BRAZIL: LULA ENVOY AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS BOLIVIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 001549

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2015
TAGS: PREL BR BL
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: LULA ENVOY AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS BOLIVIA
CRISIS

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN DANILOVICH. REASONS: 1.4 (B)(D)


1. (C) Introduction: Ambassador and PolCounselor met on 8
June at the residence for a private lunch with President Lula
da Silva's Foreign Affairs Advisor, Marco Aurelio Garcia and
his deputy, Marcel Biato. Garcia has traveled repeatedly as
Lula's "fireman" to Venezuela (he speaks by phone and meets
frequently with Hugo Chavez),Haiti (where he spent a week in
October 2004 assessing security, political and assistance
issues) and Bolivia (where he was dispatched by Lula last
week for meetings with President Mesa, MAS leader Evo
Morales, church and social sector representatives and U.S.
Embassy Charge.) Septel will focus on the discussion
regarding Haiti; details of the Bolivia discussion follow
below.

2.(C) Garcia returned from Bolivia at the end of last week
and has been monitoring the situation closely since then. He
expects major developments in the next 24-48 hours. Garcia
said that both he and FM Amorim (who returned early from the
OAS GA because of Bolivia) are on stand-by for travel to
Bolivia on short notice, but Garcia opined that he thought it
would be best if he goes instead of Amorim (Comment: Garcia's
reasoning was not explained, but we assumed he thought
Amorim's presence would raise the signature of Brazilian
involvement higher than the GOB believes to be opportune.
Amorim called Garcia on his cell phone during the meeting
with Ambassador and the two conferred on Bolivia
developments. End comment.) Garcia made these observations
on the current situation:

-- The GOB believes the best succession scenario in the
current conditions would be by-passing Senate President Vaca
Diez and Chamber of Deputies President Mario Cossio, who are
deeply unpopular with protesting sectors, and passing
executive authority after their resignations to the chief
Supreme Court justice until new elections are held. This is
constitutional and provides "breathing room" in which Morales
and others may be persuaded to demobilize protests in the
immediate term.

-- A worst case scenario, in Garcia's view and based on his
meetings last week, would be assumption of authority by Vaca
Diez. Garcia said the GOB fears a large-scale, violent
revolt in such a case, with protestors occupying areas around
government buildings in an effort to bar Diez's installation
as acting president. The potential for a blood bath is such
circumstances deeply concerns the Brazilians, Garcia said.

-- Another scenario for defusing tensions would be a decision
to nationalize the gas sector immediately by whomever is
acting as president, Garcia said. He noted that such a
decision would involve complex arbitration in its aftermath
and would be "reversable at most any time," hence there could
be some merit in using this tactic to provide immediate
stabilization in the country. (Comment: Garcia must
understand this would be an extreme option, but he appeared
to believe the circumstances are sufficiently grave that
unorthodox tactics are required. End comment.)

-- Asked about the possibility of a victory by Morales if
elections are called, Garcia replied that the GOB doubts
Morales could win, and Morales must be aware of this reality.
Garcia opined that Morales has "radicalized" in some
positions, but that he also must be aware that such extreme
positions do not constitute "an agenda for governance."
Garcia also seemed to downplay the influence of Chavez on
Morales, but would not be drawn into a detailed discussion,
joking only that "Venezuela and the United States are equally
distrusted," depending on who one talks to in Bolivia.

-- Garcia praised the role of the church and senior clergy
who are politically astute, saying the church now is
virtually the only institution in Bolivia with sufficient
credibility and good will across the social spectrum to act
as a mediator.

-- In terms of mediation, Garcia said that the GOB has not
offered itself in any specific role to the Bolivians, but has
made clear it would be willing to engage if requested,
possibly working with the Argentines. Garcia said that OAS
mediation is not likely to be accepted in Bolivia owing to
the Chilean nationality of the Secretary General.

-- Garcia said the GOB and Brazilian military are quietly
completing contingency planning for evacuation of Brazilian
citizens (mainly from La Paz) in the event of a major
collapse.


3. (C) Comment: It is possible Garcia will be on a plane to
Bolivia on/around the time this message reaches Washington.
The GOB clearly is seized with the unfolding crisis, and
Garcia candidly stated to Ambassador that what is happening
in Bolivia is a potentially devastating repudiation of
Brazil's efforts to present regional economic integration as
a basis for enhancing political stability in South America.
The efficacy of Brazilian efforts to assist in the crisis in
the immediate term remain to be seen, but we believe we
should remain engaged with the GOB on its willingness to work
with Argentina in some capacity as mediators/guarantors if
the different sectors in Bolivia reach a consensus on seeking
outside support for a solution to the crisis.