: PTER ASEC CASC KCRM EG
SUBJECT: APRIL 7 CAIRO BOMBING: EMERGENCY ACTION COMMITTEE
MEETING

REF: CAIRO 2743

Classified by Charge Gordon Gray for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) The Charge convened the Embassy's Emergency Action
Committee on April 8 at 12 noon local to discuss the April 7
bombing incident at Cairo's Khan el-Khalili tourist bazaar in
the early evening of April 7. Attending the meeting were the
A/DCM, RSO, LEGATT, ORA, CONS, ECPO, OMC, DATT, NCIS, RMO,
PA, AGATT, DEA, MGT, MSG, AID, NAMRU, and CLO.

--------------
The Incident
--------------


2. (SBU) The EAC reviewed information gathered by Embassy
personnel, including officers from RSO, CONS, and LEGATT
dispatched to the bomb scene immediately after the attack.
The attack occurred at approximately 1745 local on April 7 on
Gawhar al-Qaed street in the Khan el-Khalili, Cairo's most
famous and popular tourist bazaar. The blast site is .18
miles due west of the al-Hussein mosque, the biggest landmark
in the area.


3. (C) Our best information currently indicates four
fatalities, including one AmCit, one French national, and two
others, still unidentified, one of whom is believed to be the
bomber. The dead AmCit has been identified as Alex
Mirandette. 17-20 others were injured in the event,
including three AmCits. After strenuous lobbying by CONS,
the three AmCits were moved in the early hours on April 8
from the decrepit Hussein Hospital, near the blast scene, to
Dar al-Fuad hospital, one of Egypt's best, in Six October
City, just west of Cairo. Of the three wounded AmCits, 19
year-old Erik Mirandette, brother of deceased Alex, is in
critical condition - in addition to multiple shrapnel wounds,
he has an apparent puncture to his kidney. The others, Kris
Ross and Michael Kiel (Tenhaaf) are stable. CONS has made
notifications to the parents of the Mirandette brothers and
Kris Ross and the mother of Michael Kiel. Kiel and Ross have
given verbal privacy act waivers for notification of
families. Mirandette has not been lucid enough to do so.
Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif visited those wounded in the
attack on the morning of April 8. Family members of the

AmCits are due to arrive in Cairo April 9 and 10 and will be
met and assisted by Consular staff.


3. (C) In an interview with A/LEGATT, Kris Ross, one of the
wounded AmCits, stated that they had been walking in the Khan
when he noticed out of the corner of his eye an individual
carrying a large green bucket and trying to light something
in the bucket. Seconds later, the explosion occurred.
Ross's account is consistent with the shrapnel wounds,
(nails, glass, and bits of burned green plastic) and other
observations from the blast scene.

--------------
Observations/Investigation
--------------


4. (C) The indications suggest the use of a low-tech
improvised explosive device (IED),delivered manually,
apparently by one perpetrator. Details of observations by
RSO and LEGATT are provided septel. Reports that the bomb
was delivered by a passing motorcyclist or vehicle appear to
be inaccurate.


5. (C) RSO noted that the State Security Investigations
Service, the lead GOE agency in the investigation, has
collected debris from the area for analysis at their
laboratory. LEGATT noted that the crime scene must be
considered contaminated, with the parade of journalists,
police, and onlookers that that have congregated at and
around the site. LEGATT has offered technical/forensic
assistance in the investigation to GOE counterparts, but our
expectation, based on past experience, is that
self-confidence and national pride will preclude Egyptian
acceptance of this offer. At the same time, ORA noted that
GOE counterparts have so far been open and cooperative with
us, although they seem to be suffering from some coordination
problems. ORA added that, contrary to some reports in the
media, no suspects have been taken into custody as of mid-day
April 8.

--------------
Targetting/Implications
--------------


6. (C) It is obvious that the principal targets in the attack
were western foreigners. The time selected for the attack,
close to 1800, is a time favored by foreigners, rather than
Egyptians, to frequent the Khan. As consistent with previous
terrorist attacks in Egypt, the tourism industry, and
ultimately the GOE, must be considered targets as well.
There are not yet any indications that Americans, as opposed
to westerners, were specifically targetted in this attack,
but this possibility cannot be ruled out. Initial reactions
on Arabic media, and anecdotal reports, indicate that the
Egyptian public is worried by this development and believes
it will have a negative impact on Egypt's tourism industry,
which had a record year in 2004.

7. (C) The use of a low-tech IED in this incident suggests
that the perpetrator(s) could have been operating alone or in
a small group, and would not require significant resources,
training, expertise, or outside support. This observation
cuts two ways: On the one hand, there is no indication that
the "enemy" in this case is sophisticated or well organized,
and may be an isolated individual. On the other hand, it is
almost impossible to effectively defend against free-lance,
"copy-cat" bombers, and materials for such attacks are
readily available. The Embassy is unaware of any claims of
responsibility for this attack.

--------------
American Community
--------------


8. (SBU) On the evening of April 7, CONS issued a warden
message to the American community in Egypt notifying them of
the event and advising Americans to stay away from the Khan
area, until further notice, to be especially vigilant, and to
avoid areas of Cairo where large numbers of tourists
congregate. (Reftel includes the text.) RSO distributed the
identical message to members of the U.S. mission. CONS
advised that has received managable number of inquiries from
community members and concerned relatives in the U.S.


9. (SBU) CLO observed that the reaction of the American
community in Cairo has so far been calm. She has thus far
not received many inquiries. RSO reviewed a number of
community events taking place over the weekend, and advised
that it has requested, and will receive, augmented security
support from the GOE. RSO is also dispatching surveillance
detection teams, as appropriate, to provide extra coverage
for these events. Charge urged that all EAC members, and
their staffs, be vigilant in communicating with the American
community and controlling rumors.

--------------
Media Reaction
--------------


10. (SBU) Reporting in the international and Egyptian media
has so far been factual, balanced, and generally accurate,
although there have been some discrepencies in reports of
casualty figures. The Egyptian media, which is only
beginning to digest the story, has so far offered little in
the way of speculation on the motives and perpetrators of the
attack, although a number of reports have communicated the
concerns of ordinary Egyptians, particularly those connected
to the tourist industry, that foreigners will now view Egypt
as a "dangerous country." The Embassy's Public Affairs
section has received numerous inquiries, particularly from
wire services such as AP and Reuters.


11. (U) We sent proposed points for the media to PA, NEA, et.
al. via unclassified email.

--------------
Next EAC Meeting
--------------


12. (C) The Charge thanked EAC members, particularly from
the CONS, RSO, and LEGATT sections, for working overnight on
this incident. He called for a follow up EAC meeting to be
held on April 10 at 0930 local; This meeting will focus in
particular on the mood of the private and official American
communities.


Visit Embassy Cairo's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/cairo

You can also access this site through the
State Department's Classified SIPRNET website.

GRAY