BRAZILIAN RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE ON VENEZUELAN ARMS

S E C R E T BRASILIA 003116 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2015 TAGS: PREL MARR MASS PARM BR VE SUBJECT: BRAZILIAN RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE ON VENEZUELAN ARMS TRANSFER POLICY REF: A) BRASILIA 3074 B) STATE 207628 Classified By: Charge Patrick Linehan, 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (S) Foreign Ministry Undersecretary-General for Cooperation and Brazilian Communities Abroad Ruy Nunes Pinto Nogueira called the Charge to the Foreign Ministry November 28 to respond to the demarche delivered by then Charge Chicola on November 22 concerning the new U.S. policy concerning arms transfers to Venezuela (Ref A). Nogueira said FM Celso Amorim had read the report of the November 22 meeeting when he returned from abroad, and because of the importance of the issue to Brazil, asked Nogueira to deliver the Brazilian response immediately, in place of the Secretary-General, who was out of town. SIPDIS ¶2. (S) Nogueira noted that President Lula had raised the issue of the sale of Super Tucano planes to Venezuela with President Bush during their November 6 meeting at Granja do Torto in Brasilia. He said that President Bush had reportedly been quite positive to the presentation, and had promised to examine the subject sympathetically. Nogueira, reading from the Brazilian Government report of the November 6 session, said President Bush had expressed concern about the possible sale of the planes to Venezuela and said there could be opposition to the sale in Congress because of the high percentage of U.S. components in the planes, and in view of Chavez' actions. However, President Bush had concluded that "We have to be prudent. We don't need to take a decision right here at this table." Nogueira said the last two sentences were a direct quote of President Bush's words. ¶3. (S) Nogueira added that, after the meeting with President Lula, FM Amorim had personally provided a non-paper to Secretary Rice. Nogueira told the Charge that Secretary Rice SIPDIS had agreed to look into the matter and respond as soon as possible. Nogueira gave the Charge a copy of the non-paper in English, the text of which is in paragraph six. ¶4. (S) Nogueira told the Charge that, aside from the financial concerns Brazil had about the possible cancellation of the Super Tucano sale, Brazil believes Chavez has the option to buy the same, or better aircraft from other buyers, mentioning Russia as an example. Brazil would not like to see Venezuela procure a plane from outside the hemisphere, and is worried that the purchase of a more advanced plane from the Russians or others would cause an imbalance among the air forces of South America. Finally, he claimed that if the sale were allowed to go forward, and the U.S. and/or Brazil later decided it to be no longer convenient to allow Chavez to deploy the aircraft, the U.S. or Brazil could ground the fleet by denying support and/or spare parts, just as the U.S. had done in the case of the Venezuelan F-16s. ¶5. (S) Nogueira concluded by saying that the Foreign Ministry would be tasking the Brazilian Embassy in Washington with obtaining a reply to the non-paper that FM Amorim gave to Secretary Rice on November 6. He said instructions would be sent to the Embassy on November 29. ¶6. (S) Text of the Non-Paper: Begin Text: Sale of Brazilian aircraft to Venezuela On Octoer 28, 2005, the Brazilian Aerospace Company (EMBRAER) signed a contract with the Venzuelan Air Force, which provides for the sale of 20 (twenty) Super Tucano airplanes, for US$169.7 million. The deal was conluded only after U.S. parts suppliers (which account for roughly 50 percent of the aircraft compnents) provided written assurances that the U.S. Government had nothing against the sale. According to unofficial information received by EMBRAER, Washington would be planning to review such decision. The cancellation of the deal wuld imply significant loss to EMBRAER. The Brazilian government would highly appreciate that the U.S. Government maintained its positiion on the transaction, since all conditions were met at the time of the signing of the contract. It is worth recalling that the Supert-Tucano airplanes are designed to provide operational support in domestic law enforcement missions, such as air space surveillance, drug trafficking and guerrilla combat, objectives that this kind of aircraft is also expected to accomplished in Colombia. End Text. Linehan