ROBERT FICO HAS DIRECTION, BUT NO COMPASS

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000992 SIPDIS FOR EUR/NCE MLABONTE AND EFICHTE, INR/EUC AHARMATA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2020 TAGS: PREL KDEM PGOV PINR SOCI EU LO SUBJECT: ROBERT FICO HAS DIRECTION, BUT NO COMPASS Classified By: Ambassador Rodolphe M. Vallee for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D ). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: Robert Fico, the driven chairman of opposition party Smer ("Direction"),hosted a small lunch for the Ambassador on December 15 during which he outlined his views on Slovak politics and foreign policy, and revealed what we had long suspected: Fico is an intense and driven politician, but his positions on issues are guided almost exclusively by polling and public opinion more than any well defined policy analysis. Fico told the Ambassador that -- if he becomes Prime Minister next year -- he would pursue a Slovak foreign policy in which Slovakia tows the EU line, though he hinted that Slovakia may increasingly reach out to Russia. Domestically, Fico expects to gain 21 to 22 percent of the vote in September 2006 parliamentary elections. A true social democrat, his domestic agenda would be focused on turning around reforms in the HEALTH care sector and socializing medicine; he will campaign against what he says are the Dzurinda government's unfair reforms which have disadvantaged the little guy in favor of the entrepreneur. When Ambassador noted that Fico's previous anti-American comments had not gone unnoticed by our Embassy or Washington, Fico reassured the Ambassador that anti-American rhetoric and the war in Iraq would not play a role in his campaign next year because they were not themes that won him votes (we think this deal would be off if Fico's pollsters saw political benefit in such rhetoric) and Fico noted cynically that an unfortunate incident suffered by Slovaks in Iraq could raise the issue politically. While Robert Fico moves forward intensely in his chosen direction, he lacks the "compass" of a clearly defined policy position in many cases. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. SMER WOULD FORM COALITION WITH ANY PARTY, BUT... -------------- --- ¶2. (C) Smer party leaders Robert Fico, Vice Chairman Robert Kalinak, and parliamentary foreign affairs committee chairman Pavol Paska told the Ambassador that Smer (which, according to polling data made public December 16, receives a 31.8 percent preference among Slovak voters) is moving into the September 2006 national election cycle optimistic that Slovak voters will, for the first time, have a choice between parties and platforms rather than personalities. Judging by his experience with past elections and by the crowds "of thousands" he claims are coming to hear him speak as he travels Slovakia, Fico told the Ambassador he fully expects to win 21 to 22 percent of the vote next fall. While noting that Smer is moving into the election cycle without any public hints of its preferences for a ruling coalition, he told the Ambassador that Smer cannot work with communist party KSS or nationalist party SNS because of its commitments as a member of Socialist International. However, he said, having SNS and KSS in parliament would be "strategically a good thing" for Smer, as it would help Smer form a coalition with other parties which also consider KSS and SNS untouchable. ¶3. (C) Fico said that the current ruling coalition parties KDH and SMK have been "neutral" toward Smer and could be possible partners in a future coalition, but that Smer would have trouble working with SDKU if Dzurinda or Miklos were still a part of it. Similarly, Fico discounted cooperation with Meciar's HZDS, though he said Smer is actively trying to "convert" HZDS voters. When the Ambassador thanked Smer for its regional commitment to Roma political participation, Fico took the opportunity to express his view that Roma integration in Slovakia was "too big a problem" for Slovakia to solve, and must be addressed through the EU. ¶4. (C) When asked about his domestic priorities for Slovakia, Fico delivered his party's standard points on health care reform ("not all Slovaks can afford quality care, so we must socialize the sector"). He emphasized that he believes Europe is different than the United States, and that a full market economy is not practical here. He plans to raise taxes on big business to fund lower VAT rates on more basic consumer items. Fico also complained that the Dzurinda government has been too generous in its incentives to attract FDI. However, when asked later by the Ambassador how the United States can best assist Slovakia, Fico's immediate response was "more foreign investment." IRAQ NOT AN ELECTION ISSUE (FOR NOW) -------------- ¶5. (C) Ambassador highlighted our memory of Fico's opposition to the Iraq war and expressed our optimism that Fico and Smer could be "on the right side of history" and continue to support democratization in Iraq. Fico conceded that Saddam Hussein was a tyrant, but reiterated his belief that the invasion of Iraq "violated" international law and said that his position on that would not change. However, he told Ambassador that Slovak voters do not much care about foreign policy goals and are not too concerned with Slovak participation in Iraq reconstruction (where Slovak engineers and deminers are currently deployed),so he will not make it an issue in the election cycle, nor would Smer introduce legislation calling for the withdrawal of Slovak troops from Iraq. (NOTE: Fico's language on this issue was very precise, and we took note of the fact that he neither committed to avoiding the Iraq issue altogether (his position could change if he feels the issue could bring him votes) and did not indicate whether or not Smer would support legislation introduced by other parties to withdraw the Slovak contingent from Iraq. END NOTE.) FICO'S FOREIGN POLICY: MORE MONEY, LESS LEADERSHIP -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Fico presented a comprehensive "big picture" vision of his foreign policy preferences. Most importantly, he said that Slovakia, as a member of the EU, would give preference to EU foreign and defense policy positions, as Slovakia was not big enough to have independent foreign policies from the EU (COMMENT: And thus, presumably, would end the precedent of Slovakia taking stances occasionally more favorable to the U.S. than Europe. END COMMENT). He also indicated a possible warming of relations with Russia, which he said had been hurt by Dzurinda's "disrespect" of Putin during the Russian President's attendance at the Bush - Putin meeting in February 2005. ¶7. (C) In addition, Fico said that he would find it easy to work with other Social Democrat governments in the region, and noted that he is already in close contact with the Austrian government. If the social democrat parties of the Czech Republic and Hungary were also successful in upcoming elections, he mused, Slovakia would be able to work closely with it neighbors on regional issues. COMMENT: WHAT FICO LEADERSHIP COULD MEAN TO US -------------- -- ¶8. (C) COMMENT: During our conversation, Fico failed to grasp our questions / comments about Slovakia's international commitments as a democracy including those commending Slovakia's positive role in transformational diplomacy in eastern Europe. While Pavol Paska appeared to understand and even agree a bit with the idea of democracy promotion abroad, Fico interpreted the point as a question solely of financing, assuring the Ambassador that, if made Prime Minister, he would increase Slovakia's overseas aid. We remain concerned that Fico -- who lives and dies by the polls -- will not find motivation within Slovakia's electorate to take a leadership role in the European Union (and even less, NATO); he noted himself that there are "no votes" in foreign policy issues in Slovak elections. Fico did indicate that Slovakia's commitment to some regional projects (such as the Western Balkans) would not change if he was in charge; if he does grab the reins in next year's elections, we can expect him to certainly listen more closely to Moscow, and our challenge could be moving him from a position where Slovakia simply "tows the line" of France and Germany in the EU to ONE of continued partnership with the U.S. on common foreign policy goals. ¶9. (C) COMMENT, Cont'd: In addition, if Smer leads the new government next year, we may need to encourage "Prime Minister" Fico to engage Slovakia's neighbors regardless of which party is in power, as Fico's current hopes for central European cooperation hinge too much on the success of the social democrat movement in other countries. Finally, Fico's resignation to the Ambassador that Slovakia is just "a small country" may require our attention as Slovakia -- in addition to holding a UNSC seat for the next two years -- has also been recently developing into a key partner for the U.S. both in Europe and elsewhere. Fico's "size matters" statement and willingness to warm relations with Russia may indicate that Slovakia could slip off the international stage and again find itself a quiet country wedged between the transatlantic alliance and Russia. While only time will tell what sort of government and foreign policy will emerge in Slovakia after the September 2006 elections, we will take every opportunity to make Fico and his party more sympathetic to American and European voices and encourage a continuation of Slovakia's forward-leaning position in the international arena. END COMMENT. BIO NOTES -------------- ¶10. (C) Fico demonstrated an incredible improvement in his English language ability from previous years, which we find even more indicative of his personal drive. With a daunting domestic and international travel schedule that does not place a premium on English language usage, Fico has somehow found the time to build up a thorough vocabulary and a grammatically precise delivery. He told Ambassador that he enjoys spending time at his cottage near Malacky (around 40km from Bratislava) and playing hockey with his son, and that he occasionally smokes cigars, he said with a laugh, "to support the Cuban economy." VALLEE NNNN