EGYPT AND THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 002693

SIPDIS

NOFORN

FOR NEA FRONT OFFICE
ALSO FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/RA, S/CT, CA, DS, AND INL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2030
TAGS: PTER PREL ASEC KFRD EG
SUBJECT: EGYPT AND THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

REF: A. STATE 60749

B. CAIRO 2596

C. CAIRO 2357

Classified by Charge Gordon Gray for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

--------------
Introduction
--------------


1. (S/NF) Egypt brings to the fight against terrorism both
its own grim experience and a track record of results. In
the 1990s, Egypt successfully subdued domestic terror groups
that conducted operations ranging from firebombing video
stores to attempted assassinations of senior GOE officials,
to the massacre of foreign tourists. The long period of calm
that had prevailed since 1997 was interrupted on October 7,
2004, when attacks targeting Israeli tourists in the Sinai
left 34 dead. These attacks were a clear reminder that the
threat of terror remains, as does the need for constant
vigilance. U.S.-Egyptian cooperation on terrorism is
excellent and constitutes one of the pillars of our strategic
relationship. While we are encouraged by our cooperation
with the GOE, there is no question that Egypt faces serious
challenges, particularly in the area of underlying conditions
that can breed extremism. Reinvigorating the U.S.-Egypt
Counterterrorism Joint Working Group and reopening
negotiations with the GOE on a Letter of Agreement that would
enhance the GOE's counterterrorism capabilities are two
practical steps we could take in the near future.

--------------
Defeating Terrorists
--------------


2. (S/NF) Both the Egyptian General Intelligence Service
(EGIS) and the Ministry of Interior's State Security
Investigations Service (SSIS) conduct extensive surveillance
and disruption operations against extremist groups in Egypt.
The GOE vigorously prosecutes cases of terrorism, recently
convicting an Egyptian national and (in absentia) an Iranian
Revolutionary Guard operative, of conspiracy to plan and
execute acts of terrorism in Egypt and elsewhere in the
region (ref B). While the methods of some Egyptian security
services can be crude and overzealous, and often raise
serious human rights concerns, it cannot be denied that the
GOE has been generally successful in its war on terrorism,
particularly in the past 15 years.


3. (S/NF) While SSIS and EGIS are the senior partners is the
GOE's counterterrorism infrastructure, Egypt has established
an interagency National Counterrorism Committee charged with
coordinating GOE counterterrorism policy and operations.
This committee, composed of elements from the Ministry of
Justice, the Public Prosecution, and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (as well as SSIS and EGIS),received in January
visiting USDOJ officials and accompanying Embassy
representatives. In the candid conversation that followed,
the National Committee affirmed its interest in strengthening
the application of the U.S.-Egypt Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty, exploring the possibility of a modern extradition
treaty, and expanding training and technical cooperation.
The Regional Representative of the UN's Office on Drugs and
Crime recently briefed us on his work to establish in Cairo a
regional organized crime training center (which would include
a major counterterrorism component),and told us that he
found the GOE's National Counterterrorism Committee to be
serious, pragmatic, and flexible in pursuit of its mission.
In our interactions with the GOE, we have welcomed this
interdisciplinary approach and will continue to encourage it.


4. (SBU) In addition to an ongoing and fruitful exchange of
information and intelligence between the U.S. and Egypt on
suspected terrorists and operations, the Department of
State's Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program, implemented
by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security has run a variety of
successful training programs in Egypt and plans to do more.


5. (SBU) In the past year, ATA funded a multi-day crisis
management seminar in which 20 senior GOE security officials
participated. The seminar stressed principles of
establishing policy and command structures for managing
crises caused by terrorist provocation as well as crises
caused by natural events that impact on national-level
systems and/or have international ramifications. In early
2005, ATA funded a major maritime security training module in
which a United States Coast Guard Mobile Training Team
presented a two week course on various Maritime Security
measures ranging from International law, ship boarding,
smuggling trends, effective communications and use of force,
defensive tactics, escorts and high risk searches. The 24
Egyptian participants came from a wide range of backgrounds,
including narcotics, Port Security, State Security, Port
Police, Environmental Police, Central Security and Special
Operations.


6. (SBU) In the coming year the Embassy plans to implement
two more ATA funded programs: The first course, a two week
program focused on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD),will
provide hands-on training, an academic refresher, and field
exercises in simulated WMD emergencies. The course will
provide participants with the capability to execute
fundamental hazardous material and emergency management
response and procedures. In addition to the training course,
there will be an equipment grant issued upon the conclusion
of training. Participants will include police, fire,
emergency medical technicians. The second course planned for
this year will concern Airport Security Management. The
Transportation Security Administration will give the Egyptian
Airport security training in technical areas of National and
Civil Aviation Security, Security Control Systems, and
recommended aviation security issues. The participants will
include all elements of National and Civil Aviation Security
as well as all liaison security to Aviation facilities. In
sume, the ATA program has been a success in enhancing CT
capabilities in Egypt.


7. (S/NF) Another important element in defending the homeland
is the Embassy's own effort to ensure that terrorists do not
exploit our travel document issuance processes. The Embassy
has maintained a high alert in both the visa and American
Citizens Services sections. In March 2005, we held a very
successful seminar on detecting terrorists through visa
interviews, described in ref C. In addition, the Consular
Section has a fraud investigator who is funded by DS, and who
focuses on Consular Fraud issues. This person, a seconded
Egyptian police officer, is in a key position to ferret out
fraud and to coordinate with the local authorities in
investigating the syndicates and other organizations that
proliferate the fraud. A position for another FSN fraud
investigator has been funded by CA and filled in the last
year.


