Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05CAIRO2524
2005-03-31 11:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Cairo
Cable title:  

THE SOUND AND THE FURY OF EGYPT'S REACTION TO USG

Tags:  PGOV PREL EAID KMPI KDEM EG 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 002524 

SIPDIS

NSC STAFF FOR ABRAMS/POUNDS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID KMPI KDEM EG
SUBJECT: THE SOUND AND THE FURY OF EGYPT'S REACTION TO USG
DIRECT FUNDING OF DEMOCRACY GRANTS

REF: A. CAIRO 2198


B. CAIRO 1703

Classified by Charge Gordon Gray for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 002524 SIPDIS NSC STAFF FOR ABRAMS/POUNDS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID KMPI KDEM EG SUBJECT: THE SOUND AND THE FURY OF EGYPT'S REACTION TO USG DIRECT FUNDING OF DEMOCRACY GRANTS REF: A. CAIRO 2198 ¶B. CAIRO 1703 Classified by Charge Gordon Gray for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Egyptian anger at our March 3 announcement of direct USG funding for democracy promotion has now reached the Parliament. After several weeks of increasingly strident editorial coverage in newspapers controlled by or sympathetic to the GOE, the People's Assembly has debated the implications of the announcement. The People's Assembly's threats include a proposed effort to eliminate the "civil company" loophole that has allowed civil society organizations, like the Ibn Khaldun Center, which are unable or unwilling to register with the GOE as recognized NGOs, to establish themselves legally under an alternate framework. At this point, we think that the GOE's fulminations do not threaten the ability of civil society here to play a role in democratic reform. In our view, the GOE's actions are a response, for domestic consumption, to the public nature of our support for political reform. We are, however, closely monitoring the developing reaction in the event that we need to make counter-moves of our own. End summary -------------- The Angry Whine of the Press -------------- ¶2. (C) Shortly after the March 3 announcement (ref B), editors close to the GOE, such as Samir Raghab of Al-Gomhouriya, launched a series of caustic press complaints about the grants announcement. These attacks were soon echoed by elements of the nationalist tabloid press, such as Al-Osboa and Sawt Al-Umma. The complaints lambasted "American interference in Egypt's internal politics" and denounced the Egyptian civil society organizations as "spies," "tools in foreign hands," and "Marines" for their willingness to take USG funds ("dirty, soft, and slippery American money") allegedly to undermine the Egyptian nation. In another disturbing development, Al Masry Al Youm, a leading independent newspaper, reported that on March 18, imams (prayer leaders) at two major Cairo mosques described Saad Eddin Ibrahim (SEI),chairman of the Ibn Khaldun Center, and Negad El Borai, director of the United Group, as "traitors" for agreeing to accept USG funding for their democracy promotion projects.
-------------- Civil Society Pushes Back, a Bit -------------- ¶3. (C) Although the press has provided relatively little space for the civil society groups which received the USG grants to defend themselves, the groups have nevertheless acquitted themselves well when the opportunity has presented itself. They have all emphasized that they are legally-established organizations, operating on a non-partisan basis within the limits of existing Egyptian law. Dr. Hoda Badran, of the Alliance for Arab Women, one of the grantees, also mused on the irony of the GOE, which receives billions of dollars in foreign funding, criticizing NGOs for receiving much smaller amounts. In response to the alleged defamation by prayer leaders on March 18, Negad El Borai, of the United Group, issued a press release alleging that the GOE was supporting this religious intimidation of civil society. Borai also said that the GOE would be responsible if any harm came to SEI or himself. In comments to us on March 28, Borai urged the USG not to be silent in the face of the media outcry. We assured Borai of USG support for civil society activists, but noted that we did not see utility at this time in trying to engage Egypt's yellow/nationalist press on this issue. ¶4. (C) Comment: Borai, in our view, has some reason to be concerned about the potential for thuggery directed or motivated by the GOE in this campaign against the NGOs. There have been sporadic instances of politically motivated attacks, including a November 2004 assault on journalist Abdul Halim Qandil and the disruption last month of a human rights NGO's seminar on the case against opposition leader Ayman Nour, which the GOE's critics have blamed on GOE-controlled thugs. More ominously, Borai's press release mentions the case of liberal intellectual Farag Foda, who was assassinated in 1992 by an Islamist attacker after being vilified by Islamist writers in the media. Notwithstanding these concerns, none of our civil society partners have expressed any hesitation to us about proceeding with their projects. Dr. Hoda Badran told ECPO Minister Counselor on March 28 that she had checked with both the Ministries of