NO CHANGE IN EXTRADITION POLICY FOLLOWING AUC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 009593 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2015 TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL KJUS KCRM CO AUC FARC SUBJECT: NO CHANGE IN EXTRADITION POLICY FOLLOWING AUC STATEMENT, GOC HAS 10 DAYS TO RESTORE PEACE PROCESS MOMENTUM Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood. Reason: 1.4 (b,d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In a 90-minute meeting with Ambassador Wood on October 7, Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo described paramilitary leaders as distrustful of President Uribe and scared of extradition, but confirmed GOC extradition policy would remain unchanged following the October 6 AUC statement suspending demobilizations. Restrepo said the GOC calculates it has about 10 days to ensure that the peace process regains its momentum before pending demobilizations, and the December 31 deadline, are threatened. He noted that more than 1,000 members of the Bloque Central Bolivar had left the concentration zone for demobilization and returned to the field. Restrepo expressed great concern that the GOC would struggle to secure the security corridors left exposed by the pending demobilizations of the Bloque Central Bolivar, and said Colombians are insufficiently attentive to the FARC retaking control of the areas. End summary. -------------- Restrepo: Paras Distrustful, Scared -------------- ¶2. (C) Restrepo said the paramilitary leaders with whom he met in Santa Fe de Ralito October 6 distrust President Uribe and are scared that they could be extradited to the U.S. Their behavior and statements were not "radical"; rather, they appeared to lack confidence in the president and the peace process. The leaders told him they are the stronger "third generation" of paramilitary leaders and they fear being accused by their followers of selling out if they do not ensure that Don Berna is safe from extradition, for they could be next (Colima prison is the "antechamber to extradition," they believe). The leaders say Uribe takes decisions over their heads and makes it difficult for them to defend the peace process to their subordinates. Restrepo described the behavior of demobilized leader Salvatore Mancuso as especially revealing: he had his head in his hands frequently, and appeared scared at times and dumbfounded ("tonto") at others. He asked for forgiveness for his deeds and told Restrepo he did not even want to be at Ralito for the meeting. Similarly, Vicente Castano sent a letter to Restrepo saying he would not participate in the meeting. Restrepo said demobilized commanders (like Mancuso and Castano) are in the worst of all positions, in that they have no troops to command and rely on the GOC for their security. ¶3. (C) The leaders told Restrepo they feared "judicial uncertainty" and requested legal guarantees that they would not be extradited. As stated in an October 7 presidential press release (see para 10),Restrepo said "judicial certainty" does not depend on legal norms but rather on the political credibility of the peace process. In turn, such credibility is intimately linked to the seriousness with which the paramilitaries approach their obligations under the Justice and Peace law. Restrepo told the paramilitaries Uribe had to take the decision to transfer Don Berna to Colima to maintain the integrity of the peace process. Restrepo emphasized that Uribe made the decision some time before Ambassador Wood characterized as "disappointing" Uribe's decision to suspend Don Berna's extradition. In the GOC's view, sending Don Berna to Combita does not violate any GOC undertaking; the Justice and Peace law requires paramilitary leaders such as Don Berna to be incarcerated in "serious prisons." ¶4. (C) According to Restrepo, the leaders at Ralito requested that the GOC issue a joint declaration saying that demobilizations were suspended; dialogue would restart; and Don Berna would have the same "probation" (i.e., freedom to move around and meet with people) as ELN leader Francisco Galan. The GOC declined the suggestions. Restrepo said the GOC offered the paramilitaries two options: first, that the GOC would seek their suggestions on how the "Casas de Justicia y Paz" (justice centers) would operate (Restrepo did not elaborate); and second, that the GOC would reaffirm its recognition of Don Berna as a paramilitary leader. According to Restrepo, it is "practically impossible" to go beyond these offers. -------------- -------------- Ambassador: GOC Has Made Great Progess, Should Stay Course -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Noting he was reading from instructions, the Ambassador told Restrepo the GOC should remember it was negotiating from a position of strength. Don Berna is in a serious prison, thousands have demobilized, and remaining leaders feel vulnerable. The behavior of paramilitary leaders is a test for the peace process. The Ambassador said the U.S. was not looking for a public confirmation of the GOC's continued commitment to extradition; rather, the U.S. wants to know privately that doors have