TRANSATLANTIC CONSULTATIONS ON AFRICA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BRUSSELS 004300 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2015 TAGS: PREL PREF PGOV PHUM EAID MOPS XA EUN USEU BRUSSELS SUBJECT: TRANSATLANTIC CONSULTATIONS ON AFRICA Classified By: PRMOFF MARC J. MEZNAR. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (SBU) Summary. The October 19 transatlantic consultations on Africa included a variety of big picture themes -- the EU strategy for Africa, peacekeeping, development, political Islam and extremism, China in Africa -- as well as discussion about key political issues in the Great Lakes, Uganda, Sudan, Horn of Africa, West Africa (including Mauritania) and Zimbabwe. End Summary. -------------- Participants -------------- ¶2. (U) EU participants included: James Bevan, UK Director for African Affairs (FCO),Anne Schmidt, FCO Pan African Policy Unit Advisor, and Ruth Bradley-Jones, Second Secretary, UK PermRep for the British Presidency; Aldo Ajello, EU Special Envoy for the Great Lakes and Pekka Haavisto, EU Special Envoy for Sudan; Koen Vervaeke, Head of the EU Council Secretariat Africa Task Force, and desk officers SIPDIS Jean-Christophe Belliard, Peter Clausen and Genoveva Hernandez; Roger Moore, Head of Unit for the Horn and East (DG DEV),Miriam Brewka and Andreas Fischer-Barnicol, both of the ACP Issues Unit (DG RELEX) for the European Commission (EC); and Georg Lennkh, Special Envoy for Africa for the incoming Austrian Presidency. USDEL consisted of AF Assistant Secretary Jendayi E. Frazer, John Nay (Director, AF/Regional and Security Affairs),Michael McKinley (Charge d,Affaires, USEU),Patricia Lerner (Development Counselor, USEU/USAID) and Marc Meznar (Political Officer, USEU/PRM). -------------- EU Strategy for Africa -------------- ¶3. (U) Bevan opened by presenting a preview of the EU Strategy for Africa, which will guide Europe's interaction with Africa over the next ten years. According to Bevan, one of the most prominent pillars of the strategy will be in the area of peace and security. Bevan noted that the European Commission (EC) has already presented a proposal for the other major pillars of the strategy: democracy and governance, economic growth (through trade agreements, infrastructure development and maintenance, etc.),and developing human capacity (health, education, etc.). The EU strategy will also work to incorporate all the bilateral assistance programs and policy initiatives undertaken by the Member States. Bevan said that the new strategy will help guide the disbursement of increased funding as Member States raise the percentage of their budgets dedicated to official development assistance (ODA) in the coming years. Moore noted that the EC supports moving away from implementing specific projects in favor of generalized budget support for countries that have a track record of accountability and good governance. He said that budget support would enhance "African ownership" of the development funds, as well as help the EU manage increased levels of ODA. According to Bevan, the EU strategy for Africa will also deal with migration, including ways to stem the emigration of qualified Africa professionals, which negatively impacts important sectors in Africa (such as health care). He said the EU was looking for ways to manage migration so that it was more beneficial to both countries of origin and countries of destination, noting that the largest number of asylum seekers in the EU is from Africa. A/S Frazer expressed concern over the expedited deportations of Africans from the EU. Meznar noted that many of those being interdicted and summarily removed were Africans from conflict zones that might be legitimate refugees. -------------- Great Lakes: DRC is key -------------- ¶4. (C) Ajello said that the peace process in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was currently stalled because of the upcoming elections. According to Ajello, ongoing challenges in the DRC include: -- Security sector reform: Soldiers were neither arriving at, nor departing from, the orientation centers; furthermore, the disarmament ("brassage") centers were empty. -- Lack of political will: The international community needed to put pressure on all parties to keep the peace process moving forward. -- Corruption in the army: Many "phantoms" were on state payrolls and distributions of food and salary were erratic. -- Lack of good governance: Although the current level of corruption is equivalent to the worst days of the Mobutu regime, China and Russia do not support a UN-sponsored good governance mechanism; the DRC,s neighbors also oppose the idea (as it might set a precedent to be used on them later). ¶5. (C) Ajello said it was critical for the international community to develop a package of "carrots and sticks" to persuade the FDLR to return to Rwanda. He distributed a proposal that outlined steps that could be taken by Rwanda, DRC, the international community, MONUC, the World Bank and the AU. He described the EC,s contribution of 3 million euros to reintegrate ex-combatants in Rwanda by providing employment in building infrastructure projects around Kigali. Ajello highlighted a part of the EU plan that would urge that the AU find third countries in Africa for resettling ex-combatants who did not want to return to Rwanda. A/S Frazer noted that with regard to the FDLR, the days of "carrots" might be over. It may be time to concentrate on "sticks". ¶6. (C) Participants discussed a possible MONUC role in persuading the