BRAZIL: A/S DESUTTER'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRASILIA 002282 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2015 TAGS: AORC KNNP PARM PREL BR CWC SUBJECT: BRAZIL: A/S DESUTTER'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTRY TO DISCUSS COMPLIANCE DIPLOMACY REF: A. STATE 141086 ¶B. BRASILIA 002066 Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DENNIS HEARNE. REASONS: 1.4 (B)(D) ¶1. (U) INTRODUCTION. Assistant Secretary for Verification and Compliance Paula A. DeSutter met on 15 August with Foreign Ministry Officials for compliance diplomacy discussions, led on the Brazilian side by Ambassador Antonio Guerreiro, Assistant Secretary of International Organization Affairs (in the MRE structure this includes UN and arms control/non-proliferation issues). A/S DeSutter was accompanied by Embassy POL Counselor Dennis Hearne, Thomas Yehl, VC Director for Technology and Assessment, Astrid Lewis, VC Foreign Affairs Officer, and other Embassy POL staff. A working lunch with GOB officials and a media event on compliance diplomacy followed. The delegation concluded the visit with a meeting with Nilson Mourao, Vice President of the Foreign Affairs Committee, of the Brazilian Congress' Chamber of Deputies. Principal themes are reported below. END INTRODUCTION. COMPLIANCE DIPLOMACY -------------- ¶2. (C) On August 15, A/S DeSutter, along with her team, met with Foreign Ministry officials. In attendance were: Ambassador Antonio Guerreiro, Assistant Secretary of International Organization Affairs; Santiago Mourao, Division Director for Disarmament (DD); Manuel Montenegro da Cruz, General Coordinator of Sensitive Items to the Ministry of Science and Technology; Everton Frask Lucero, First Secretary, International Advisor to the Ministry of Science SIPDIS and Technology; Jandyr dos Santos Jr., Third Secretary, DD; Claudio Leopoldino, Third Secretary, DD; and Igor Germano, Third Secretary, DD. A/S DeSutter had previously met with Ambassador Guerreiro in November 2004 to discuss the Verification and Compliance Bureau's approach to compliance diplomacy. Several issues were covered, starting with compliance diplomacy. The A/S explained that verification and compliance is an evolving concept. While the building blocks and tools of the past still exist, it is necessary to be creative in addressing these problems by adapting these tools and creating new ones. It is especially important that the international community grapple with challenge of enforcement, which is a key element of verification and compliance policy. The international community is challenged in a very clear way )perhaps for the first time in multilateral fora such as the NPT ) with the problem of how to persuade international violators to come back into compliance. This, she argued, is not just a U.S. problem but one with respect to which all parties to agreements share the responsibility ) and share a real security interest in achieving. The purpose of our compliance diplomacy effort is to explain to other countries how and why we assess compliance, and why we place such emphasis on verification, compliance, and enforcement. DeSutter walked through the Libya WMD elimination and verification process and some of the key elements we hope to adapt. The importance of obtaining a clear strategic commitment can't be understated. Once this was achieved from the Libyans, we worked with international organizations like the IAEA and OPCW, but also worked trilaterally with the Libyans and United Kingdom. This gave us much more agility, rapidity, and proven results than would have been possible working solely through multilateral fora. The A/S contrasted the case of North Korea's (DPRK) nuclear program with that of Iran, and noted that the former country may not be as susceptible to international pressure. Iran, however, is a different case, specifically regarding their nuclear program. The question was raised as to how we can reach out to other countries to get their help in this regard. The A/S pointed to Brazil's ideal position ) with its credentials ) to serve as an example for other countries and reach out to them to help the U.S. in the effort to enforce compliance. ¶3. (U) Brazil explained their National Program for Public-Private Sector Collaboration on Sensitive Items (PRONABENS),which conducts outreach activities involving industries that develop activities related to production of sensitive goods and/or dual use technologies. The program, which began in 2004, has thus far worked with the public sector on export controls in dual use biological and chemical address equipment and items. Plans are in place for a nuclear workshop to address United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540. NUCLEAR ISSUES -------------- ¶4. (C) The Brazilians then turned the discussion to Iran's nuclear program. A/S DeSutter underscored