EGYPT AND THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 002693 SIPDIS NOFORN FOR NEA FRONT OFFICE ALSO FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/RA, S/CT, CA, DS, AND INL E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2030 TAGS: PTER PREL ASEC KFRD EG SUBJECT: EGYPT AND THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM REF: A. STATE 60749 ¶B. CAIRO 2596 ¶C. CAIRO 2357 Classified by Charge Gordon Gray for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Introduction -------------- ¶1. (S/NF) Egypt brings to the fight against terrorism both its own grim experience and a track record of results. In the 1990s, Egypt successfully subdued domestic terror groups that conducted operations ranging from firebombing video stores to attempted assassinations of senior GOE officials, to the massacre of foreign tourists. The long period of calm that had prevailed since 1997 was interrupted on October 7, 2004, when attacks targeting Israeli tourists in the Sinai left 34 dead. These attacks were a clear reminder that the threat of terror remains, as does the need for constant vigilance. U.S.-Egyptian cooperation on terrorism is excellent and constitutes one of the pillars of our strategic relationship. While we are encouraged by our cooperation with the GOE, there is no question that Egypt faces serious challenges, particularly in the area of underlying conditions that can breed extremism. Reinvigorating the U.S.-Egypt Counterterrorism Joint Working Group and reopening negotiations with the GOE on a Letter of Agreement that would enhance the GOE's counterterrorism capabilities are two practical steps we could take in the near future. -------------- Defeating Terrorists -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) Both the Egyptian General Intelligence Service (EGIS) and the Ministry of Interior's State Security Investigations Service (SSIS) conduct extensive surveillance and disruption operations against extremist groups in Egypt. The GOE vigorously prosecutes cases of terrorism, recently convicting an Egyptian national and (in absentia) an Iranian Revolutionary Guard operative, of conspiracy to plan and execute acts of terrorism in Egypt and elsewhere in the region (ref B). While the methods of some Egyptian security services can be crude and overzealous, and often raise serious human rights concerns, it cannot be denied that the GOE has been generally successful in its war on terrorism, particularly in the past 15 years. ¶3. (S/NF) While SSIS and EGIS are the senior partners is the GOE's counterterrorism infrastructure, Egypt has established an interagency National Counterrorism Committee charged with coordinating GOE counterterrorism policy and operations. This committee, composed of elements from the Ministry of Justice, the Public Prosecution, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (as well as SSIS and EGIS),received in January visiting USDOJ officials and accompanying Embassy representatives. In the candid conversation that followed, the National Committee affirmed its interest in strengthening the application of the U.S.-Egypt Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, exploring the possibility of a modern extradition treaty, and expanding training and technical cooperation. The Regional Representative of the UN's Office on Drugs and Crime recently briefed us on his work to establish in Cairo a regional organized crime training center (which would include a major counterterrorism component),and told us that he found the GOE's National Counterterrorism Committee to be serious, pragmatic, and flexible in pursuit of its mission. In our interactions with the GOE, we have welcomed this interdisciplinary approach and will continue to encourage it. ¶4. (SBU) In addition to an ongoing and fruitful exchange of information and intelligence between the U.S. and Egypt on suspected terrorists and operations, the Department of State's Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program, implemented by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security has run a variety of successful training programs in Egypt and plans to do more. ¶5. (SBU) In the past year, ATA funded a multi-day crisis management seminar in which 20 senior GOE security officials participated. The seminar stressed principles of establishing policy and command structures for managing crises caused by terrorist provocation as well as crises caused by natural events that impact on national-level systems and/or have international ramifications. In early 2005, ATA funded a major maritime security training module in which a United States Coast Guard Mobile Training Team presented a two week course on various Maritime Security measures ranging from International law, ship boarding, smuggling trends, effective communications and use of force, defensive tactics, escorts and high risk searches. The 24 Egyptian participants came from a wide range of backgrounds, including narcotics, Port Security, State Security, Port Police, Environmental Police, Central Security and Special Operations. ¶6. (SBU) In the coming year the Embassy plans to implement two more ATA funded programs: The first course, a two week program focused on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD),will provide hands-on training, an academic refresher, and field exercises in simulated WMD emergencies. The course will provide participants with the capability to execute fundamental hazardous material and emergency management response and procedures. In addition to the training course, there will be an equipment grant issued upon the conclusion of training. Participants will include police, fire, emergency medical technicians. The second course planned for this year will concern Airport Security Management. The Transportation Security Administration will give the Egyptian Airport security training in technical areas of National and Civil Aviation Security, Security Control Systems, and recommended aviation security issues. The participants will include all elements of National and Civil Aviation Security as well as all liaison security to Aviation facilities. In sume, the ATA program has been a success in enhancing CT capabilities in Egypt. ¶7. (S/NF) Another important element in defending the homeland is the Embassy's own effort to ensure that terrorists do not exploit our travel document issuance processes. The Embassy has maintained a high alert in both the visa and American Citizens Services sections. In March 2005, we held a very successful seminar on detecting terrorists through visa interviews, described in ref C. In