BRAZIL'S RESPONSE TO U.S. PROPOSALS TO ENABLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 002798

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2015
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP BR IN
SUBJECT: BRAZIL'S RESPONSE TO U.S. PROPOSALS TO ENABLE
CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH INDIA BY THE NUCLEAR
SUPPLIER'S GROUP

REF: STATE 190856

Classified By: Political Counselor Dennis Hearne for Reasons
1.4. (B) a
nd (D)


1. (C) Poloff delivered reftel demarche October 18 to Acting
Director Jandyr Santos of the Foreign Ministry's Disarmament
Division. Calling the briefing very timely given the ongoing
Nuclear Supplier's Group (NSG) meeting in Vienna -- where
Division Director Santiago Mourao is heading the Brazilian
delegation -- Santos said he appreciated the new details of
the U.S.-India accord and said he would forward them
immediately to the Brazilian delegation in Vienna. He also
noted that the Brazilian side would raise the issue with its
American counterparts during the ongoning JSNEC meetings in
Brasilia.


2. (C) Santos noted that, given Brazil's history, this issue
is a particularly sensitive one and Brazil has serious
concerns that India may be profiting from its decision to
pursue a nuclear weapons program -- a path Brazil decided to
forego. He told Poloff that the GOB had held discussions
with the GOI recently in Delhi on the issue and he expected
there would be further contacts in the future, but said it is
still too early to have a clear idea of how Brazil will deal
with the new situation.


3. (C) Santos said Brazil was most interested in the
proposed timetable for moving forward. He was pleased to
note the points Poloff made that any provision of trigger
list items to India would come only after India has
implemented its commitments under the Joint Statement, and
that we did not advocate a making changes to the essential
substance of the NSG guidelines, a step which Santos said
constituted a red line for Brazil. He also said he was
pleased that the IAEA would be responsible for concluding a
safeguard agreement with India and for concluding and
overseeing the Additional Protocol with respect to civilian
nuclear facilities.


4. (C) In response to his question as to how the U.S. could
claim that the Joint Statement would not constitute a
precedent for other nuclear states, Poloff provided Santos
with the points concerning Israel and Pakistan, as well as
those concerning Iran and North Korea, stressing that the
U.S. did not believe any other countries were comparable to
India and therefore, the Joint Statement would not set a
precedent.


5. (C) Although he said he understood the U.S. position that
the Joint Statement would provide for a safer world and
acknowledged that in a world of tough choices, this one could
be seen as a practical way forward, he still insisted it was
hard to see how the Joint Statement upheld the NPT. In
closing, he said he would carefully review the materials
provided and looked forward to continuing discussion on this
important issue.

DANILOVICH