Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BRASILIA2339
2005-09-02 12:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brasilia
Cable title:
BRAZIL ON COMBATING WMD PROLIFERATION VIA
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 002339
SIPDIS
TREASURY FOR OFAC AND C.MEDINA
TREASURY FOR FINCEN
STATE FOR NP
STATE FOR S/CT
STATE FOR EB/ESC/TFS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2015
TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC KTFN EFIN
SUBJECT: BRAZIL ON COMBATING WMD PROLIFERATION VIA
FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS
REF: STATE 158275
Classified By: Economic Counselor Bruce Williamson, reasons 1.4
(b) and
(d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 002339
SIPDIS
TREASURY FOR OFAC AND C.MEDINA
TREASURY FOR FINCEN
STATE FOR NP
STATE FOR S/CT
STATE FOR EB/ESC/TFS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2015
TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC KTFN EFIN
SUBJECT: BRAZIL ON COMBATING WMD PROLIFERATION VIA
FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS
REF: STATE 158275
Classified By: Economic Counselor Bruce Williamson, reasons 1.4
(b) and
(d).
1. (C) Post delivered reftel demarche to Gustavo Rodrigues of
COAF (Brazil's financial intelligence unit),Luiza Lopes da
Silva of the Ministry of External Relations' (MRE's) Office
for the Combat of Illicit Transnational Activities and
Santiago Morao of the MRE's Disarmament and Sensitive
Technologies Division. Rodrigues responded enthusiastically
to the points, noting that Brazil had presented a paper in
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) context calling for the
involvement of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) in
tracking financial networks behind the trafficking of nuclear
materials. The paper (document number NSG(05)24 dated March
29, 2005),was discussed at an NSG Oslo meeting in June,
according to Rodrigues. The dialogue in the NSG context,
Rodrigues said, was not extremely substantive as only two
countries' delegations, Brazil's and Norway's, included
representatives from their FIUs.
2. (C) While the GoB strongly supports the concept of using
FIU's to combat WMD proliferation, Rodrigues noted that
Brazil does not have domestic authority to freeze the assets
of WMD proliferators. Rodrigues nevertheless undertook to
conduct a search of COAF's own databases for transactions in
the names of the proliferating entities enumerated in U.S.
Executive Order 13882. He further undertook to coordinate
with the Central Bank and the Brazilian Intelligence Agency
(ABIN) a search of their respective databases. The Central
Bank, he explained, has the capability to track the
originator and destination for all foreign exchange
transactions made through the formal banking system.
3. (C) Rodrigues acknowledged that, should these searches
produce a hit, then the GoB would have to grapple with how to
respond. Econoff reiterated that UN Security Council
Resolution 1540 requires countries to combat proliferation
and could form the legal basis for GoB action. Rodrigues
took the point, but said it would take some time to implement
the UNSC resolution (usually done via presidential decree).
Instead, he said, if assets were found in this case, the Gob
would have to find a creative solution, perhaps freezing the
(theoretical) assets in response to a USG request through law
enforcement channels.
DANILOVICH
SIPDIS
TREASURY FOR OFAC AND C.MEDINA
TREASURY FOR FINCEN
STATE FOR NP
STATE FOR S/CT
STATE FOR EB/ESC/TFS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2015
TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC KTFN EFIN
SUBJECT: BRAZIL ON COMBATING WMD PROLIFERATION VIA
FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS
REF: STATE 158275
Classified By: Economic Counselor Bruce Williamson, reasons 1.4
(b) and
(d).
1. (C) Post delivered reftel demarche to Gustavo Rodrigues of
COAF (Brazil's financial intelligence unit),Luiza Lopes da
Silva of the Ministry of External Relations' (MRE's) Office
for the Combat of Illicit Transnational Activities and
Santiago Morao of the MRE's Disarmament and Sensitive
Technologies Division. Rodrigues responded enthusiastically
to the points, noting that Brazil had presented a paper in
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) context calling for the
involvement of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) in
tracking financial networks behind the trafficking of nuclear
materials. The paper (document number NSG(05)24 dated March
29, 2005),was discussed at an NSG Oslo meeting in June,
according to Rodrigues. The dialogue in the NSG context,
Rodrigues said, was not extremely substantive as only two
countries' delegations, Brazil's and Norway's, included
representatives from their FIUs.
2. (C) While the GoB strongly supports the concept of using
FIU's to combat WMD proliferation, Rodrigues noted that
Brazil does not have domestic authority to freeze the assets
of WMD proliferators. Rodrigues nevertheless undertook to
conduct a search of COAF's own databases for transactions in
the names of the proliferating entities enumerated in U.S.
Executive Order 13882. He further undertook to coordinate
with the Central Bank and the Brazilian Intelligence Agency
(ABIN) a search of their respective databases. The Central
Bank, he explained, has the capability to track the
originator and destination for all foreign exchange
transactions made through the formal banking system.
3. (C) Rodrigues acknowledged that, should these searches
produce a hit, then the GoB would have to grapple with how to
respond. Econoff reiterated that UN Security Council
Resolution 1540 requires countries to combat proliferation
and could form the legal basis for GoB action. Rodrigues
took the point, but said it would take some time to implement
the UNSC resolution (usually done via presidential decree).
Instead, he said, if assets were found in this case, the Gob
would have to find a creative solution, perhaps freezing the
(theoretical) assets in response to a USG request through law
enforcement channels.
DANILOVICH