8. (SBU) Unfortunately, the Embassy does not have a
full-time fraud prevention management (FPM) officer to
oversee the unit. The recent OIG team formally recommended
that an FPM position be established. The addition of the
designated fraud officer will, besides bringing much-needed
emphasis on fraud management, allow post to reduce its
backlog and allow additional training on identifying
mala-fide travelers. We understand that Cairo is in line to
receive such an officer in FY 2006.

--------------
Denying Sanctuary
--------------


9. (S/NF) Unlike some states in the region, Egypt does not
provide a safe-haven or hospitable base for regional or
international terrorist or extremist groups. Egypt
periodically hosts representatives from violent and extremist
Palestinian factions, but with the aim of persuading and
pressuring these groups to abandon terrorism and submit to
the Palestinian Authority.


10. (S/NF) Egypt has set an example for the region in its
efforts to combat money laundering. Egypt has a strong
assets-freezing regime, passed robust anti-money laundering
legislation in 2002, and formed a fully functioning financial
intelligence unit (FIU) in 2003. However, Egypt is still in
need of a neutral superintendent of banks. Recent progress
in modernizing and liberalizing Egypt's financial sector
could make the country a more attractive money-laundering hub
in the absence of continued vigilance. Post believes a focus
on cooperation with the FIU, and efforts to include terror
financing considerations in GOE banking reform, would be a
useful aspect of counterterrorism cooperation.

--------------
Diminishing Underlying Conditions
--------------


11. (C) Combating the conditions in which extremism can rise
and flourish poses the most difficult challenge in Egypt.
Economic growth has not kept pace with population growth,
leading to chronic and widespread unemployment among Egypt's
youth. As amply documented by Egyptian and Arab social
researchers, a decayed, overtaxed, and under-resourced
educational system in Egypt has produced generations of youth
lacking analytical and critical thinking skills. Images of
violence from Palestine and Iraq, amplified by biased and
irresponsible local media, have had a radicalizing effect and
have reinforced a tendency in Egyptian society to glorify
"martyrs" among Palestinian extremist groups and even among
the perpetrators of the insurgency in Iraq.

12. (C) Though the GOE has at times shown an inexplicable
ambivalence toward irresponsible and inflammatory media
coverage of terrorist activity in Palestine and Iraq, it has,
in other ways, taken on the challenge of battling extremist
ideology at home. In 2003, the GOE began tentatively
releasing imprisoned members of the Islamic Group, the
organization responsible for most of the acts of terror
committed in the early-mid 1990s. The releases came in the
context of a reconciliation and recantation process in which
the former Islamic Group leadership published new tracts,
citing Islamic scripture and jurisprudence, to renounce
violence and expose flaws in the religious logic they had
previously used to justify terror.


13. (S/NF) Similarly, the GOE has long been engaged in
programs to monitor mosque activity and ensure that Imams
(prayer leaders) installed by the Ministry of Religious
Endowments do not themselves hold extremist views and are
qualified and capable of defusing extremist theology that
might be in circulation in local communities.


14. (U) Our development programs play a critical role in
addressing the broader underlying challenges in fighting
terrorism. Aggressive and ambitious programs targeting the
various weaknesses in Egypt's education sector, and programs
aimed at shoring up democratic institutions and practices,
should make a significant impact, over the long haul, on the
underlying conditions which breed extremism.

--------------
What More Can be Done
--------------


15. (SBU) The Embassy believes the February 2005 Riyadh
declaration represents an important opportunity to shore up
and expand international engagement on the GWOT.
Coordination and cooperation by the states of the Middle East
is particularly imperative and we stand ready to assist in
this effort. Egypt is perfectly placed to play a leading
role. Cairo has long been a hub of regional activity and the
Arab League secretariat, and many other Arab regional
organizations continue to make the city their home. The USG
should seriously weigh the many advantages of Cairo when
considering venues for future regional Counterterrorism
activities.


16. (C) In July 2003, the U.S. and Egypt met in Washington to
inaugurate a new Counter Terrorism Joint Working Group (JWG).
Both sides found the exchanges useful and strongly endorsed
the continued use of the JWG as a forum for dialogue and
cooperation. Unfortunately, the follow-on JWG, which was to
be held in Cairo in 2004, could not be scheduled. We believe
it imperative that this mechanism be reactivated and that a
second U.S.-Egypt Counterterrorism JWG be scheduled as
quickly as possible. Besides enhancing our bilateral
counterterrorism dialogue, the JWG also serves to reinforce
the GOE's own inter-ministerial counterterrorism committee.


17. (C) Although plans to complete with Egypt a $625,000
Letter of Agreement were shelved in 2003 due to delays and
reluctance on the Egyptian side, the Embassy believes it
worthwhile to revive our efforts on this front. Funds for
the proposed LOA, which would have funded a border security
initiative aimed at modernizing and augmenting security
procedures at Egyptian ports of entry, were eventually
reprogrammed by INL. Tentative discussions with the Ministry
of Interior suggest that the Egyptians may have some regrets
that they did not take us up on our initial offer and would
probably be more flexible in negotiating a new LOA. If funds
could be identified for a new LOA, we believe it could be
negotiated and that U.S. benefits from a strengthened GOE
counterterrorism capacity would more than compensate for the
effort and resources applied.


Visit Embassy Cairo's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/cairo

You can also access this site through the
State Department's Classified SIPRNET website.

GRAY