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05BRASILIA1130 2005-04-28 12:01:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
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1. (C) Introduction: Assistant Secretary of State for Arms
Control and Non-Proliferation Stephen G. Rademaker met on 11
April with his Brazilian Foreign Ministry counterpart,
Ambassador Antonio Guerreiro, Assistant Secretary for
International Organizations (in the MRE structure this
includes UN and arms control/non-proliferation issues).
Guerreio was accompanied by senior aides from his UN and arms
control divisions, but Guerrerio alone spoke to all of the
issues throughout the meeting. A/S Rademaker was accompanied
by Arms Control Bureau Senior Advisor Joan Corbett, WHA/BSC
Regional Affairs Officer Carolyn Croft, AC/NP Special Advisor
Carolyn Leddy, NP Bureau Foreign Affairs Specialist Steve
Adams, DOD/OSD Attorney Advisor Musetta Johnson and Embassy
PolCouns. A/S Rademaker and Guerreiro discussed goals for
the May 2005 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference,
general proliferation issues, and Article 98. Principal
themes are reported below. End introduction.


2. (SBU) A/S Rademaker provided Guerreiro with a briefing on
USG views and goals for the 2005 NPT Revcon, and provided
slides of the presentation to the GOB interlocutors. A/S
Rademaker stressed U.S. commitment to the NPT, and said the
U.S. views noncompliance as the critical challenge to the
treaty at present. Indeed, in the USG view, the treaty is
"under siege" as evidence increasingly points to some member
states undercutting their treaty obligations by noncompliance
with the basic NPT obligations under Article II and III, use
of Article IV (peaceful nuclear cooperation) as a cover for
weapons programs, and ineffective prevention of transfer of
weapons technologies to non-state networks. In this regard,
A/S Rademaker emphasized the importance of a high standard
for safeguards among supplier states as a condition of
supply, including Brazil, and urged adoption of the
Additional Protocol by Brazil. Similarly, he stressed the
importance of broad endorsement of UNSCR 1540 and encouraged
Brazilian participation in the Proliferation Security

3. (C) A/S Rademaker characterized the situation with Iran as
"very serious" and said the USG and Europeans will support
referral of the matter to the UNSC if Iran breaks with any
aspect of the current IAEA suspension. A/S Rademaker
provided a detailed presentation of the USG record on
disarmament under Article VI, noting the May 2001 statement
by President Bush that the U.S. nuclear posture is that of
achieving a credible deterrent with the lowest possible
number of nuclear weapons consistent with national security
needs, including obligations to allies. He outlined USG
positions on stockpile reductions, fissile materials, and
cooperation with Russia, noting that U.S. assistance to
Russia for nuclear security efforts, together with aid from
G-8 allies, now totals USD 20 billion. In response to
comments by Guerrerio on new U.S. nuclear arms programs and
the lack of U.S. adherence to the CTBT, A/S Rademaker
emphasized that the robust nuclear earth penetrator is only a
conceptual design study -- there are no active R and D
efforts on these systems. The U.S. Senate has not ratified
the CTBT principally because of concerns relating to the
verifiability of the treaty. For the United States, it is
important to be assured that all other countries have given
up nuclear testing if they are to do so, because for all
nuclear weapons states it would be useful to retain the
right, if a need arises in the future, to test nuclear
weapons. Nuclear weapons are man-made devices that
deteriorate over time like all other man-made devices. He
also noted that the U.S. has unilaterally observed a 10 year
moratorium on testing and has no testing planned now or in
the future.


4. (C) Guerreio provided the following comments in response
(organized below thematically):

--Brazil, the AP and Rezende: Echoing statements made at
various times over the past several months by FM Amorim and
other GOB officials, Guerreiro said the GOB had never said it
would not adhere to the AP, and he "hoped" that Brazil would
sign the protocol this year, although it would be after the
May Revcon. Brazil and the IAEA have also successfully
completed their agreement on agency inspections of Brazil's
Rezende facility, Guerreiro said, although some ongoing
technical questions are still being resolved.
--Iran: Guerrerio said the GOB had sternly and repeatedly
told Iranian delegations that Iran had "messed things up"
(for other non-weapons nuclear states) and that Iran must
cooperate fully with IAEA, since non-weapons states must have
impeccable credentials under all articles of the treaty in
order to challenge weapons states on disarmament issues. He
added that the statutes of the IAEA required that the Board
of Governors refer Iran's case to the UNSC if the agency
exhausts all of its authorities and resources but achieves no
resolution with Iran, and Brazil understands the UNSC would
then have to "live up to its obligations." Guerreiro and A/S
Rademaker agreed on the necessity of taking a "graduated
approach" -- i.e., not starting immediately with sanctions --
in the event Iran is referred to the council.