FDLR to leave DRC, and how an AU force might contribute to this goal. Ajello praised the improvements in MONUC, crediting the Pakistanis and Indians with doing an excellent job. He said that the nine brigades of Congolese being trained by MONUC should comprise a frontline "force de frappe" since they would not be limited by the terms of the UN peacekeepers' mandate. Ajello noted that while the DRC had good soldiers, it lacked officers. ¶7. (C) A/S Frazer said her view of MONUC was not as favorable as Ajello's; MONUC had failed -- even with the LRA -- because it had neither political will nor capacity. She also said that it did not seem feasible to bring the Congolese troops up to speed quickly enough to be the key element in dislodging the FDLR from the DRC, so a combination of MONUC and AU forces seemed to be the best way forward, and for which the USG might be willing to financially support a command and control operation. Ajello said the EC would be willing to contribute 15 million euros to support an AU peace mission in the DRC (possibly with Angolan, Ethiopian, and South African troops) to supplement Congolese and MONUC forces. ¶8. (SBU) Bevan stressed that successful elections in the DRC are critical for all of Africa and asked what the U.S. was doing to support them. A/S Frazer noted that the U.S. pays 27 percent of MONUC's operating costs and has already spent over $300 million to support MONUC. (Note. The EU's total assessment for PKOs such as MONUC is 40 percent. End note.) USAID also has provided critical assistance in helping the Congolese Independent Elections Commission organize itself. ¶9. (C) Bevan raised concern at the EU's perceived exclusion from the latest round of Tripartite Commission talks. He stressed the EU's desire to remain engaged in the process, noting the EU's substantial political clout and financial assistance. A/S Frazer reviewed the purpose for creating the Tripartite Commission was to get the three sides (Uganda, Rwanda, DRC) talking directly with the assistance of a neutral broker and that the ultimate objective was a direct dialogue without mediators. She said it was not the USG's aim to create another talk shop, but also noted that she was not aware of any U.S. effort to exclude the EU from the talks. -------------- Northern Uganda: Dealing with the LRA -------------- ¶10. (C) Bevan characterized Northern Uganda as a grave humanitarian problem with broader strategic implications. He stated, "The ICC indictments have changed the equation completely" and that they "need to be seen to deliver justice." Bevan added that the dialogue with the LRA is dead. He favored pressing Uganda to welcome the LRA's foot soldiers home and to refrain from using force to deal with the LRA. A/S Frazer agreed that the ICC indictments are working in this case. She said that Presidents Museveni and Kabila should discuss the issue of hot pursuit and that forces should be able to cross the border with permission. Bevan was concerned that allowing Ugandan forces to enter DRC might add to instability there or lead to an unwelcome quest for mineral resources. -------------- Sudan: Government of National Unity? -------------- ¶11. (C) A/S Frazer outlined several strategic issues for bringing stability to Sudan: the nature and intentions of the Government of National Unity (GNU),the situation in the region (e.g. Darfur, Beja),the quality of southern leadership under Salva Kiir and the role of neighboring countries. Regarding the GNU, Bevan said that he personally felt that partition should not be considered inevitable and that a single Sudan could still exist in ten years. Bevan said he believes that a true government of national unity does not currently exist and that the death of John Garang has probably been more of a setback than initially perceived. Participants agreed that the SPLM, the regime in Khartoum, and the rebels in the regions all influence each other and that the key to stabilizing the country lies in moving the various entities toward a common agenda. Vervaeke expressed concern that two separate initiatives were currently being considered to stabilize Sudan, one by Chad and one by the U.S.; he urged that any U.S.-led initiative should not exclude the EU since it has been long been involved in the peace process and since it is a major donor. A/S Frazer agreed that a unified initiative is needed and suggested that the critical players were the AU and France (as France could influence Chad, and Chad the rebels). A/S Frazer also said that the international community could consider encouraging the creation of a shadow government and had no problem to be seen backing and strengthening the SPLM. She added that a stronger SPLM could put pressure on the regime to transform itself. -------------- Darfur: Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Challenges -------------- ¶12. (C) Regarding AMIS, Bevan said that the EU favored consolidating the peacekeeping force at about 5000 before any further expansion. He added that the EU had agreed October 18 to provide an additional 70 million euros to support AMIS. Moore noted that increasing the force beyond 5000 could decrease its competence and that the EC was interested in seeing AMIS operating "properly and efficiently." Bevan also highlighted the problem of finding troops to cover a significant expansion of the force; Vervaeke said South Africa was not delivering on its current troop commitment. Haavisto stressed the need to review the AMIS mandate to include protecting observers and humanitarian