U.S.-EU CONSULTATIONS ON OSCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 001226 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/RPM GRETA HOLTZ; EUR/ERA AMY CARNIE E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2015 TAGS: PREL PHUM OSCE EUN RU USEU BRUSSELS SUBJECT: U.S.-EU CONSULTATIONS ON OSCE REF: A. A) USEU TODAY 03/11/05 ¶B. B) STATE 43096 ¶C. C) USEU TODAY 03/16/05 Classified By: USEU POLOFF TODD HUIZINGA, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In meetings with USOSCE Ambassador Stephan ¶M. Minikes, EU officials said: --in light of growing Russian intransigence on democracy issues, the EU is preparing a strategy on how to respond to the Russian challenge in OSCE; --Russia is blocking democracy promotion in the Council of Europe (CoE),also, and the EU is preparing for the May CoE summit, which is set to address relations between the two organizations; --while the EU has several options on the table, the EU remains reticent about a full-fledged EU border monitoring operation because of likely Russian objections; --the EU is raising the Moldova/Ukraine border issue with Ukraine at all levels; -- the EU agreed with the need to speak out often in the OSCE on developments in Belarus * not with the expectation that it will influence the regime, but as a signal of support to democratic forces and lower-level officials. --the EU will discuss internally the advisability of reappointing in 2006 the three Personal Representatives of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office (CiO) on Tolerance; --getting the Kazakhs to live up to OSCE standards in exchange for the OSCE Chairmanship in 2009 is "back on the EU agenda." During EU deliberations on the future of the OSCE and relations between it and the CoE, we must ensure the EU keeps in mind the OSCE's value as an important venue for continued U.S. engagement with OSCE participating states. END SUMMARY. -------------- Participants -------------- ¶2. (U) On March 11, The EU hosted a U.S. delegation headed by USOSCE Ambassador Stephan M. Minikes for the biannual U.S.-EU "COSCE" consultations on the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Minikes also had meetings with two top officials in EU HighRep Javier Solana's Council Secretariat: Pieter Feith, Deputy Director-General for SIPDIS Political-Military Affairs (see REF A),and Christoph Heusgen, Director of the Policy Unit. The following participated in the COSCE consultations: EU Delegation -------------- 
Luxembourg (current EU Presidency): Ronald Mayer, Ambassador to the CoE Beatrice Kirsch, Deputy Permanent Representative to the OSCE Fabienne Rossler, Attachee, Ministry of Foreign Affairs United Kingdom (successor to Luxembourg in EU Presidency): Timothy Morris, Head of International Organizations Department, FCO Annabelle Malins, Team Leader for OSCE/CoE Section, FCO European Commission: Gilbert Dubois, Head of Unit for OSCE and CoE, DG External Relations Michael Meyer-Resende, Desk Officer, Human Rights Unit, DG External Relations EU Council Secretariat: Alison Weston, OSCE and CoE Desk Officer U.S. delegation -------------- Stephan M. Minikes, Ambassador to the OSCE Christopher Davis, Consul General AmConGen Strasbourg Greta Holtz, OSCE Coordinator, EUR/RPM Stephen Steger, Political Officer, USOSCE Vienna Todd Huizinga, Political Officer, USEU Brussels -------------- -------------- EU DEVELOPING STRATEGY ON HANDLING RUSSIA IN OSCE -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Minikes reported that Secretary Rice had told Russian FM Lavrov during their meeting in Ankara on February 5 of deep U.S. concerns over how Russia was treating the OSCE, especially as a founding member of the organization, and urged Russia to be more supportive and positive. Minikes said that, in effect, Russia was trying to deny the benefits of democracy to about 200 million people living in the CIS, and that the U.S. and EU could not allow Russia to speak for these countries. Minikes said the U.S. and EU needed to create a situation in which Russia,s national interests no longer were served by its present policy in the OSCE. Just making the argument that Russia,s interests were better served by closing the &democracy gap,8 he said, was not enough. ¶4. (C) Our EU interlocutors replied that, while we needed to be tough with the Russians, we also needed to get to a "positive atmosphere" with the Russians to keep them from withdrawing into a shell. Heusgen said the EU was working on a strategy paper on how the EU should react to the Russian challenge in the OSCE. He said the strategy, which would be discussed at the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) in the