--NPT Revcon: Noting that Brazilian Revcon President Duarte
has "a tough job ahead of him," Guerreiro said the GOB
thinks there should be a strong effort at an agreed agenda at
the meeting's outset, and will seek USG cooperation in this
effort. He also noted GOB agreement with an emphasis on
compliance but said the Revcon should aim at producing a
"balanced agreement" that addresses all pillars of the treaty
(i.e., disarmament as well as nonproliferation). Brazil will
not oppose consecration of adherence to the Additional
Protocol as a condition of supply, "but that cannot be the
only proposal," he said. Discussion of regional issues will
be important during the conference, and it is "unavoidable"
that Israel will come up in the Middle East-Iran context,
Guerreiro opined. In other potential problem areas,
Guerreiro saw little prospect for a robust agreement on
restrictions on enrichment and processing technologies.
Guerreiro expected the Revcon would endorse UNSCR 1540 as "a
good step" in stemming technology flows to non-state actors.

--Proliferation: While agreeing that compliance is a major
challenge for the NPT, Guerreiro did not agree with the
statement that the treaty is "under siege" -- rather he
posited rather that the NPT has been a success, witness the
fact that the number of weapons states is still fairly small,
despite the worried predictions of John F. Kennedy and others
that as many as thirty countries would some day have nuclear
arms. However, on a related point, Guerreiro said the GOB
believes it is critical that the NPT Revcon not inadvertently
give recognized weapons state status to non-treaty-party
countries with declared or suspected arms programs. This is
"a highly sensitive issue" for Brazil, South Africa and other
countries that have voluntarily renounced nuclear weapons
programs only to see others who have flouted
non-proliferation principles achieve de facto status
(bordering on acceptance) as military nuclear powers.

--PSI: Guerrerio called the Proliferation Security
Initiative a "fair exercise," but not one that Brazil had
studied in depth or considered joining until now. However,
Brazil will send a military observer to an upcoming PSI
exercise in Portugal, and may then look more carefully at the
possibility of participation.


5. (C) A/S Rademaker outlined USG motives for seeking Article
98 agreements to provide protection for American citizens
from extradition to face trial at the International Criminal
Court. He explained how U.S. national experience with
independent prosecutors had left negative views in American
society about unaccountable prosecutors with broad mandates,
and related fears that Americans -- given the U.S. leadership
role in international affairs -- could be frequent targets
for specious and politically-driven indictments. The U.S.
wants to find a way to be a "good neighbor" to the ICC,
perhaps in time able to offer some degree support that
approximates the critical legal, technical and investigative
assistance offered by the USG to the ICTY and ICTR over the
years. But that can only come about if the U.S. has a
"comfort level" with the direction and activities undertaken
by the court, and if U.S. personnel are protected by Article
98 agreements with a wide range of states.

6. (C) Guerreiro politely but unequivocally stated that
Brazil would not sign an Article 98 agreement with the U.S.,
and views the idea as a "non-starter." Brazil is a strong
supporter of the ICC and believes the necessary checks and
balances are in place to deter the kinds of concerns outlined
by A/S Rademaker. Brazil remains convinced that it is better
to have a permanent criminal court than ad hoc tribunals.
Noting the abstention by Brazil on 31 March on the UN
resolution that indicated the ICC for accountability and
investigations into the Sudan-Darfur atrocity allegations,
but with special protections carved out at U.S. insistence,
Guerreiro said FM Amorim himself had issued instructions for
abstention and considered a resolution with special
protections from ICC authorities to be a "dangerous

7. (C) Comment. A/S Rademaker's visit provided a valuable
opportunity to consult at a senior level with the GOB on a
wide range of issues. Guerreiro's comments on likely
Brazilian adherence to the Additional Protocol this year and
support for the AP as a condition of supply at the May Revcon
are encouraging. Less promising was Guerreiro's categorical
rejection of discussing an Article 98 agreement with the U.S.

8. (U) The Assistant Secretary cleared this cable.