workers. Bevan noted deficiencies in the current command/control logistics and said that blue hats would probably be necessary "in due course". Various participants noted that re-hatting would double the costs of the peace mission and that a proper transition from AU to UN would require six months preparation, even if the same forces stayed on. A/S Frazer expressed satisfaction with AMIS, acknowledging the funding shortages. She said that the U.S. was still committed to getting the AMIS force up to the 7000 ceiling level because "presence matters." Both sides agreed that any transition to a UN force should underscore the AU,s success in keeping the peace in Darfur. ¶13. (C) Lerner urged donors to follow through with pledging commitments, particularly since humanitarian agencies are already predicting a failed harvest. She also asked for EC help in getting an update on disbursements of Oslo pledges. Moore stated that the EC was ahead of schedule in disbursing its Oslo commitments, but he expects problems in meeting humanitarian needs in 2006 once the EC stops using its development funds for humanitarian work. To illustrate, he said that in recent years over 180 million euros given for humanitarian work in Darfur had come from the European Development Fund. -------------- Ethiopia: Elections and Boundaries -------------- ¶14. (C) Bevan said that the U.S. and EU worked well in handling a volatile situation in Ethiopia following the elections. He said the EU's congratulatory message to Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was sober in tone and urged him to respect the democratic process and called on Meles to allow the opposition to take their seats in Parliament and participate in the machinery of government, as well as to establish an independent inquiry into the electoral violence. A/S Frazer agreed with the message, but noted that the opposition also had a responsibility to realize they were in the minority. ¶15. (C) Bevan also explained that the EU Council rejected Gomes, call to end development aid to Ethiopia due to the election problems because the country was impoverished, as well as for strategic reasons. He stressed that all EU aid is conditioned on good governance; although Ethiopia did not have to achieve European standards, it was required to comply with basic democratic principles. A/S Frazer said that the U.S. would give careful consideration to the EU's assessment as to whether Ethiopia had met the governance criteria of the international community. Belliard added that in the EU's view, Meles had been weakened, not strengthened, by the election, so it would be more difficult than ever for him to resolve differences with Eritrea. A/S Frazer said that while the U.S. stood by the need to implement the decision, there had been a subtle change regarding implementation, with the U.S. stressing the need for Addis Ababa and Asmara to communicate well to guarantee the process. She said the U.S. was considering sponsoring a dialogue between the two parties. -------------- Somalia: Renewed U.S. Interest -------------- ¶16. (C) A/S Frazer said that at her initiative the U.S. is taking a "whole new look" at Somalia as it might be the time for more active engagement. Bevan welcomed renewed U.S. involvement in the Somali peace process. Both Belliard and Moore underscored the increasingly prominent role of the Islamists in Somalia. They did not discount the possibility that Islamists could provide a more positive and unifying role in the country (without being hijacked by Al Qaeda or jihadist elements). -------------- West Africa: Democracy and Coups -------------- ¶17. (C) A/S Frazer praised the way elections in Liberia had been conducted, highlighting the "tremendous leadership" of SRSG Alan Doss and the work of the UN. She said that it was inspiring to see the participation of the Liberian people in the process and that UNMIL had responded appropriately to any signs of unrest. However, A/S Frazer said that the international community needed to stay engaged through the second phase of the election, as well as the reform of the security sector and economic recovery of the country. A/S Frazer noted that the UK had played the same role in Sierra Leone and France in Cote d'Ivoire. Regarding Cote d'Ivoire, Bevan said that the upcoming elections would not solve all the country's problems. He noted that the "Gbagbo regime was over" but that no new leaders had been identified. A/S Frazer expressed concern over developments in Guinea, saying that unless steps were taken, the military might step in as they had done in Togo. She noted that the U.S. was reaching out to political parties in GUINEA and that DOD had established outreach with the Guinean military. She also said that the AU and ECOWAS were reviewing Guinea,s constitution. Vervaeke said that the EU shared these concerns and that it had identified GUINEA (along with Guinea-Bissau) for an "early warning and action" exercise. ¶18. (C) A/S Frazer identified responses to the coup in Mauritania as an area of possible policy divergence between the EU and U.S. and said that a common approach was needed. Bevan noted that although there were no "good coups" some were less bad than others and that the coup in Mauritania had popular support. A/S Frazer replied that although the populace had welcomed virtually every coup in Africa, because the deposed regimes were corrupt or dictatorial, the U.S. found offensive the Mauritania's current structure placing a "military council" above the cabinet. She said that the