BRAZIL: REGIONAL INFORMATION SHARING FOR AIR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000318 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2015 TAGS: SNAR MARR MOPS PINR BR POL MIL SUBJECT: BRAZIL: REGIONAL INFORMATION SHARING FOR AIR BRIDGE DENIAL REF: WHA/BSC (MALHEIRO) - EMBASSY (HEARNE) CLASSIFIED E-MAIL 2 FEB 05 Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DENNIS HEARNE. REASONS: 1.4 (B)(D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Ref query requested Embassy views on the potential for sharing U.S. information (particularly ROTHR data) with the GOB as part of cooperative regional effort at air bridge denial (ABD) that may also include Colombia. In summary form below are our observations, based on the history of this issue and consideration of the current shootdown program in Brazil. We believe that it is worthwhile and an opportune moment, given Brazil's success to date with its ABD program, to approach the Brazilians about expanded cooperation. Options for moving ahead include an offer of direct assistance, perhaps taking advantage of the visit of Secretary Rumsfeld, or an indirect approach in which SIPDIS U.S.-origin information (including ROTHR data) is provided to Brazil via Colombia in the context of their bilateral cooperation in aerial surveillance and interdiction. We are prepared to make preliminary inquiries on these issues with the GOB if instructed. End summary. History ¶2. (C) Since circa 1999-2000, the USG has periodically made inquires to the Brazilian Goverment (GOB) and air force (BRAF) regarding information sharing with Brazil for aerial surveillance and ABD efforts. Mission personnel, as well as senior visitors from State, DOD and SOUTHCOM, have all registered with Brazil, formally and informally, our willingness to explore cooperation ranging from limited bilateral information sharing to larger-scale regional programs to develop a common operating picture (COP). ¶3. (C) The centerpiece of the USG discussion has usually been our interest in providing low-altitude tracking data from the USG's Puerto Rico Relocatable Over the Horizon Radar (ROTHR) installation to Brazil, as a complement to the data generated by Brazil's own assets (especially the SIVAM Amazon surveillance system),which are focused primarily on higher-altitude coverage. We have been willing to discuss different operational modalities, including enhancing Brazil's liaison program at JIATF-South in Key West and/or installing real-time ROTHR terminals in Brazil's SIVAM center in Manaus. Mixed Reactions, No Progress ¶4. (C) Brazilian reactions to these queries have been mixed, and there has been no progress on the issue. On a technical level, some of the BRAF's best officers -- e.g., former SIVAM Commission President Brigadier Orlando Bellon -- have a keen understanding of the advantages of integrating ROTHR data into the SIVAM spread, and over the years have informally expressed enthusiasm for the options outlined in para 3 and even beyond (i.e., BRAF officers a few years ago informally discussed with USAF and Raytheon officials the idea of installing a ROTHR in Brazil). As recently as August 2004, during a visit to JIATF South, Brazilian air defense chief Brigadier Azambuja indicated his desire to assign a BRAF representative in Key West (the current Brazilian liaison officer is from the civilian intelligence service) to facilitate ROTHR data feed to BRAF air defense operations centers. ¶5. (C) However, other BRAF officers -- notably current Chief of Air Staff Brigadier Astor -- have been hesitant, and the following factors appear to be impediments: -- Dissing SIVAM: Astor said directly to Mission officers one year ago, as Brazil's multi-million dollar SIVAM system was becoming fully operational, that incorporating ROTHR into Brazil's surveillance program could appear to some -- notably in Brazil's prickly congress and media -- as an admission that SIVAM is inadequate. That this view is short-sighted and parochial seems obvious to us, but Astor is not necessarily wrong to fear the worst from Brazil's politicians and press when it comes to money issues, the military and virtually anything to do with the U.S. However, now that SIVAM is up and running, Astor's concerns (and a related BRAF technical concern that incorporating ROTHR terminals could delay getting SIVAM installations on line) may have lessened. -- Sovereignty: On a related theme, and is often the case in Brazil, sovereignty concerns and suspicions about U.S. motives (ranging from mild reluctance about appearances of needing outside help to outright conspiracy theories about U.S. designs on the Amazon) sometimes color GOB and BRAF attitudes toward closer