DARFUR - RHETORIC AND REALITY OF A COMPLEX CONFLICT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BRUSSELS 001549

SIPDIS

FOR D AND AF FROM P/DAS RANNEBERGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM PREF EAID AU SU US USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: DARFUR - RHETORIC AND REALITY OF A COMPLEX CONFLICT


Classified By: AF PDAS Michael Ranneberger. Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. The prevailing rhetoric on Darfur conveys
the gravity of the humanitarian crisis, but does not capture
the complexity of the changing situation on the ground.
Though the violence emerged as a result of the political
conflict between the GOS and the Darfur rebels, it had a
ready base in traditional conflicts between Arab nomads and
sedentary African tribes. Local factors are important, and
the lines are not always clearly drawn between African and
Arab tribes. The African Union is taking an impressive
pro-active approach; its presence is directly responsible for
the diminishing of large-scale organized violence since
January. Expansion of the AU to more areas quickly is vital
to maintain momentum. The AU can do more within its existing
mandate, but more forces and heavier armament are needed.
The AU still faces significant logistical constraints. Steps
to address these underway now should pave the way for
expansion to begin in June. The AU wants help in this
process from the U.S., EU, NATO, and UN. The GOS is
continuing to provide support to the jinjaweed, though not
through direct involvement in attacks. Violence is
continuing. The jinjaweed have attacked some villages and
may be massing for action against a rebel stronghold located
near an AU operating base. Rebel commanders claimed they are
complying with all agreements, but virtually admitted
attacking humanitarian workers and convoys because, they
argued, the GOS is blocking humanitarian assistance to their
areas. They said they are in daily contact with their
leaders outside of Darfur and would support whatever decision
is made to return to the political talks. Tribal
reconciliation will not drive the political process. Working
on this now, however, will pave the way for eventual
implementation of a political settlement. Tribal leaders
believe that traditional relationships can be reconstituted
once there is peace and they return to their native villages.
They will then work out compensation and land usage issues.
I followed up on Darfur issues in Addis Ababa with AU
Chairperson Konare and his team, and in Brussels with the EU
(septels). End summary.


2. (SBU) During April 15-17, following the Deputy
Secretary,s visit to Sudan, I visited by helicopter six

SIPDIS
operating bases of the African Union in northern, southern,
and western Darfur; talked with rebel field commanders; met
with non-governmental groups; held discussions with local
tribal leaders; and talked with the Sudanese government,s
military commander for Darfur. Taiya Smith of the Sudan
Programs Group and U.S. Army Liaison Ron Capps organized the
visit and provided invaluable support. The U.S. military
observers have forged close working relationships with the AU
that help energize AU efforts. Stationing additional U.S.
military observers and advisors now and as the AU expands is
key to drive the process.

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The African Union,s Pro-active Approach
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3. (C) At the six AU bases (at Muhajiriyah, Nyala, El Fasher,
Kutum, Zalingei, Nertiti) we found an activist approach. The
AU commanders are generally impressive, with competent teams.
They are well-briefed on the situation in their areas of
responsibility, demonstrating an appreciation of local tribal
realities. They have detailed information on the positions
of the rebels, government forces, and Arab militias. The
commanders showed a good understanding of the AU mandate. In
addition to monitoring of the rebel-GOS ceasefire and
carrying out timely investigations of incidents, they are
engaged in outreach to local communities and their
traditional leaders. They meet with local GOS and rebel
commanders, and say they are generally cooperating with the
AU. AU commanders also have contacts with the Arab militias
where possible. The AU commanders and forces appear
disciplined, and their camps have been well-constructed by
the U.S. contractor PAE, often under enormous time pressure.
(The fact that many of these AU troops are well-experienced
in peacekeeping missions is reflected in their quality of
life demands, like excessive requirements for bottled water!)
All the AU commanders and staff with whom I met expressed
enormous appreciation for U.S. assistance.