addition, the Consular Section has a fraud investigator who is funded by DS, and who focuses on Consular Fraud issues. This person, a seconded Egyptian police officer, is in a key position to ferret out fraud and to coordinate with the local authorities in investigating the syndicates and other organizations that proliferate the fraud. A position for another FSN fraud investigator has been funded by CA and filled in the last year. ¶8. (SBU) Unfortunately, the Embassy does not have a full-time fraud prevention management (FPM) officer to oversee the unit. The recent OIG team formally recommended that an FPM position be established. The addition of the designated fraud officer will, besides bringing much-needed emphasis on fraud management, allow post to reduce its backlog and allow additional training on identifying mala-fide travelers. We understand that Cairo is in line to receive such an officer in FY 2006. -------------- Denying Sanctuary -------------- ¶9. (S/NF) Unlike some states in the region, Egypt does not provide a safe-haven or hospitable base for regional or international terrorist or extremist groups. Egypt periodically hosts representatives from violent and extremist Palestinian factions, but with the aim of persuading and pressuring these groups to abandon terrorism and submit to the Palestinian Authority. ¶10. (S/NF) Egypt has set an example for the region in its efforts to combat money laundering. Egypt has a strong assets-freezing regime, passed robust anti-money laundering legislation in 2002, and formed a fully functioning financial intelligence unit (FIU) in 2003. However, Egypt is still in need of a neutral superintendent of banks. Recent progress in modernizing and liberalizing Egypt's financial sector could make the country a more attractive money-laundering hub in the absence of continued vigilance. Post believes a focus on cooperation with the FIU, and efforts to include terror financing considerations in GOE banking reform, would be a useful aspect of counterterrorism cooperation. -------------- Diminishing Underlying Conditions -------------- ¶11. (C) Combating the conditions in which extremism can rise and flourish poses the most difficult challenge in Egypt. Economic growth has not kept pace with population growth, leading to chronic and widespread unemployment among Egypt's youth. As amply documented by Egyptian and Arab social researchers, a decayed, overtaxed, and under-resourced educational system in Egypt has produced generations of youth lacking analytical and critical thinking skills. Images of violence from Palestine and Iraq, amplified by biased and irresponsible local media, have had a radicalizing effect and have reinforced a tendency in Egyptian society to glorify "martyrs" among Palestinian extremist groups and even among the perpetrators of the insurgency in Iraq. ¶12. (C) Though the GOE has at times shown an inexplicable ambivalence toward irresponsible and inflammatory media coverage of terrorist activity in Palestine and Iraq, it has, in other ways, taken on the challenge of battling extremist ideology at home. In 2003, the GOE began tentatively releasing imprisoned members of the Islamic Group, the organization responsible for most of the acts of terror committed in the early-mid 1990s. The releases came in the context of a reconciliation and recantation process in which the former Islamic Group leadership published new tracts, citing Islamic scripture and jurisprudence, to renounce violence and expose flaws in the religious logic they had previously used to justify terror. ¶13. (S/NF) Similarly, the GOE has long been engaged in programs to monitor mosque activity and ensure that Imams (prayer leaders) installed by the Ministry of Religious Endowments do not themselves hold extremist views and are qualified and capable of defusing extremist theology that might be in circulation in local communities. ¶14. (U) Our development programs play a critical role in addressing the broader underlying challenges in fighting terrorism. Aggressive and ambitious programs targeting the various weaknesses in Egypt's education sector, and programs aimed at shoring up democratic institutions and practices, should make a significant impact, over the long haul, on the underlying conditions which breed extremism. -------------- What More Can be Done -------------- ¶15. (SBU) The Embassy believes the February 2005 Riyadh declaration represents an important opportunity to shore up and expand international engagement on the GWOT. Coordination and cooperation by the states of the Middle East is particularly imperative and we stand ready to assist in this effort. Egypt is perfectly placed to play a leading role. Cairo has long been a hub of regional activity and the Arab League secretariat, and many other Arab regional organizations continue to make the city their home. The USG should seriously weigh the many advantages of Cairo when considering venues for future regional Counterterrorism activities. ¶16. (C) In July 2003, the U.S. and Egypt met in Washington to inaugurate a new Counter Terrorism Joint Working Group (JWG). Both sides found the exchanges useful and strongly endorsed the continued use of the JWG as a forum for dialogue and cooperation. Unfortunately, the follow-on JWG, which was to be held in Cairo in 2004, could not be scheduled. We believe it imperative that this mechanism be reactivated and that a second U.S.-Egypt Counterterrorism JWG be scheduled as quickly as possible. Besides enhancing our bilateral counterterrorism dialogue, the JWG also serves to reinforce the GOE's own inter-ministerial counterterrorism committee. ¶17. (C) Although plans to complete with Egypt a $625,000 Letter of Agreement were shelved in 2003 due to delays and reluctance on the Egyptian side, the Embassy believes it worthwhile to revive our efforts on this front. Funds for the proposed LOA, which would have funded a border security initiative aimed at modernizing and augmenting security procedures at Egyptian ports of entry, were eventually reprogrammed by INL. Tentative discussions with the Ministry of Interior suggest that the Egyptians may have some regrets that they did not take us up on our initial offer and would probably be more flexible in negotiating a new LOA. If funds could be identified for a new LOA, we believe it could be negotiated and that U.S. benefits from a strengthened GOE counterterrorism capacity would more than compensate for the effort and resources applied. Visit Embassy Cairo's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/cairo You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. GRAY