Interior and Social Affairs regarding USG support for her project and they appeared willing to let it proceed. End comment. -------------- Irritation from the Ministry of International Cooperation... -------------- ¶5. (C) Privately, the GOE also expressed its pique at our decision to announce the democracy grants. In a letter dated March 3 to USAID Director Ellis, Minister for International Cooperation Aboulnaga described the announcement of the grants as "a surprise." In a March 7 meeting with Director Ellis and ECPO Counselor, she complained that the USG had inadequately consulted with the GOE regarding the announcement of the grants. Director Ellis and ECPO Counselor advised Aboulnaga that the USG remains committed to transparent direct funding of civil society projects in Egypt that are working to expand freedom and democracy. -------------- but Progress on the Consultative Group -------------- ¶6. (C) Also in her March 3 letter and in the March 7 meeting, Aboulnaga demonstrated a newfound enthusiasm for the long-delayed establishment of a Consultative Group on democracy and governance assistance (ref A). The onus to propose GOE nominees for the Consultative Group had been with the GOE since December. The March 3 announcement of the democracy grants seemed to spur Aboulnaga to action; she provided the GOE nominees to the Consultative Group at the March 7 meeting. The group conducted its first organizational meeting on March 24 and plans to meet on a monthly basis. -------------- The People's Assembly Jumps into the Fray -------------- ¶7. (C) On March 27, the People's Assembly was the scene of a vigorous debate over the issue of foreign funding for civil society groups. The consensus of the debate was that the GOE needed to monitor closely and perhaps limit foreign funding to civil society groups. In response to pointed questioning by a number of parliamentarians, Minister of International Cooperation Aboulnaga, and Minister of Insurance and Social Affairs Guindy (whose ministry has oversight for NGO matters),emphasized that the GOE would in no way allow the grants announced on March 3 to serve as "a vehicle for foreign interference." Minister for Parliamentary Affairs Shazly also opined that the GOE needed to review the existing provision for the establishment of civil companies, which has offered some civil society groups, such as the Ibn Khaldun Center, with an alternative to registering under the GOE's restrictive NGO law. -------------- Comment: Where Is It All Leading? -------------- ¶8. (C) In the charged environment of evolving political reform in Egypt, it is unclear where this strident and heated debate will lead. As we move toward additional USAID and MEPI grants to support freedom and democracy in Egypt, and as we urge other donors to do the same, we hope that the controversy over direct funding of democracy grants to civil society will diminish. Similarly, we believe that once the civil society groups in question are able to implement their projects, the non-partisan and technical nature of their projects will become even more apparent. ¶9. (C) Most of the backlash is the result of the GOE's nationalist inclination to demonstrate its resistance to "foreign interference." As the GOE reconciles itself to the USG goal of providing direct funding to civil society projects which are focused on democracy promotion, we anticipate that this negative media campaign will ebb and flow, but we do not think that it will prevent Egyptian civil society from carrying out its vital work. Although the GOE has long known about our intentions to provide funds directly to civil society projects, and although this message has been reinforced by developments such as the Brownback amendment, our March 3 announcement represented a particularly bitter pill to the GOE old guard. ¶10. (C) The shrillness of the GOE reaction has been driven by two interrelated forces. First, the GOE perceives--and resents--that the USG is "undoing the deal" of the Camp David agreement, which the GOE believes entitles it to control over USG assistance funds. Second, the fact that the USG is providing democracy promotion funds to Egyptian non-governmental organizations gives the GOE old guard, as it grudgingly contemplates political reform, a reason to complain about foreign interference, and avoid grappling with the real issues of reform. ¶11. (C) As this point, we do not plan to respond publicly to the broadside of criticism, since a defensive response on our part might only encourage the GOE and its commentators to up their rhetoric. We will continue to monitor the reaction closely in the event that GOE actions go beyond the current rhetoric and threaten the ability of civil society here to play the role that we believe it should. At this point we do not anticipate that the GOE will escalate the situation (e.g., by directly interfering with or preventing our grantees from conducting their work),although we cannot rule out the possibility. End comment. Visit Embassy Cairo's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/cairo You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. GRAY

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