THE STRUCTURE AND PROGRESS OF THE EU'S CIV-MIL CELL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 002923

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPT FOR EUR/ERA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2015
TAGS: PREL MOPS EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: THE STRUCTURE AND PROGRESS OF THE EU'S CIV-MIL CELL

Classified By: USEU Poloff Lee Litzenberger for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (C/NF) Summary: The EU has created a civilian-military
cell designed to enhance its strategic and operational
planning capabilities without detracting from NATO,s role as
"the natural choice" for a military operation involving the
European and American allies." Declared operational on 1
June 2005, it consists of two components: a branch of
civilian and military planners who do strategic advance
planning for civilian, military, and civilian-military ESDP
operations, and a permanent military staff able to rapidly
set up and run an operations center in the event of an EU
Council-authorized autonomous EU operation. It is currently
working with DG E IX, the civilian crisis management unit in
the Council Secretariat, to ensure compatible development of
military and civilian capabilities (as laid out in the
military Headline Goal 2010 and civilian Headline Goal 2008).
It has also been designated as the primary planning body
responsible for the upcoming EU-led civilian monitoring
mission to Aceh. The cell,s director acknowledges
shortcomings in coordination and capabilities, but this may
be due to the limited amount of time the cell has been
functioning rather than a lack of political will to see the
cell become an effective crisis management tool for the EU.
End summary.

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Background
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2. (C/NF) The EU,s civilian-military cell was created as a
compromise negotiated by the UK, France, and Germany and was
endorsed by the European Council in December 2003. France
and Germany, along with Belgium and Luxembourg, had
previously called for an independent EU operational
headquarters in April 2003, but the UK opposed the measure in
keeping with its preference to advance the European Security
and Defense Policy (ESDP) in ways that would not detract from
NATO. The cell was established within the EU Military Staff
(EUMS) of the Council Secretariat but is expected to work
across the EU with civilian units like DG E IX in order to
anticipate crises and "develop expertise in managing the
civilian/military interface" of crisis response issues. The
cell has a planning branch that assists the EUMS and DG E IX
with strategic advance planning for civilian, military, and
joint ESDP operations. It also houses a permanent ops center
staff responsible for generating the capacity to rapidly set
up and run an ops center in the event of an autonomous EU
operation, which occurs if: 1) NATO as a whole chooses not to
engage; 2) the EU opts not to make use of NATO assets and
capabilities through Berlin Plus arrangements; and 3) no
national HQ is identified for the operation. The civ-mil
cell was declared operational on 1 June 2005.

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Mission and Structure
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3. (C/NF) The mission and structure of the civ-mil cell are
essentially twofold. On the strategic level, the 17 civilian
and military planners of the strategic planning branch assist
the EUMS and DG E with advance planning and coordination for
ESDP operations, whether they are civilian, military, or
integrated. It does so at the initiative of Secretary
General/High Representative Javier Solana or the Political
and Security Committee (PSC). On the operational level, the
cell includes a permanent staff of eight military officers
(double-hatted from the EUMS) who can, in the event of an
autonomous EU operation, reinforce a national HQ or generate
the capacity to set up and run an independent operations
center. They also serve as a "housekeeping" team to maintain
the premises when the ops center is not in use. Including
the director of the cell (currently Brigadier General
Horst-Heinrich Brauss) and three deputies, the cell totals 29
positions, which are staffed on a three-year rotational basis.


4. (C/NF) If the Council decides to activate the ops center,
the permanent staff increases by up to 50 civilian and
military planners who are deployed under the operations
commander (for the military component) or DG E (for the
civilian component). The ops center becomes fully
operational when additional augmentees from EUMS, DG E, and
member states are added to the staff, the maximum of which is
supposed to be 89 according to trilateral working documents.
On July 25, however, General Brauss told USG officials that
it could exceed 100 personnel, possibly in reference to the
rest of the civ-mil cell staff who could join the ops center
roster.