military leaders needed to show genuine signs of transitioning to democracy within a year, and dispelled any notion that the U.S. would ignore the lack of democracy in Mauritania due to any Mauritanian self-perception that it was crucial to the fight against international terrorism. A/S Frazer criticized the AU for lacking a coherent policy with regard to Mauritania. -------------- Zimbabwe -------------- ¶19. (C) Bevan stated that the situation in Zimbabwe was going from bad to worse but that Mugabe's regime was not on the verge of collapse. He said that the EU continued maintaining its sanctions, condemning abuses, and urging SADC engagement, and noted a shift in U.S. policy to reengage with SADC after suspending the dialogue over Zimbabwe. Bevan said he believed it was premature for the EU to appoint a special envoy to dialogue with Mugabe; he also noted that the track records of special envoys to Africa were not particularly good. A/S Frazer said that South Africa was baffled by Mugabe's behavior, and that the international community needed to push for involvement of the UNSC, and particularly to work with China on its reservations, even if African countries were not on board. Bevan indicated that EU sanction renewal would be considered February 22. (Note: We do not believe all EU Member States are necessarily on board with maintaining sanctions. End note.) -------------- China's Growing Presence in Africa -------------- ¶20. (C) The EU suggested that the results of China's activism throughout the continent are largely negative for Africa. The Chinese undermine good governance and transparency, fuel conflicts through weapons sales, strip away natural resources with little regard for the environment, and block consensus in the UNSC for dealing with problematic regimes. Development projects are aimed at gaining popular support rather than strengthening the economy. Both sides agreed that moving China's engagement with Africa towards a pattern similar to Africa's current relationship with the West and certain Asian countries (e.g., Japan, India) was better than trying to block China,s relations with Africa, which could not succeed in any case. A/S Frazer said she hoped to meet soon with Chinese authorities to discuss some of these issues and to seek areas of mutual interest and cooperation. McKinley suggested the EU might also like to put relations with Africa on the agenda of the next EU-China summit. -------------- Political Islam,s Impact ¶21. (C) Bevan said that the EU was grappling with political Islam in general, particularly since it posed a threat to European values such as the rights of women and free speech. He noted that EU Member States have increasingly large Muslim communities and that governments need to be careful to not define Islam as the problem. Rather, the problem is the perversion of Islam's values. Bevan argued that most Africans did not support shifting from secular to Islamist political systems, but that traditionally moderate and integrated societies, like Nigeria, were being threatened by funding from Saudi-based Wahabi fundamentalist and militant Pakistani preachers. He also noted the worrying growth of "jihadism", particularly in the Horn of Africa. McKinley added that the work of Islamic development agencies on the ground in many African countries provided order and a supra-structure that was proving popular; he noted that many Africans were embracing a more fundamentalist version of Islam. Lerner linked the discussion back to the EU Strategy for Africa, noting the emphasis on infrastructure and growth in that context. She stressed the importance of investments in secular education, as well as stimulating the private sector to create jobs for young people. A/S Frazer reviewed the objectives of the East African Counter-Terrorism Initiative, as well as a similar program planned to address the use of ungoverned spaces in the Sahel. Vervaeke briefly mentioned three Council initiatives to support counter-terrorism efforts in Algeria, Kenya, and Morocco, including the strengthening of border controls. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶22. (C) The troika meeting underscored the overall alignment of U.S. and EU objectives in Africa, and EU interlocutors appreciated the open and candid talks with the new Assistant Secretary and welcomed possible enhanced U.S. engagement in SIPDIS certain areas like Somalia. Some important differences were clear, however, including: -- EU concern at being included in various policy dialogues spearheaded by the U.S. (e.g., Tripartite Commission in the Great Lakes, and possible new dialogues between Eritrea/Ethiopia and among key Sudan players); -- U.S. aim of expanding AMIS vs. EU goal of consolidating the existing force; -- softer EU response to Mauritania coup; -- EU willingness to continue a "carrot and stick" approach to the FDLR, rather than discontinuing the carrot as no longer appropriate; -- somewhat differing assessments of MONUC; -- continued EU lobbying for U.S. funding for the DRC elections; and, -- EU favoring budget support to stimulate development. ¶23. (C) Although the UK made Africa a hallmark of its twin G8 and EU Presidencies in 2005, generating much attention and discussion, we do not expect this to carry over to the Austrian Presidency next year. In fact, the participation of the Austrian official was the weakest yet for an incoming Presidency, and no mention was made of a focus or date for the next Africa troika meeting. (A/S Frazer has cleared this message.) McKinley .