4. (C) The AU commanders understand the central importance of
their role in helping stop violence. They are deploying
their military observers and protection forces in patrols to
towns and villages within their areas of responsibility;
patrolling roads; and visiting camps of internally displaced
persons. The presence of the AU in the areas we visited has
constrained violence. The AU commanders generally want to do
more, and are frustrated by logistical impediments. (In one
case the AU learned of jinjaweed abduction of 8 women from an
IDP camp. They pursued the group and the women were released
when the jinjaweed fled.) The base at Muhajiriyah, for
example, has 130 troops and 13 military observers, but only 4
vehicles and one Thuraya phone. At many of the bases vehicle
and base station radio frequencies are incompatible. (VSAT
and internet communications were also initially disrupted due
to introduction of viruses caused by the downloading of
pornography at a number of the AU bases; the AU command
cracked down and this is no longer a major problem.)
Logistical difficulties limit the number of patrols that can
be sent out to cover hundreds of square miles. As a result,
one still sees some troops lying in their tents in the middle
of the day with nothing to do. Each of the 8 AU sectors in
Darfur has access to helicopters, and these are used for
reconnaissance and patrolling, in addition to providing
logistical support for AU bases.


5. (SBU) The AU is sensitive to the need to help facilitate
humanitarian access. They are developing close liaison with
UN agencies and non-governmental groups to share information
on the security situation and to offer assistance. In some
cases, the AU is escorting humanitarian convoys. However, in
most cases, the humanitarian organizations do not want to be
directly associated with the military. Consequently, the AU
either patrols the road before the convoy departs, or places
a patrol a short distance in front of the convoy.


6. (SBU) The AU is also occupying villages if information is
developed that an attack may be imminent. U.S.-provided
fly-away kits facilitate quick AU reaction. The AU cannot do
this in all cases due to the limited size of the mission and
logistical problems.


7. (C) Progress is being made in addressing logistical
issues, and command and control problems. Some of the
recommendations of the recent EU/US/UN/AU Joint Assessment
Mission have already been implemented. The AU has agreed on
the need to establish a planning cell in Khartoum responsible
to AU Special Representative Kingibe, and the AU has
identified a candidate to be a new deputy to Kingibe, who
will be responsible for ensuring coordination in Darfur.
These steps now and over coming weeks are essential to
facilitate expansion of the AU mission to 7,447. The AU
expects the expansion to be approved at the end of April and
hopes to have additional personnel on the ground beginning in
June.


8. (C) The recent addition of civ-pol elements to each of the
AU sites, as the mission continues to expand, holds promise.
The civ-pol are just starting to monitor the activities of
the GOS police, particularly with respect to investigations
of rapes and other abuses against civilians. However, we
found the civ-pol teams not properly trained for this work
and not sensitized to the local context in which the GOS
police are in fact part of the problem. The AU recognizes
the need for training and is working with the UN, the UK, and
Canada (all of whom have offered to train the civ-pol) to
increase civ-pol capacity.


9. (C) AU commanders were frank in discussing the limits of
what they can do. Several commanders pointed out that AU
units do not have the heavy weaponry that would be necessary
to react should an AU base be attacked or should the AU find
itself in immediate proximity to an attack on a village orconvoy. They believe
their existing mandate enables them to
be even more active. Commanders pointed out, for example,
that if they are stopped by a rebel roadblock or jinjaweed
group, all they can do is try to persuade the groups to let
them pass. Their preferred approach would not be to ask
permission. They believe that patrols with heavier weaponry
(with battalion-sized units at AU operating bases) would not
be challenged, would strengthen AU credibility as a
deterrent, and would bolster morale.

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Violence Reduced in Scope But Continuing
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10. (SBU) Those Arab militias referred to as the "jinjaweed"
have not stopped burning villages, but they do so more
sporadically, and not in areas where the AU is present.
Flying over Darfur, I saw many burned and abandoned villages,
but also many villages still occupied, some with cultivation
evident. The diminishment in large-scale, systematic
destruction has occurred not so much because all villages
have been destroyed, but because the AU acts as a deterrent
where it is present. That said, the jinjaweed militias
remain very active, particularly in southern Darfur, where
there are now few rebel strongholds remaining. AU commanders
and NGO representatives associated most of the violence with
either GOS-supported jinjaweed or the rebels, but also said
that there are growing indications of some banditry not
associated with either. The AU provided details of attacks
by the rebels and jinjaweed.


