BRAZIL - STEEL POLICIES; NAMA NEGOTIATIONS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 003162 SIPDIS SENSITIVE DEPT FOR WHA/BSC, WHA/EPSC AND EB/TPP DEPT PLEASE PASS TO USTR SBOVIM, JKEMP AND MSULLIVAN USDOC FOR 3134/USFCS/OIO/WH/EOLSON USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/MWARD, KPARKHILL, SLANGKAMP USDA FOR FFAS NSC FOR SCRONIN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON ETRD EIND BR WTO SUBJECT: BRAZIL - STEEL POLICIES; NAMA NEGOTIATIONS Refs: A) STATE 190684 B) Brasilia 1929 C) Sao Paulo 1185 ¶1. SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE TREAT ACCORDINGLY ¶2. (U) Introduction. The following information is provided in response to ref A's request for information on the Brazilian steel industry and related government policies. See paras 12 and 14 regarding FIESP views on WTO NAMA negotiations. End Introduction. ¶3. (U) The Brazilian steel industry is ranked eighth in the world in terms of crude steel production. It contributes 3.1 percent of the world's total crude steel output and accounts for more than half (51 percent) of the crude steel production in Latin America. In 2004, gross revenues for Brazilian steel companies totaled USD 50 billion, up 43 percent from the USD 35 billion for 2003 due principally to increased steel prices in the international market. ¶4. (U) The 2004 production capacity for Brazil's steel industry was 34 million tons, up 20 percent from a capacity of 28 million tons in 1996. Current capacity utilization is running at about 97 percent given high domestic and export demand. The industry has plans to invest USD 13 billion over the next 5 years to increase production capacity to 49.6 million tons, a 46 percent increase. Given the high domestic interest rates in Brazil, the industry expects to finance the expansion with foreign capital and through loans from Brazil's national development bank, BNDES; according to a BNDES analyst, the bank will likely provide around 30 percent of the industry's financing needs. The expansion covers 27 plants owned by companies such as Usiminas/Cosipa, Usinor/Arcelor-Acesita-CST, CSN, Gerdau, and Arbed/Arcelor- Belgo-Mineira, which are the five largest groups controlling 94 percent of the production capacity in Brazil. These steel plants are mainly located in the south (3),southeast (20),and northeast (4) regions of Brazil. ¶5. (U) As part of Brazil's privatization process in the 1990s, there was an intense re-structuring of the steel industry. When the process ended in 1997, there were 21 steel companies. In general, the companies do not compete against each other in all market segments, but tend to specialize in certain product areas. After the privatization process, international and national companies started to form strategic alliances. Although not yet complete, Companhia Nacional de Siderurgia (CSN) and CORUS the British-Dutch steel company started working on a strategic alliance in 2002, which will have the capacity to produce 25 million tons of steel. It is rumored that Usiminas and Companhia Siderurgica de Tubarao, two of the main steel producers in Brazil, may merge. According to the Brazilian Steel Institute, there have not been any recent firm closings and no other information is available on future amalgamations. ¶6. (U) Brazil's production of steel products increased from about 25.8 million tons in 2000 to 30.6 million tons in ¶2004. Between the years 2000 and 2003, domestic consumption as a proportion of total production declined from 61 percent to 54 percent while exports rose, reaching almost 13 million tons. Domestic consumption once again accounted for around 60 percent of production in 2004 (an export tax was in effect for part of the time) with exports dropping to 12 million tons. However, despite the drop in export volume, strong steel prices pushed the value of exports up by 37 percent in 2004 to reach USD 5.3 billion. This trend has continued in 2005 with a 1.6 percent increase in export volume of steel products between January and September yielding a 29 percent increase in the value of exports (close to USD 5 billion) over the same period a year earlier. Overall, export volumes grew from 9.6 million tons to 12.0 million tons (24.8 percent) between 2000 and 2004; the value of exports grew from USD 2.7 billion to USD 5.3 billion (94.5 percent) over the same period. ¶7. (U) Through September of this year, Latin America had absorbed 29 percent of Brazil's steel exports, Asia 28 percent (China peaked as an export destination with a 18.9 percent share in 2003 and currently accounts for 6.7 percent of Brazil's exports),North America 24.6 percent (of which 20.6 percent goes to the U.S),the European Union 12.1 percent, Africa 5.9 percent, and