REGIONAL ISSUES: GOB VIEWS ON VENEZUELA-COLOMBIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000210

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2015
TAGS: PREL BR
SUBJECT: REGIONAL ISSUES: GOB VIEWS ON VENEZUELA-COLOMBIA
DISPUTE AND SITUATION IN BOLIVIA

REF: A. STATE 11483

B. BOGOTA 555

C. LA PAZ 193 AND 194

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN D. DANILOVICH. REASON: 1.4 (B)(D).



1. (C) Summary: Senior GOB officials told Ambassador and
PolCounselor this week that Brazil is prepared to play an
informal role in helping mediate a resolution to the
Venezuela-Colombia dispute following the rendition of a FARC
official from Venezuela to Colombia in recent days.
President Lula da Silva met with President Uribe in Leticia
on 20 January and spoke by phone to President Chavez the same
day. The GOB is counseling "good sense" and efforts to lower
the tone and is optimistic that both governments want to
avoid escalation. Presidential envoy Marco Aurelio Garcia
will see Chavez in Caracas on 22 January, and Chavez will
attend the Porto Alegre Social Forum in Brazil next week,
where he will meet Lula, affording other opportunities for
GOB mediation. On Bolivia, a senior presidency foreign
affairs official said that the GOB does not believe there is
imminent danger of a resignation by President Mesa, despite
his threats, but remains intensely concerned about the
unstable situation there. End summary.


VENEZUELA-COLOMBIA


2. (C) On 20 January Ambassador raised ref a points on the
Venezuela-Colombia dispute with Ambassador Antonio Aguiar
Patriota, chief of staff to FM Amorim, and asked for MRE
views on the state of play. Patriota responded that Amorim
had spoken by phone with both President Uribe and President
Chavez prior to President Lula's meeting in Leticia with
Uribe on 20 January. Patriota said Lula and Uribe discussed
the dispute for an hour during their meeting, and that Lula
had spoken the same day by phone with Chavez. Lula had
subsequently expressed the view that Chavez needed to be
"handled very calmly." Patriota said Brazil needs to
maintain friendly relations with both neighbors and is
prepared to act in an informal capacity to try to facilitate
a resolution. Ambassador Danilovich stressed USG concern
about Chavez/Venezuelan connections with FARC and other
foreign terrorist organizations, and reiterated our
commitment to fight terrorism in the region and globally. He
also noted the mediation efforts of Peru's government in
leadership of the Andean Community and urged the GOB to be
supportive. (Note: PolCounselor also provided demarche
points to the foreign ministry's Andean division chief and to
the international affairs office at the Presidency. End note.)


3. (U) On 20 January Presidential spokesman Andre Singer told
journalists at Planalto that President Lula had discussed the
dispute by telephone with Chavez and in Leticia with Uribe,
and indicated that, "in as much as the two presidents took
the initiative to touch on the subject with President Lula,
it was understood that (Brazil) should act to facilitate a
reapproximation between the two countries."


4. (C) PolCounselor followed up Singer's statement on 21
January with a call to Marcel Biato (strictly protect),
deputy foreign affairs advisor to Lula. Biato said that Lula
had counseled "good sense" and the need to cool off tensions
by lowering the volume on public statements and looking for
good-will gestures. Essentially, Brazil will offer an
informal channel for communication and good offices for the
two governments "to find a way out," according to Biato. It
is the GOB's assessment that both the GOC and GOV are
inclined to seek a resolution, since the GOB sees no
political advantage to either side in an escalation. Biato
confirmed Lula's senior foreign affairs advisor, Marco
Aurelio Garcia, will travel to Caracas on 22 January to see
Chavez, a trip previously scheduled as a planning mission for
Lula's February visit to Venezuela, but Biato said Garcia
will further discuss with Chavez resolution options for the
dispute. Biato also noted that Chavez will travel to Brazil
next week for the Porto Alegre Social Forum, which Lula is
also planning to attend, providing additional opportunities
for GOB mediation. Biato added Lula was promised on the
phone by Chavez that he would not make inflammatory
statements while in Brazil (presumably against either the GOB
or Colombia).

BOLIVIA


5. (C) PolCounselor also asked Biato for views on the current
tensions in Bolivia (Biato's boss, Marco Aurelio Garcia, has
been to Bolivia as Lula's envoy). Biato said he had talked
to Brazil's Ambassador in La Paz, Antonino Mena Goncalves, at
length on the evening of 20 January, and Goncalves indicated
he had just consulted with other Ambassadors in La Paz
(including, Biato presumed, Ambassador Greenlee) and the
consensus was that there is not an imminent probability of
Mesa's following through on his resignation threat. Biato
said that is the GOB view at the moment, but nonetheless
there is intense concern that Mesa's concessions are
weakening him, contributing to a situation so precarious that
he sees a political necessity in "continuously threatening a
plunge into chaos" (through resignation). Biato confirmed
Lula continues to try to "persuade by example" -- i.e.,
stressing to opposition leader Evo Morales the importance of
patience and adhering to constitutional processes in pursuing
political legitimacy, as reflected in Lula's own personal
rise to the presidency. PolCounselor replied that the U.S.
Embassy and Brazil's embassy in La Paz have discussed their
shared questions about the nature of Chavez's influence on
Morales (ref C),and asked whether there is GOB concern that
Chavez's "mentoring" of Morales may be less salutary in
content and effect than Lula's. Biato demurred on discussing
the question in depth, saying only that the GOB believes
Chavez is, at bottom, enough of a democrat to not stoke up
instability in fragile Bolivia.



6. (C) Comment: It appears the GOB, both in the Presidency
and the foreign ministry, is willing to provide a
conflict-resolution channel for Colombia and Venezuela, but
wants to avoid a formalized, drawn-out role. We are seeking a
meeting with Marco Aurelio Garcia, and will follow
Chavez-Lula contacts on the issue in Porto Alegre (our Labor
Attache will attend the forum and report for the Mission). On
Bolivia, the GOB seems relatively hopeful that Mesa will
remain; we anticipate the GOB would engage robustly, both
politically and economically (e,g., taking steps to
accelerate financial support) in the event of a dramatic
deterioration.


DANILOVICH