SLOVAKS DISCUSS BELARUS ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY, THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000924 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2015 TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM ETRD PREL SOCI PINR BO LO SUBJECT: SLOVAKS DISCUSS BELARUS ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY, THE NEED FOR MORE EU INVOLVEMENT, AND THE POWER OF THE PRESS REF: A. STATE 208887 ¶B. BRATISLAVA 804 ¶C. STATE 168836 Classified By: CDA a.i. Lawrence R. Silverman for Reasons 1.4 (B) and ( D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During a series of recent meetings we have engaged our Slovak interlocutors in both the GOS and NGO community about democracy promotion efforts and strategy in Belarus, and spoken with several visiting Belarusian opposition figures about Slovak and EU engagement in the country. From these discussions -- particularly a roundtable hosted by the local International Republican Institute (IRI) -- we have heard several common themes. Among them: the need for increased focus on and assistance to print and radio media, a complaint (in front of the representative of the EU Presidency) that the EU does not do enough in Belarus, and the idea that Belarusian activists (and their families) forced from Belarus should receive financial assistance as an investment in the future of Belarus. Finally, the issue of Russian subsidies for Belarusian oil and gas exports was raised, with the former Prime Minister of Lithuania encouraging the U.S. to use its leverage in the WTO to change the equation. END SUMMARY. IRI: TO KNOW THE OPPOSITION IS TO LOVE IT -------------- ¶2. (C) In recent days we have engaged a variety of GOS, NGO and foreign government officials regarding Slovak, regional, and EU involvement in Belarus. During a roundtable discussion hosted by IRI featuring a variety of foreign government officials (including three former Prime Ministers from Poland, Lithuania, and Estonia),IRI presented polling data collected by their office in Vilnius that reemphasized the importance of media engagement in democratization efforts. Specifically, IRI cited figures that showed that a lack of electronic media (and the "repetition" of message it brings) is limiting the growth of popular awareness of the opposition. When Belarusian voters are made aware of the presence of the opposition, a "fair fight" between Lukashenko and opposition candidate Alexander Milinkevich emerges in the polling data. Of those who have not heard of the unified opposition candidate, 60 percent support Lukashenko; of those who have heard of Milinkevich, Lukashenko and Milinkevich are in a "dead heat" with polling numbers in the high 30s. IRI noted that the Lukashenko regime's attempt at painting the opposition as "homosexuals" backfired, as the press coverage of the opposition conference -- including several government-planted actors in what IRI described as Shakespearean dress -- only drummed up more curiosity about what the opposition really was. COMPLAINTS ABOUT INSUFFICIENT EU ACTION -------------- ¶3. (C) Stefan Rozkopal, who directs the Third Territorial Division at the Slovak MFA (which covers everything "from Lubljana to Vladivostok") was surprisingly critical of EU efforts in Belarus, in front of the British Ambassador to Slovakia (who was attending the roundtable in the capacity of the EU Presidency). Rozkopal, who told DCM on November 15 that Slovakia has agreed within the Visegraad Four (V-4) to take the lead on Belarus issues, has told us in the past that Slovakia "doesn't want to miss any opportunity to make public statements" about the Lukashenko regime and that he, personally, believes the EU position paper on Belarus could go even further. He told the roundtable that he believes the EU could devote more attention and activism to Belarus. Similarly, former Lithuanian Prime Minister Andrius Kubilius told the roundtable that he, too, believes that the EU can and should do more in Belarus. He specifically suggested opposition to the Russian oil and gas subsidies on Russian exports to Belarus, which provide Russia with undue influence in the country; he suggested that this is an issue where the United States -- via the WTO negotiation framework -- might be able to use this leverage in Moscow to affect change. (COMMENT: We pass this point along as it was said. Addressees will be able to make a better assessment as to its validity and advisability. END COMMENT.) RADIO VS. PRINT MEDIA -------------- ¶4. (C) Our interlocutors differ on what is the best media venue for the pro-democracy message. Some think the best way is via hard-copy, more traditional printed materials; others believe the electronic media represents the best, most repetitious way to spread awareness of the need for democracy in Belarus. Former Polish Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek emphasized the importance of Radio Free Europe during the Cold War, noting that what was important was not the amount of information, but the fact that Poland could receive "even just a few sentences" a week of outside information that served to remind the people that the world cared about them. THE NEED FOR PRINT MEDIA -------------- ¶5. (C) During a brief encounter with visiting Belarusian opposition members Anatolij Lebedko (Chairman, United Civic Party),Vincuk Viachorka (Chairman, Belarusian Popular Front),and Lyudmila Gryaznova (Vice Chairman, United Civic Party),all of whom were in Bratislava to meet with Prime Minister Dzurinda on November 16, Ambassador was told of Belarus' need for increased printing capacity. The three opposition members noted that many independent printing presses had been shut down by the Lukashenko regime and that they found grassroots, door-to-door organizing to be highly effective. The problem, they told Ambassador, was that they had "nothing to leave behind" when they visited homes. At the IRI roundtable, there was a discussion of a pre-existing proposal to fund four mobile printing presses at the cost of USD 250,000; the proposal was warmly received as a good complement to electronic media. ¶6. (C) Ambassador asked the opposition figures about the issue of radio broadcasting, and specifically in which language broadcasting would be most effective. The opposition members said that Belarusian would be the preferred language, not because it is most effective (IRI believes that 70 percent of Belarusians conduct their daily lives in Russian),but because it makes the political statement that the outside world is conducting the broadcasts for Belarus, that Belarusians matter, and -- as mentioned by Buzek about Radio Free Europe programming to Poland under Communism -- that the outside world "cares" and supports them. SUPPORTING DISSIDENTS ABROAD, AND THEIR FAMILIES AT HOME -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Those present at the roundtable also discussed the need for the specific "targeting" of Belarusian government officials for visa and travel bans, noting that anything broader adversely affects the Belarusian population, many of whom return from trips abroad very aware of the problems and lack of transparency within their own government. Moreover, the opposition leaders told the Ambassador that, while they are appreciative of U.S. efforts in Minsk and within Belarus, there are many dissidents who have been forced abroad by the regime; the leaders encouraged the U.S. and EU to explore the possibility of supporting these dissidents abroad, as well as their families at home, providing a "safety net" which would, in turn, encourage more people in Belarus to become active in the struggle for democracy. SILVERMAN NNNN