finally 0.5 percent has been sold to other countries in Europe. ¶8. (U) Import levels of steel into Brazil are typically low and declined by 49 percent from a high of 1.1 million tons in 2001 to 0.5 million tons in 2004. However, due to high domestic demand for steel, imports from January to September 2005 increased by 31.4 percent by volume and 60.7 percent by value compared to the same period in 2004. Between January and September this year, the European Union supplied 36.1 percent of Brazil's imports of steel products. Latin America accounted for 30.2 percent, Asia for 14.5 percent, Africa for 4.8 percent, North America for 4.5 percent (of which the United States is responsible for 4.1 percent),and finally other countries in Europe such as Ukraine, Russia, Turkey, etc. supplied 9.9 percent of Brazil steel imports. ¶9. (U) The GoB does not have export promotion policies in place specifically for the steel industry. Furthermore, currently there are no government imposed export restrictions on key inputs for steel production or final products. The GoB does, however, offer a variety of tax, tariff, and financing incentives to encourage production for export, and the use of Brazilian-made inputs in domestic production. For instance, recently passed legislation provides some tax relief for capital equipment investment by companies for which exports account for 80 percent of gross revenues (ref B). This so-called MP do Bem measure was contained in law 11,196, which President Lula signed on November 21, 2005. ¶10. (U) The steel industry also makes use of BNDES' FINAME program, which provides capital financing to Brazilian companies for, among other things, expansion and modernization projects as well as acquisition or leasing of new machinery and equipment. One goal of this program is to support the purchase of domestic over imported equipment and machinery. As noted above, the steel industry also makes use of BNDES' long-term financing programs. The interest rates charged on this financing are customarily lower than the prevailing market interest rates for domestic financing. ¶11. (U) The federal government does not use VAT policies to promote the domestic steel industry. The VAT-like ICMS tax is a state rather than federal tax. States, at times, manipulate the ICMS to attract individual investments, but there is no policy specific to the steel industry. NAMA Negotiations and Steel ¶12. (SBU) Ref A also posed questions regarding Sao Paulo industry association's (FIESP) view of potential flexibility in Brazil's position on tariff reductions within NAMA and the possibility of Brazil's steel sector going to zero tariffs. On October 14, FIESP's Director of International Relations Roberto Gianetti da Fonseca informed visiting USTR Director for Brazil and Southern Cone that the GoB was considering moving off the ABI formula in NAMA to a Swiss formula, perhaps with a coefficient of 30, providing a glimpse of future Brazilian flexibility (ref C). As the Hong Kong Ministerial has drawn closer, FIESP officials have increasingly been "toeing the line" on the GoB's NAMA tariff cut limits and the government's linkage of flexibility in NAMA to additional concessions in agriculture. ¶13. (SBU) In a November 19 Estado de Sao Paulo article, Rubens Barbosa, chairman of FIESP's Trade Council, claimed FIESP would reject tariff cuts of over 50 percent (from bound rates) in NAMA, reinforcing Foreign Minister Amorim's earlier statements on the GoB position. Carlos Antonio Cavalcanti, FIESP Assistant Director for International Relations, reaffirmed FIESP's support for the GoB position in a conversation with Econoff November 30. Cavalcanti said additional flexibility is impossible without substantial further movement in agriculture - the "payment" in industrials would be commensurate with concessions received in agriculture. While Cavalcanti linked the 50 percent tariff cut limit to agricultural offers currently on the table, he provided no insight on what might be possible with further concessions in agriculture, in particular whether Brazilian flexibility would be limited to engagement on sectorals. ¶14. (SBU) Cavalcanti was unwilling to confirm the steel sector's ability to "go to zero," but noted that it is an extremely competitive sector in Brazil. While claiming FIESP "is open" to sectorals, he cautioned that many industries do not believe they are sufficiently competitive to engage in such negotiations. With regard to Amorim's statements on the weekend of November 26-27 suggesting a possible opening to sectoral agreements, Cavalcanti claimed that Brazil would only negotiate sectorals if very substantial, additional concessions were made in agriculture, principally by the European Union. Linehan