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The Present and Future
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5. (C/NF) At the same 25 July meeting, officers from the
civ-mil cell told senior planners from S/CRS that they are
currently working with DG E IX to ensure compatibility
between the objectives, documents, training, and other
elements of the military Headline Goal 2010 and the civilian
Headline Goal 2008. (Note: Headline Goal 2010 strives to
develop military capabilities that match the ambitions of the
European Security Strategy through the establishment of the
European Defense Agency, battlegroups, and other milestones.
Headline Goal 2008 calls for "integrated civilian crisis
management packages" consisting of experts in police, rule of
law, civil administration, civil protection, monitoring, and
other support tasks that can deploy by themselves or in close
coordination with military efforts. Its aims include drawing
up a Capabilities Requirements List and illustrative training
scenarios, for which the cell,s officers say they have been
providing input. End note.) They said that cooperation with
DG E IX has been facilitated by the fact that both units work
in the same building, although there is still lingering
concerns that the cell will focus disproportionately on
military planning due to its location within the EUMS.


6. (C/NF) General Brauss made it clear that the cell still
lacks coordination and planning capabilities. He noted that
it has been difficult bridging the gap between the Council
and the Commission, which controls the budget for civilian
ESDP operations. He was insistent on the need for the EU to
have planning capabilities for integrated operations and
specifically identified a need for more pol-mil officers to
help broaden the strategic military perspective. Brauss also
defended the existence of an independent ops center, pointing
out that NATO planning via Berlin Plus had proven cumbersome
when implemented for the EUFOR takeover in Bosnia. He opined
that SHAPE,s military planning structures are not
necessarily suited for the flexible planning required for
short-fuse integrated missions. Brauss expressed hope,
however, that the projected reciprocal liaison cells within
SHAPE and the EUMS would ensure broader EU-NATO coordination
on crisis management. (Note: Planning for the liaison cells
is in the final stages. On 29 July, NATO SYG Jaap de Hoop
Scheffer sent SG/HR Solana a letter indicating NATO,s
readiness to agree to the EU team's proposals (sent to NATO
in December) and to "(implement) the agreements in parallel
once the details of the staffing arrangements have been
settled in both organizations." End note.)

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The Aceh Mission
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7. (C/NF) The civ-mil cell has been assigned primary planning
responsibility for the upcoming civilian monitoring mission
to Aceh, which came from a request "out of the blue" from
UNSR Ahtisaari (operations are usually initiated by member
states or the Council Secretariat). Brauss said that the cell
has already developed a crisis management concept to monitor
a ceasefire that is being negotiated between the Indonesian
government and GAM rebels. The elements of the ceasefire are
likely to include demobilization, decommissioning,
reintegration, human rights, legislative changes, and more.
The EU-led mission, expected to comprise 250-350 personnel
from the EU, Norway, Switzerland, and ASEAN countries, is
scheduled to begin 15 September. An initial monitoring
presence (IMP) will deploy 15 August to set up logistics,
accommodations, and security briefings.


8. (C/NF) Comment: In discussions with DG E IX--which has 30
planners to the cell,s 17--and the Committee for Civilian
Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM),the cell was portrayed
as more of a planning instrument than an actor in its own
right. As for the ops center, the actual facility consists of
one unfurnished room and some within the EU appear to believe
that they can prevent its activation by ensuring that a
national HQ is always made available for an ESDP military
operation. It seems unlikely, however that the EU would carve
out space and pledge several million euros to establish a
facility with communication and computer equipment and allow
it to remain unused. Even the UK, which initially sought to
emphasize the precedence of NATO and national HQs for
military operations, seems to have recognized the value of
creating a capable planning unit for civilian and integrated
missions within the EU. In fact, UK reps have said that
exercising the civ-mil cell will be one of its priorities
during its presidency, and the Aceh mission may be a timely
opportunity to do so. We anticipate that political and
institutional pressure to activate the ops center once
created will be irresistible. End comment.

MCKINLEY
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