coming weeks, needed two tracks: (1) how to save the OSCE; and (2) alternatives to the OSCE for cases in which Russia remained intransigent. Minikes warned that there would be a limit to what the EU could and should do without involving the U.S. via the OSCE. Heusgen agreed, but reiterated that the EU had to be "ready to act" if necessary. (NOTE: We have since heard that the EU aims to have the strategy agreed in time for the EU-Russia summit in May. END NOTE.) -------------- RUSSIA ALSO A PROBLEM IN COE -------------- ¶5. (C) Mayer, the Luxembourg Ambassador to the Council of Europe (CoE),said Russia was attempting to water down CoE human rights promotion and election monitoring, just as in the OSCE. The May 16-17 CoE Summit in Warsaw would focus, among other things, on improving coordination and lessening unproductive overlaps between CoE and OSCE; Russia might try to hijack this reform discussion to move some OSCE activities to the CoE and vice versa, in order to weaken both organizations' democracy and human rights oversight. Minikes thanked Mayer for raising the CoE-OSCE issue, and pointed out that in discussing relations between the two organizations member states should not forget that the U.S. is a member of OSCE and not of CoE; thus, the U.S. might oppose any CoE-OSCE division of labor that lessens the OSCE,s role in the OSCE region. Russian behavior must be dealt with effectively in both organizations. -------------- MIXED SIGNALS ON EU INVOLVEMENT IN GEORGIA -------------- ¶6. (C) After having gone over EU internal discussions on Georgia border monitoring with EU Council Deputy Director General Pieter Feith (REF A) on March 10, Minikes delivered, at the March 11 COSCE, REF B demarche points urging the EU to establish an EU BMO in Georgia. The EU COSCE interlocutors confirmed that the EU still had all its options on the table, including a full-fledged EU-flagged BMO, but implied they did not want to risk damaging relations with Russia by moving too quickly. Both Feith and EU Council Policy Unit Director Christoph Heusgen, in separate meetings, seemed more forward leaning. Heusgen especially emphasized the EU's determination to step in if the OSCE could not. Heusgen, a German, claimed he had seen a German MFA paper urging the EU move in if the OSCE BMO is brought to a definitive end. (NOTE: Our impression of continued EU indecision on this issue was later affirmed (REF C) by the March 15 decision of the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) to send the question of an EU-flagged Georgia BMO back to the working-group level for further discussion. END NOTE.) -------------- UKRAINE NEEDED TO SOLVE MOLDOVA/TRANSNISTRIA -------------- ¶7. (C) Minikes pointed out that Ukraine needed to be engaged to resolve the Moldova/Transnistria problem, especially since Russia remained uncooperative. Kirsch replied that the EU was raising with the Ukrainian government at all levels the need to patrol the Ukraine/Moldova border and clamp down on smuggling and trafficking. Dubois said the European Commission was offering more support for patrolling and monitoring as well as pushing better monitoring of cross-border trade flows. Nonetheless, Kirsch suggested, a lack of working-level cooperation from Ukraine called into question the Ukrainian leadership's willingness to expend political capital on the issue. Minikes said high-level engagement with the Ukrainians would be necessary to get Ukraine truly engaged. Heusgen said the EU would appoint a Special Representative for Moldova, former Dutch Ambassador Adriaan Jacobovits, on March 16. -------------- MAINTAINING PRESSURE ON BELARUS -------------- ¶8. (C) Secretary Rice had aptly characterized Belarus as an &outpost of tyranny,8 Ambassador Minikes said. Since the October 17 elections, repression of independent civil society and democratic political parties appeared to have only intensified. The OSCE,s means of influencing the regime were limited, but we needed to keep the pressure on by limiting official contact, actively monitoring abuses, and by publicly condemning Belarusian repression whenever possible. In this last respect, Ambassador Minikes appealed to the EU to be more outspoken at the OSCE on developments in Belarus, not with the expectation that doing so would influence the regime, but as a signal of support to democratic forces and lower-level officials. The EU agreed with Ambassador Minikes,s assessment; publicly highlighting the regime,s abuses was one of the most useful tools at our disposal for promoting democracy in Belarus. Another was leadership. In that respect, the EU asked if the U.S. had made any decision about who we would support as a successor