the importance of referring Iran to the Security Council now, lest the international community send the wrong message that compliance with international obligations is both optional and does not much matter. She noted that Libya was referred to the Security Council for its IAEA safeguards violations, even after agreeing to give up its program, while Iran has yet to be. Ambassador Guerreiro stated that they had been encouraging Iran to cooperate with the UN and to clean their record. He expressed skepticism regarding what the international community can do and how to deal with issues of non-compliance in general. Guerreiro also expressed concern about: whether UNSC referral would end IAEA activity in Iran; whether the U.S. had considered the possibility that Iran might respond to referral by withdrawing from the NPT; and whether Russia and China would preclude any action on Iran as China had with the DPRK. DeSutter answered that while she couldn't predict whether Iran would kick the IAEA out, there is a danger that it is dangerous to allow a violator such as Iran to use the threat of withdrawal to put all the pressure on the international community ) instead of itself facing pressure to live up to its obligations. With regard to the UNSC, she said that Ambassador Bolton would work the issue for the U.S. in New York, and furthermore that: a) the Six Party process came in response to referral of the DRPK to the UNSC; b) referral is mandated in the IAEA statute (although the European Union (EU-3) process had deferred this); and c) the U.S. grappled with whether there should be automatic, pre-set responses to noncompliance and decided to leave it to decision makers that would confront the issues at the time. This would be the diplomatic enforcement challenge facing the UNSC on which Brazil sits. Iran is learning how to evade the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). DPRK -------------- ¶5. (C) Ambassador Guerreiro asked the A/S her thoughts as to whether there was cause for optimism in the Six Party Talks with the DPRK. The A/S responded by giving the example of Libya's decision to give up its weapons of mass destruction (WMD)* which shows that a country that has had a difficult relationship with the U.S. can still work together with us at some point, based on mutual cooperation, by making a genuine strategic commitment to eliminate WMD. The DPRK is a much more difficult case than Libya, she said, but nevertheless, the Libya case can be used as a model approach. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL -------------- ¶6. (C) Ambassador Guerreiro stated that Brazil is committed to the NPT and hopes by early next year to resolve the signing of the Additional Protocol (AP). He further stated that Brazil was in ongoing discussions with the IAEA on this issue. (Note: The political situation in Brazil, with the Lula administration facing corruption charges, was viewed by Embassy staff as a distraction from these matters at best.) CHEMICAL ISSUES -------------- ¶7. (U) The discussion then turned to chemical weapons, specifically Other Chemical Production Facilities (OCPFs). A/S DeSutter brought up points previously made in the December 2004 meeting with Fabio Antibas, Brazil's Second Secretary to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical SIPDIS Weapons (OPCW) about the need to increase OCPF inspections. She reiterated her concern about under-inspection of OCPFs and for the Technical Secretariat (TS) to develop a site selection methodology to inspect these facilities to ensure proliferation deterrence. Brazil responded that they have not objected to the increase of OCPFs inspections. Their concern remained on the strengthening of the OPCFs selection methodology, and further pointed that not all OCPFs threaten the Chemicals Weapons Convention (CWC). Brazil feels that the focus of inspections should be directed toward scheduled facilities. Both parties agreed to continue working on this issue so that all parties are satisfied on the selection methodology. ¶8. (U) The A/S expressed the USG's appreciation to Brazil to ensure the readiness of the OPCW TS to carry out a challenge inspection, but said that the OPCW may not be quite ready to conduct investigations of alleged use. A/S DeSutter noted that the VC Bureau is putting together its own "cookbook" on how it will pursue such investigations, and that we are working closely with the OPCW on how it would conduct such inspections, if that option is viewed as needed and useful. She cited the example of press allegations of CW use in Darfur, Sudan, and Burma. She reiterated that effective tools are necessary to address this issue. ¶9. (U) A/S DeSutter also encouraged Brazil to continue developing a leadership role in the region by continuing to assist other States Party on CWC Article VII implementation matters. She also urged them to