cooperation. In the past, concerns have been heard from the fever swamps of the nationalist fringes of both left and right that SIVAM, which was largely built by Raytheon, is perhaps secretly wired for penetration by U.S. intelligence. Hence real cooperation in surveillance, including ROTHR, could be potentially controversial in the BRAF's view. -- Neighbors first: BRAF and MOD officials have also indicated to USG officials at different times that their priority interest is pursuing bilateral information sharing agreements with neighboring countries, and hence possible Brazil-U.S. cooperation or a unified regional effort toward a COP appear to be well down the road. We are aware that, in the past several months, Brazil has signed information sharing agreements with both Colombia and Peru, but the GOB has not provided us details of the accords. We believe Brazil is also in discussions with Venezuela and Bolivia, but have not confirmed this yet with the GOB. A Way Ahead -- Two Options ¶6. (C) Bilateral: Despite the history and challenges noted above, we believe it is worth pursuing enhanced cooperation in air surveillance and ABD, and now may be an opportune time. The GOB has trumpeted its October 2004 implementation of its national ABD program (shootdown) as a success. BRAF and MOD statements to the media have claimed a substantial decrease in suspicious air traffic, and the Federal Police have reported through the press that traffickers are now resorting to landing aircraft over the frontier in Paraguay and transporting cocaine by land into Brazil. BRAF data supplied to us confidentially for a U.S. congressional reporting requirement is less dramatic than media reports, but still encouraging: i.e., an approximately one quarter drop in suspect flights from October through the end of 2004, one force down event (in which no drugs were seized),and no necessity for use of either warning shots or lethal force to secure compliance from intercepted aircraft. Brazilians are deeply worried about the drug-related organized criminal violence ravaging Rio and other cities, and good news is welcomed by the public and GOB. Increased cooperation with us in enhancing Brazil's capabilities against illegal aerial trafficking may be more attractive now, as Brazil seeks to build on success. The possible visit of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld would offer an ideal opportunity to reiterate to the Brazilians at the minister level that we want to do more to help and have technical assets that can complement SIVAM. We see little to lose in making another overture for direct bilateral cooperation. ¶7. (C) Via Colombia: Another option would be an indirect approach via Colombia. Brazil is already committed to greater cooperation with Colombia, witness their signing of a cooperation accord last year. That presents a potential building block for regional cooperation that includes providing U.S. information to both governments (Colombia directly, Brazil via Colombia). We defer to experts on the question of whether there would be any U.S. legal impediment to Colombia's sharing U.S.-origin information (including ROTHR tracks) with Brazil for ABD operations, since both countries have Presidential Determinations to address liability under U.S. statutes. But we anticipate the Brazilians would definitely want our legal judgment on that question before moving ahead. (Note: The terms of annexes to the U.S.-Brazil exchange of diplomatic notes indicate the GOB will not share U.S.-origin information or intelligence with another country without express permission from the USG. End note.). Receiving U.S. information via Colombia could ameliorate some of the Brazilian concerns outlined in para 5 above, as it can be couched within the context of Brazil-Colombia cooperation. ¶8. (C) Comment. There is appreciation in the GOB for the USG's efforts to secure a Presidential Determination for Brazil's ABD program, especially in light of its success to date. That fact and the visit of our defense secretary may create a favorable environment for momentum on ABD and surveillance cooperation. That said, the Brazilians repeatedly emphasized during our negotiations on the PD last year that their ABD program is truly and exclusively national in its operational scope and technical assets. In that regard, we would need to determine early on whether receiving U.S.-origin information -- directly from us or via Colombia -- is simply unattractive to the GOB for political or other reasons that go beyond the known reservations noted above. On that key point and other questions, we are prepared to engage informally with the GOB (MOD, BRAF and perhaps foreign ministry),if instructed.