to Ambassador Heykin, who would be stepping down as the OSCE,s Head of Office in Minsk in July. Ambassador Minikes said that we had not settled on a particular candidate, but agreed on the need to find a strong one. -------------- DISCUSSION ON CORDOBA CONFERENCE, TOLERANCE -------------- ¶9. (C) Minikes stressed that combating intolerance was not a sideshow but one of the most important tasks the OSCE had taken on in recent years. In that vein, the U.S. hoped the June 8-9 Cordoba Conference on Anti-Semitism and Other Forms of Intolerance would focus on what remained to be done, in the media, legislative, and other arenas, to oppose the forces of intolerance. The U.S. looked forward, Minikes said, to the progress reports at Cordoba from the OSCE CiO's three Personal Representatives on Intolerance; Minikes said the EU should urge Belgium, set to be the CiO in 2006, to reappoint the Personal Reps if, as expected, their work could not be completed in 2005. Kirsch responded that she would bring the issue of a possible reappointment before the EU "COSCE" Working Group on the OSCE, and urge the EU to come to a common position on the matter. Kirsch said the Luxembourg EU Presidency would be represented at Cordoba by ForMin Asselborn, and that several other EU delegations would likely also be led by ministerial-level officials. -------------- LEVERAGING KAZAKH CIO-SHIP IN 2009? -------------- ¶10. (C) Minikes reported that he would visit Kazakhstan again in mid-April. He said he would press the Kazakh government on what it was willing to do so that, by the time of its proposed OSCE CiO-ship in 2009, Kazakhstan would adequately reflect OSCE human-rights and democracy standards in its domestic policy. Minikes warned that a 2009 CiO-ship for Kazakhstan should not be an automatic, done deal; Kazakhstan should only be given the CiO-ship if it is clearly on the right track toward upholding OSCE values. Morris said the Kazakh CiO-ship was "back on the EU agenda, although I can't predict how the EU position will turn out." He admitted that the EU had been sending mixed signals on the issue, and said the UK position was that the EU should more clearly state that a 2009 CiO-ship was "not yet certain." -------------- SELECTION OF NEW OSCE SECGEN -------------- ¶11. (C) Minikes said a new Secretary General of the OSCE needed to be named soon, no later than May. Minikes urged his EU interlocutors to intervene with the Slovenian CiO on the need actively to build consensus around a candidate: "we've told the CiO that building consensus is a contact sport, not a spectator sport; it would be helpful if the EU could underline that message." -------------- COE CONVENTION ON KOSOVO -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Mayer urged the U.S. to push NATO to agree to CoE inspections of detention centers in Kosovo per the CoE Convention on the Prevention of Torture (CPT). He said NATO was withholding approval of CPT Commission visits of KFOR detention centers, thus keeping the CPT from "doing its job in Kosovo." Minikes said he would report Mayer's concerns back to Washington, but that the proper venue for raising this issue is NATO. -------------- COE: U.S. DEATH PENALTY CASES -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Mayer closed the meeting by raising current death penalty cases in the U.S. that are of particular concern to the CoE. Mayer said the stated desire to be put to death of serial killer Michael Ross, facing execution in Connecticut on May 11, might be due to the "psychological" effects of death row. He noted that the CoE had written the governor on January 28 asking for clemency. Mayer also noted the case of Daryl Atkins. He said the CoE and the EU were troubled by the fact that Atkins now tests at an I.Q. of 76, above the minimum of 70 required for the death penalty. When he committed his crime, Mayer said, Atkins' I.Q. was 59. Minikes thanked Mayer for his comments and assured him that the death penalty was the subject of constant vigorous debate in the U.S. -------------- --- COMMENT: U.S. SHOULD ENGAGE EU TO SAFEGUARD OSCE -------------- --- ¶14. (C) As the EU deliberates internally on the future of the OSCE and the relations between OSCE and CoE, we must continue to remind the EU of the OSCE's unique value as an organization which provides a venue for U.S. influence in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. While we should welcome EU and CoE engagement on democracy, human rights and election observation in the OSCE region, these should supplement, and not replace, OSCE engagement on these fronts. END COMMENT. ¶15. (U) This message has been cleared by Ambassador Minikes. MCKINLEY .