CUBA: FURTHER CHANGES IN EU POLICY UNLIKELY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 002165 SIPDIS DEPT FOR WHA/CCA, EUR/ERA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2015 TAGS: PREL PHUM CU EUN USEU BRUSSELS SUBJECT: CUBA: FURTHER CHANGES IN EU POLICY UNLIKELY REF: A. A) STATE 102505 ¶B. B) BRUSSELS 2059 ¶C. C) THE HAGUE 1536 ¶D. D) PARIS 3722 Classified By: USEU POLOFF TODD HUIZINGA, FOR REASONS 1/4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: According to a key EU Council official (protect),the EU will almost certainly continue the suspension of the June 2003 restrictive measures against Cuba and seek "constructive" dialogue with the Cuban authorities. This is the principal message of the draft EU policy declaration on Cuba that the official showed us. The June 6 meeting of the EU Working Group on Latin America (COLAT) was dominated by the Spaniards, who effectively fended off Polish and Czech attempts to take a harder line. We expect the June 7 EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) to approve the draft policy declaration (perhaps with cosmetic changes),and EU FonMins are likely to give it final approval on June 13. END SUMMARY. -------------- DRAFT DECLARATION REAFFIRMS DIALOGUE -------------- ¶2. (C) On June 6, Poloff delivered REF A demarche to Nicolas Pascual de la Parte (protect),EU HighRep Javier Solana's Adviser on Latin America. Pascual showed Poloff the Luxembourg EU Presidency's draft EU policy declaration on Cuba. The document reaffirmed the EU Common Position on Cuba, in force since 1996, and its basic approach of "constructive engagement" with Cuba. It contained language condemning detention and harassment of dissidents, and expressing EU plans to continue increased contacts with the peaceful opposition. Its basic message, though, was that the EU would extend its suspension of the June 2003 restrictive measures against Cuba in the interest of promoting dialogue with the Cuban authorities. The draft calls for another review of the suspension by June 2006, but Pascual said that Germany might push for a review by December 2005. -------------- SPAIN DOMINATES ON CUBA -------------- ¶3. (C) Pascual said COLAT discussion of Cuba policy was dominated by Spain. He said returning to the status quo ante was impossible -- it was clear the Spaniards would not agree to re-impose the June 2003 measures. Pascual reported that the Spanish COLAT representative argued successfully that the measures had proven contradictory to the EU Common Position on Cuba, with its emphasis on "constructive engagement" with the Cuban authorities. A Polish-led push to re-institute the most controversial of the June 2003 measures, the policy of inviting dissidents to national day celebrations at EU Missions in Havana, found little support. Spain asserted that if dissidents were invited, Cuban government officials would refuse to attend, thus creating an obstacle to the dialogue foreseen by the Common Position. When the Czech COLAT representative proposed that the EU fund the peaceful opposition, Spain responded that there was no reason to set such a precedent when the EU does not fund the opposition in other problematic countries with which it seeks constructive dialogue, such as China or Iran. -------------- EU CONSTITUTION VOTES AFFECT DELIBERATIONS -------------- ¶4. (C) Pascual predicted that the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) would on June 7 approve the substance of the draft policy declaration. In the wake of the French and Dutch referenda on the EU constitutional treaty, he said, the EU's foremost concern was to show unity -- to demonstrate that the EU can reach consensus and make decisions. He said Germany might push to move the next review of the restrictive measures' suspension from June 2006, as foreseen in the draft declaration, to December 2005. He added that the Czechs and Poles might succeed in getting some tougher language on the Castro regime in the declaration. All in all, though, the message coming out of the June 13 EU Foreign Minister's meeting was likely to be a reaffirmation of constructive engagement in the interest of maintaining dialogue with the Cuban regime. ¶5. (C) COMMENT: The Czechs and Poles do not appear to have been able to drum up enough support within the EU for a harder line, while the Spaniards remain determined and capable in their defense of dialogue with the regime as the top priority. Germany appears to favor a somewhat tougher policy, but did not provide the active support that is key to the Czechs' and Poles' prospects for influencing other member states. If, as expected, the EU reiterates its pledge to increase contacts with the peaceful opposition, it would offer an opportunity for continued U.S.-EU consultation on how to put those words into action. END COMMENT. MCKINLEY .