continue to support universal adherence to the CWC. And finally, her staff provided Brazil with a brief status update of the U.S. Destruction Program. US/INDIA CIVILIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION INITIATIVE -------------- --- ¶10. (C) During lunch, Ambassador Guerreiro expressed disappointment regarding the US/India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Initiative. He stated that the announcement came as a shock to Brazil. In 1998, Brazil terminated its Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with India in the wake of Indian nuclear tests. He further noted that Brazil's history of adhering late to the NPT, following much domestic political debate, made any recognition of new weapons states problematic for the GOB both in terms of Brazilian politics and Brazil's commitment to the NPT. He said that at present, Brazil is evaluating the impact of the US/India initiative to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and expressed concern about the impact to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). DeSutter responded by first noting that detailed discussions would need to be deferred to her colleague A/S Rademaker and his staff, but that the U.S. was not, by this policy, bringing India into the NPT as a nuclear weapon state, but rather was addressing the challenge of a nation that had remained outside the NPT by moving to bring them into the IAEA and AP, and that this could be viewed positively. She further stated that the U.S. Congress would review the approach since legal changes would be necessary. NSG issues would also be addressed by her colleagues in the Nonproliferation Bureau, which the Department is merging with the Arms Control Bureau to form a new Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. ¶11. (C) Guerreiro reiterated Brazil's commitment, along with international efforts, to close supply loopholes that permit proliferators to operate as defined under UN Resolution 1540. Plans are in place for a nuclear workshop to address United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 through PRONABENS. The Foreign Ministry presented its 1540 report to Congress and is awaiting a response. MEDIA EVENT -------------- ¶12. (U) A brief media event was held in the afternoon. In attendance were reporters from three top Brazilian daily newspapers. Questions covered various topics including Brazil's nuclear nonproliferation efforts, the additional protocol, and the IAEA. The A/S briefly discussed the morning's meeting with Ambassador Guerreiro and explained the USG's approach to compliance diplomacy. MEETING WITH FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE VICE CHAIR NILSON -------------- -------------- ¶13. (U) Concluding the visit was a meeting with Nilson Mourao, Vice President of the Foreign Affairs Committee. A/S DeSutter explained VC's legislative mandate and method of operations, using Libya as an example of how VC coordinated U.S. assistance to eliminate the country's WMD. The A/S further explained about the reorganization of the arms control and nonproliferation bureaus to address new areas with emphasis on counter-proliferation and addressing the nexus between terrorism and WMD. The A/S stressed Brazil's role as a leader in bringing other countries in to compliance. When asked about the bureau's opinion of the IAEA's questions about the Rezende Nuclear Power Plant in Rio de Janeiro, the A/S responded that they were comfortable with the additional protocols laid out by the IAEA and Brazil. The Brazil program is a peaceful program, in contrast to the Iran program where evidence indicates that their government has undertaken covert activities for a number of years. When Mourao suggested that perhaps the U.S. should be more cautious in examining Iran given that no nuclear weapons were ever found in Iraq, A/S DeSutter first clarified that it was not the USG's determination that Iraq had nuclear weapons but that they had a program which was not very far along. Part of the concern was the unaccounted materials in the ten years following the end of the Gulf War. In the case of Iran, we are not in a situation where other countries need to take the USG's word regarding their weapons program. Rather, they can refer to the IAEA Director General's reports to the Board of Governors which detailed Iran's noncompliance actions during the past two decades. Mourao concluded the meeting by reassuring the A/S that though the Lula administration is going through a delicate situation (scandals, etc.),Brazil's democracy has succeeded in building its institutions, and that the government is committed to disarmament. Mourao promised to draft a brief report of the meeting to be sent to the head of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the National Defense for Security Committee. A/S DeSutter approved this cable. DANILOVICH