11. (C) The spotlight that the AU sheds on Darfur coupled
with international pressure has caused the GOS to cease use
of helicopter gunships and antonov bombers for offensive
purposes (there have not been any confirmed attacks involving
the use of GOS air assets since January 2005),but it appears
that the GOS has not cut ties to the jinjaweed and continues
to support these militias. AU commanders and
non-governmental observers were emphatic on this point.
There is a strong indication that the GOS is using the
jinjaweed as a proxy for its own involvement. The local
governors, even if they wanted to, have no ability to control
the jinjaweed. For example, Tijani, the head of jinjaweed
associated with the Misserya tribe, is a prominent
personality in Nyala, the capital of southern Darfur, boasts
of his activities, and frequently talks to the governor
(Wali) of South Darfur. Tijani is viewed locally as
significantly stronger than the Wali; both the Wali and the
GOS Western Area Commander claim that they cannot control
Tijani. The AU has reports of GOS continuing to provide
weapons and support for the militias.


12. (SBU) Rapes frequently occur against women, especially
when they leave IDP camps to collect firewood. The GOS
practice of forcing women to file a police report before
being able to receive medical attention continues. The GOS
does not investigate these reports, and in a number of cases
women have been arrested or have disappeared after filing
rape reports.

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Revealing Conversation With Western Area Military Commander
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13. (C) The Western Area Commander of Darfur sought to
portray violence as purely a tribal problem, and emphasized
the importance of GOS efforts allegedly to promote tribal
reconciliation (i.e. a GOS-orchestrated process run by the
Wali). He stressed the need for rebel forces to be cantoned,
and claimed that the GOS is determined to control all militia
groups. However, in one exchange he admitted that the
Misserya tribal group is beyond his control.


14. (C) I found two things the commander said particularly
interesting. He told me that Vice President Taha recently
met privately with him in Darfur and gave strict instructions
not to undertake military offensive actions and to control
the militias. In the next breadth, however, the commander
admitted that the GOS had recruited Arab tribes because black
tribes supported the rebels, but the commander then claimed
that these Arab tribal recruits are actually now a
disciplined part of the GOS military, wearing uniforms and
regularly coming in from the field to get supplies. (This
tracks with other reports that some of the jinjaweed militias
have been loosely incorporated into the Popular Defense
Forces.) The GOS appears to have adopted this dual approach
of absorbing some of the jinjaweed while claiming that other
jinjaweed who commit violence are simply beyond the GOS,
ability to control. (An NGO representative with whom I met
characterized the Arab militias as a combination of full-time
PDF, others more loosely associated as "auxiliaries" to be
called upon as needed, and really local militias/bandits not
strictly linked to the GOS.)

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Rebel Commanders
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15. (C) Muhajiriyah, east of Nyala, is one of three rebel
strongholds (along with the Jebel Mara mountains in central
Darfur, and Jebel Moon in northwest Darfur). I met with the
following Sudan Liberation Movement military commanders at
Muhahiriyah: Bakhet Abdel Karem Abdullah, Deputy Commander
for the Southern Region; Abdel Majed El Nour, Commander of
the Southern Region; Zakeria Arga, Secretary of Information;
and Fadel Hussain, Chief of Logistics. The commanders were
from three tribes (Fur, Zhagawa, and one other). (With their
sunglasses, turbans, and bandoleers, they were right out of
central casting.) The rebels appeared well-briefed on the
UNSC resolutions and Oslo donors conference. I laid out the
U.S. view of the situation in Darfur and emphasized that the
rebels are equally liable under the UNSC resolutions if they
violate the ceasefire and commit violence. They claimed they
respect all the agreements they have signed, yet then said
they have no choice but to rob humanitarian supplies since
the GOS is blocking humanitarian access to their areas. I
explained that we are pushing hard for unrestricted
humanitarian access, but that there can be no justification
for attacks on humanitarian workers or convoys.


16. (C) I emphasized the need for the rebels to return to the
AU-sponsored political talks with unity of leadership and a
realistic negotiating position, and described the meetings
Senior Representative Snyder held with rebel leaders in Oslo.
The rebels claimed that they are in daily contact with SLM
leaders Abdul Wahid and Mini Menawi, among others. They
argued that jinjaweed violence should be stopped as a
precondition for political talks, but said they would support
whatever approach is adopted by their leaders.


