C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 002676

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS ETRD PHUM BR US
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S OCTOBER 6 MEETING WITH FOREIGN
MINISTER AMORIM


Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Philip Chicola. Reasons
1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Deputy Secretary Zoellick told FM Amorim
October 6 that the international community needs to engage
strongly in Bolivia during the elections to guarantee
transparency, and must remain engaged following elections to
guarantee some degree of governability. Amorim urged U.S.
flexibility in dealing with Evo Morales, something the Deputy
Secretary said would be difficult to do given Morales' ties

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to the drug trade. FM Amorim said he would look at using
President Lula's PT Party's ties with leftists to urge the
Sandinistas and others in Nicaragua to engage with Lewites
and put pressure on Ortega. He urged that Valdez's
replacement in Haiti be from South America. The Deputy
Secretary agreed that Amorim's proposals for broadening

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U.S.-Brazilian dialogue to the areas of science, technology,
education and fighting racism were worth looking into, but he
also proposed deepening the bilateral dialogue on democracy
and development by identifying areas where democracy and
development intersect. FM Amorim pledged to take action on
that proposal. End Summary

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BOLIVIA
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2. (C) Foreign Minister Amorim noted that there had been
much concern expressed about the situation in Bolivia during
the September 29-30 Summit of the Community of South American
Nations (CASA). He said that all of the leaders attending
the summit agreed that postponing the Bolivian elections
would be a bad idea. Amorim said he believed that Quiroga is
currently in the lead, but there remained the possibility
that the vote would end up in a virtual draw, leaving Bolivia
in a German-like situation, but without the strong
institutions that Germany has. The Foreign Minister asserted
that if Morales wins a plurality, it would be almost
impossible to deny him the presidency.


3. (C) Regarding Morales, FM Amorim said that throu

gh
Brazilian engagement with Morales, he appears to be changing
a little and is tending toward moderation except when there
occur instances of street mobilization or other popular
unrest. Opining that Morales and his party are not as far
left as radicals such as Quispe, Amorim said that when there
is popular mobilization on any issue, Morales has to
radicalize to prevent the more radical parties from
outflanking him. The Foreign Minister added that President
Lula has had a positive influence on Morales during times of
crisis.


4. (C) Amorim suggested that the U.S. might need to think
about being more flexible with Morales, to which the Deputy
Secretary replied that it would be hard to be more flexible

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with someone that has the kind of ties to "Cocaleros" that
Morales maintains, and given uncertainties about Morales'
commitment to democracy. Noting that much of the coca grown
in Bolivia passes through Brazil, and that it has fomented a
drug problem for Brazil, he said Morales' ties to the
cocaleros should be of concern in Brasilia. Amorim responded
that "There are cocaleros and then there are cocaleros," and
added that Brazil was addressing the coca problem by looking
for ways to buy more from Bolivia as part of the crop
substitution process.


5. (C) The Deputy Secretary told Amorim that in the short
term, Bolivia needs a strong international presence during
the election to guarantee a degree of transparency. In
addition, the international community needs to work with
Bolivia after the election to guarantee some degree of
governability. He said it would be useful for the U.S. and
Brazil, among others, to work with the OAS to figure out how
to create a political compact to run the country. At the
same time, Bolivians need to address the same kinds of
issues, including, for example, what the role of a
constitutional assembly should be.


6. (C) FM Amorim said he believed that kind of discussion
could be useful, but added that the international community
had to act very carefully in Bolivia because there is growing
radicalization on all sides. In addition, there is some
sensitivity in Bolivia regarding the OAS because the head of
the OAS is a Chilean. He noted that Brazil is moving
cautiously and that he had personally worked to ensure that
Petrobras' investment disputes are not pressed for the moment.

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NICARAGUA
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7. (C) Much of the Deputy Secretary's presentation on
Nicaragua was new to FM Amorim, who appeared not to be aware
of the extent of Ortega and the PLC's effort to undermine the
legitimate government of the country. However, he did note
that President Lula's Workers' Party (PT) had good relations
with the Sandinistas and other leftist parties and he could
ask prominent PT members to talk with the leftists in
Nicaragua and thereby engage with Lewites and put additional
pressure on Ortega.

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POTUS VISIT
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8. (C) The Foreign Minister said he wanted to make sure
something valuable could be extracted from the upcoming visit
of the President to Brazil. He suggested creating additional
bilateral working groups on science, technology, education
and fighting racism. He also suggested looking for ways to
increase bilateral cooperation on Africa, adding his hope
that cooperation would go beyond Guinea Bissau. He then
noted the creation of the IBSA (India, Brazil and South
Africa) fund that promotes cooperation on development
programs in different parts of the world. Amorim said it
might be useful if the U.S. could find a way to cooperate
with the IBSA fund, and so diminish the South-South aspect of
its work and make the effort look more like that of large
multi-racial democracies cooperating on development.


9. (C) The Deputy Secretary said he believed the FM's ideas
were interesting and worth looking at. Noting that he had
earlier planted some seeds on bilateral issues with Finance
Minister Palocci and President Lula's International Affairs
Advisor Garcia, the Deputy Secretary said he wanted to share
them with FM Amorim. He noted that the U.S. had started
strategic talks with China and India, and it struck him as
odd that the U.S. strategic dialogue with Brazil lagged
behind that with India and China. Given that the U.S. and
Brazil are democracies that share common political values,
the two countries should be able to do more.


10. (C) One way to enhance dialogue is to broaden
discussions as the FM had suggested. Another way, the Deputy
Secretary pointed out, is to deepen dialogue around several

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specific topics centered on democracy and development in the
Americas. With new leadership at the OAS and IDB, and with
the Summit of the Americas approaching, this might be a good
time to start deepening our dialogue.


11. (C) Specifically, the Foreign and Finance Ministries of
the two countries could meet to discuss how democracy and
development issues intersect and use the intersections as a
point of departure. FM Amorim said that was a good idea and
said he would work to identify appropriate interlocutors and
determine when such discussions could take place.

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HAITI
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12. (C) FM Amorim told the Deputy Secretary that the
replacement for Juan Gabriel Valdez should be someone from
South America in order to maintain the link between the
political and military side of UN engagement in Haiti.


13. (U) Participants:

Brazil Side:

Foreign Minister Celso Amorim

U.S. Side:

The Deputy Secretary
Ambassador Danilovich
NSC Senior Director Shannon
D Chief of Staff Padilla


14. (U) The Deputy Secretary's party has cleared this
message.

DANILOVICH