not closed, and that the GOC's firm policy on extradition remains intact. He expressed concern at the AUC's statement about "redefining" the "rules of the game," a position the Ambassador suggested was a codeword for reexamining extradition. In the Ambassador's view, this is not the time for punishments or vengeance. The GOC should, however, insist on the December 31 date by which paramilitaries must demobilize to receive benefits under the Justice and Peace law. -------------- GOC Extradition Policy Will Not Change -------------- ¶6. (C) Restrepo was clear that the GOC would not change its extradition policy in response to paramilitary demands ("definitely no extradition on the table"). He agreed with the Ambassador that the policy is somewhat ambiguous with regard to paramilitary leaders: a subjective GOC assessment of leaders' compliance with Justice and Peace obligations would be a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition to decide an extradition case. Paramilitary leaders know the GOC will assess their behavior carefully before making a judgment to extradite. Even if the leaders comply in full (which the Ambassador said he doubted in cases such as Don Berna),the GOC still had the option of extraditing. Restrepo agreed that this was the nub of the paramilitaries' concern: they want to shut the legal door on the possibility of extradition and the GOC cannot agree. The Ambassador and Restrepo agreed that extradition would not be the subject of a GOC-paramilitary negotiation. -------------- --- GOC Considers it has 10 Days to Restore Momentum -------------- --- ¶7. (C) About 10 days remain for the GOC to restore the peace process and demobilization momentum, in Restrepo's view. Any delay beyond that date risks the process unraveling. The GOC must retake control of the peace process but should avoid issuing an "ultimatum," he said. (Text of the GOC's preliminary response to the October 6 AUC statement is at para 10.) ¶8. (C) Restrepo expressed concern at the recent dispersal of 1,000 of the Bloque Central Bolivar (BCB) paramilitaries from their initial demobilization concentration zones. (The 3,500-strong BCB is the backbone of the paramilitary movement.) He said the availability of cheap weapons and the ease with which paramilitaries could return to their previous zones of influence worried the GOC. Restrepo will not meet with Don Berna October 7 to avoid the impression he is negotiating with him in the wake of the October 6 AUC statement. Rather, Restrepo plans to call Don Berna next week and offer to reaffirm his role as a paramilitary leader and peace process negotiator, and suggest communication options from Colima so Don Berna can continue to persuade his followers to disarm. (Restrepo has heard from two sources that Don Berna is not in agreement with paramilitary leader Ernesto Baez's October 6 AUC statement. Don Berna apparently fears being "too radical," a position that could push Uribe to authorize his extradition.) The GOC will hold out the possibility of additional jail visits for Don Berna. Restrepo said the GOC will also try to convince Don Berna and his supporters that the GOC has not locked the cell door and thrown away the key. It is in his interest, and that of his followers, to fulfill his Justice and Peace commitments to the letter, Restrepo said. -------------- Restrepo Fears FARC Incursions -------------- ¶9. (C) In Restrepo's view, Colombians do not sufficiently appreciate the dangers of the FARC (and to some extent the ELN) retaking control of stategic territory when the BCB demobilizes. BCB demobilizations would open up key corridors to FARC incursions, such as a corridor to Uraba (the site of the San Jose de Apartado massacre). The GOC cannot get more out of its police and military forces, who are stretched to the limit. Restrepo said he was pleased when Uribe told him he had recently removed General Cabellos from command; Restrepo said Ceballos always offered excuses and analyses rather than action when asked to deliver security. -------------- Text of October 7 Presidential Press Release -------------- ¶10. (U) Begin unofficial Embassy translation of October 7 presidential press release: Judicial security for those that will benefit from Justice and Peace Law will depend on their seriousness in complying with the Law, in order to generate national and international credibility. No norms will guarantee security of the process; lack of seriousness does not generate credibility. Despite the perceived inflexibility of a norm that has been adopted to guarantee judicial security, if there is no credibility, it becomes absolete. In public opinion and in the contemporary world, characterized by interrelations between people, judicial norms and the decisions that have to do with justice and peace processes can only be stable if the compliance is serious and it meets expectations, dispel doubts, and finally, generates the necessary legitimacy that corresponds to credibility from all beneficiaries. Only if there is seriousness is there credibility. Only if there is credibility is there seriousness. End text of October 7 presidential press release. WOOD