17. (C) The rebels and the AU said that jinjaweed have been
massing to the west of Mahajiriyah, and that there are
indications they plan an imminent assault on this rebel
stronghold. They alleged the GOS recently gave jinjaweed
leader Tijani 29 vehicles. The AU is closely monitoring the
situation. In Darfur and later in Addis I emphasized to the
AU the need to disseminate such information on a timely basis
so that the U.S. and other international partners can help
the AU by weighing in with both sides if major attacks appear
imminent.

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Tribal Reconciliation
--------------


18. (SBU) I explored prospects for tribal reconciliation in
all conversations. The AU is developing close contacts with
tribal chiefs, Imams, and other community leaders in their
areas. In some cases, they have been able use these contacts
to prevent greater violence resulting from genuine local
disputes -- usually involving theft of cattle. One AU
officer described how during an unannounced visit to a
village he found African and Arab tribal leaders engaged in a
discussion aimed at resolving a local problem.


19. (SBU) A lively meeting with about 100 tribal leaders
(Fur, Zhagawa, Messalit) at the IDP camp at Kutum in northern
Darfur was enlightening. Many of them have been at the camp
for 13 months. They said that their tribal authority remains
generally intact, but that traditional structures might break
down if they remain in the camp indefinitely. They stressed
their desire to return to their native villages, but only
once the violence ends and their security is assured. While
the tribal leaders did not seem particularly political, they
did maintain that the Darfur rebels "are protecting blacks."
They repeatedly characterized the violence in Darfur as Arab
efforts to remove them from the land and destroy their way of
life. One tribal leader made a distinction between black
Arabs and white Arabs, and suggested that in places where the
two groups appear to be cooperating, the GOS has paid off the
black Arabs.


20. (SBU) The tribal leaders said that they believe the
traditional contacts they had with Arab chiefs in their
native areas can be reconstituted once there is peace, but
they see no possibility of doing so until the violence hasbeen stopped. Once
there is peace, they said, traditional
tribal mechanisms should be used to work out issues related
to compensation and usage of the land and water. When
pressed, they said that they would be willing to meet with
Arab chiefs under AU auspices, but they strongly believe that
nothing can be accomplished until the Arab militias are
disarmed and there is peace.


21. (C) Representatives of UN humanitarian agencies and NGOs
with whom I met also said they believe peace is a
prerequisite for developing a meaningful tribal
reconciliation process. Neither they nor the AU feel that
authentic Arab and black tribal leaders can place serious
pressure on the GOS or rebels to stop violence. They
maintained that political talks are the only means of
achieving peace. Tribal reconciliation will then be key to
implementing the peace accord and returning Darfur to
normalcy. They agreed that, in this context, encouraging
tribal contacts now could be useful.


22. (C) The SLM military commanders with whom we met said
that GOS emphasis on the need for "tribal reconciliation" is
merely an attempt to go around the political process. They
also maintained that the Arab chiefs have been completely
compromised by the GOS. They claimed, for example, that
about a month ago the GOS Minister of Foreign Trade came to
Darfur and paid Arab chiefs to attack several villages in
southern Darfur.

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Grave Humanitarian Situation
--------------


23. (SBU) Representatives of UN agencies and NGOs expressed
grave concern regarding the humanitarian situation. One
official in southern Darfur said that the UN will soon have
to cut rations to one-half or even one-fourth of normal due
to insufficient humanitarian supplies being received. He
also described continuing obstacles to achieving full access
and discussed the looming danger of famine. The GOS
continues to use Arab militias as a means to impede
humanitarian deliveries to rebel-controlled areas. He
described how 150 trucks carrying supplies are currently
stopped south of Nyala by militias extorting money. He and
others with whom I spoke, however, warmly praised the AU for
its assistance in interceding in such situations, in sharing
information, and in providing escorts.

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Comment
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24. (C) We are on the right track in maintaining pressure on
the GOS and rebels, emphasizing the need for specific actions
to end violence, supporting political talks, encouraging
tribal reconciliation, pressing for unrestricted humanitarian
access, and expanding the AU presence in order to protect
civilians and end the violence. This approach is changing
the situation on the ground in a positive way, though our
visit highlighted the enormity of the problem and what
remains to be done. Continued vigorous U.S. leadership is
essential in terms of resources but also as a catalyst to
maintain and strengthen a concerted multilateral effort
involving the AU, EU, UN, and others.

SCHNABEL
.