COLOMBIAN PROSECUTOR BEGINS TO IMPLEMENT JUSTICE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 008550

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2015
TAGS: KJUS PTER PREL PGOV CO
SUBJECT: COLOMBIAN PROSECUTOR BEGINS TO IMPLEMENT JUSTICE
AND PEACE LAW; KEY STEPS REMAIN

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood.
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)


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SUMMARY
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1. (C) The GOC has taken important steps to implement the
Justice and Peace (J&P) law, but much more needs to be done.
The most significant steps so far include the naming of J&P
Specialized Unit Chief Luis Gonzalez in the Prosecutor's
Office (Fiscalia) and the creation of the National
Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (CNRR). Embassy
has stressed at every opportunity that the key to the success
of this process lies in its rigorous implementation. The
GOC's next steps include funding and staffing the J&P unit;
establishing intelligence sharing mechanisms among the GOC
agencies; and improving 782 debriefings or "version libre."
Embassy is formulating an action plan to ensure that the GOC
implements the law as effectively as possible. End Summary.

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FISCALIA EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT J&P LAW
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2. (C) The Fiscalia's appointment of J&P Specialized Unit
Chief Luis Gonzalez is a move in the right direction.
According to the law, the unit will investigate "the time,
place, and manner in which the criminal acts were
committed(and the damage the individual caused directly
either alone or collectively as a member of the organization
to victims." Emboffs who knew Gonzalez when he served as
head of the National Directorate in the Fiscalia describe him
as practical and focused on getting the job done.
Nevertheless, he reportedly lacks political clout within the
Fiscalia and has limited influence over his boss, Prosecutor
General Mario Iguaran.


3. (C) Gonzalez sought the advice of the Embassy and NGOs
before he took office on September 1. Gonzalez has agreed to
implement some U.S. and other recommendations including some
of Human Rights Watch. He plans to: (1) require former
combatants to divulge their names and aliases; involvement in
or knowledge of their group's participation in atrocities;
location of bodies and kidnapping victims; and the group's
financing assets, supporters and structure in order to
receive demobilization benefits; and (2) prepare a document
demobilized paramilitaries will sign acknowledging that the
Fiscalia will regard any omission to their statement as
intentional and thus allow the GOC to process them in the
regular justice system.


4. (C) Gonzalez told Emboffs that he has already picked
seven out of 20 prosecutors ("Fiscales ante el Tribunal")
required under the J&P law to process demobilized fighters.
He has also sought an additional 60 auxiliary prosecutors
("fiscales seccionales") and 150 investigators to work with
the unit. He has begun requesting international assistance
(including USD 4.4 million from the USG) to fund
investigations, perform forensic tests, and facilitate
communications capabilities for prosecutors and Corps of
Technical Investigators (CTI) agents assigned to the Unit.
He has also secured office space for the J&P Unit.

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FISCALIA: NEXT STEPS
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5. (C) In a press interview in late August, Prosecutor
General Iguaran said that the J&P unit would begin operating
in a "couple of months." He explained that the unit would
begin to record confessions and investigate crimes once it
received a list from the Ministry of Interior and Justice of
the demobilized paramilitaries that qualify for J&P process.
Iguaran noted that the High Council of the Judiciary's
appointment of magistrates to the Justice and Peace Tribunal
are still pending.


6. (C) On September 2, J&P unit chief Gonzalez told us that
he has a draft list of 125 demobilized paramilitaries. He
added that new prosecutors would begin their preliminary
investigations once the unit is complete. He is willing to
share the list with the Embassy to obtain any additional
information the USG might have on these individuals.


7. (C) Key next steps for the Fiscalia include:

-- Budgetary Authority: Gonzalez estimates that for the
remainder of the year, the unit's budget is around USD 2
million. Next year's budget is estimated at USD 4.2 million,
of which USD 3 million are for salaries alone, and USD 1.3
million are for general expenses. It appears that Gonzalez
and others in the GOC are expecting foreign donors to provide
some of the unit's funding needs.

-- Finding "Volunteers" for the Unit: Gonzalez informed us
that he was encountering resistance in staffing the unit
because the J&P law did not create new positions, but rather
requires re-assignment of existing personnel. He added that
many people would rather not be associated with the J&P
process because they fear for their lives and those of their
families. In addition, Gonzalez was concerned with his
superiors' decision to have the 60 auxiliary prosecutors work
only part-time with the unit, making it difficult to complete
the investigations within 60 days as the law requires.

-- Developing an Intelligence Software Program: Gonzalez said
they have begun to collect raw data from their own internal
CTI system, and from other sources (including media),but he
was extremely skeptical of his in-house ability to develop
and fund a software program capable of storing and searching
intelligence from the military, DAS, Peace Commissioner's
office, etc. Gonzalez stated that none of the Fiscalia's
agencies could spare a trained computer systems person to
dedicate full-time to this project because they are all too
busy with the transition to the accusatory justice system and
other responsibilities.

-- Obtain Access to Other Agencies: Gonzalez expressed
frustration over his inability to gain access to the
Department of Administrative Security's (DAS, rough FBI
equivalent) and the military's intelligence information on
AUC activities and membership. Gonzalez stated, however,
that he is in the process of working out an agreement to
obtain access to this information. Based on the Fiscalia's
past experience, Gonzalez expressed skepticism that the
military, in particular, would actually turn over to the CTI
its best intelligence.

-- Status of 782 Debriefings or "Version Libre": Gonzalez
appeared to retreat from his support to beef up the 782
&version libre,8 which he had expressed to us in an August
22 meeting. This came after Iguaran instructed him to report
directly to Ramiro Marin, who is the fiscal responsible for
designing and implementing the 782 process. Emboffs, who
have dealt with Marin in the past, say he is less receptive
to our recommendations and has expressed resistance to change
the current "version libre," at least with respect to the 782
demobilization process. On September 7, Emboffs met with
Marin and he informed us that the resistance to a more
rigorous debriefing not only comes from the Fiscalia, but
from the High Commissioner's Office. He added, however, that
he would respect the decision if Iguaran insists on more
rigorous 782 debriefings. (Note: Emboffs have discussed with
the Fiscalia the need to combine the 782 legal process with
the new J&P law in order help identify the paramilitary
leadership and most serious offenders who should be
prosecuted under the J&P law and not 782; acquire as much
information as possible about the demobilized individual's
participation in illegal activities; and obtain intelligence
about the activities of other members of the group, which can
later be used in J&P investigations.)

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VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT J&P LAW
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8. (C) The J&P law created an institution to manage the
National Reconciliation and Reparations Fund, and Vice
President Francisco Santos has designed the National
Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (CNRR) to fulfill
this task. At the head of this commission will be
representatives from the Vice Presidency, Fiscalia, Ministry
of Interior and Justice, Ministry of Finance, Human Rights
Ombudsman's Office, and Social Solidarity Network. The
commission also includes two representatives from victims'
groups and five civil society members (Note: Three of the
five prominent civil society leaders have already been named:
Eduardo Pizarro Leon Gomez, Jaime Jaramillo Panesso, and
Monsignor Nel Beltran.) The GOC will soon name two CNRR High
Commissioners: (1) the Director for Social Solidarity Network
Luis Alfonso Hoyos, who is currently in charge of the
reparations fund; and (2) the Director of the Reinsertion
Program Juan David Angel. Just below will be the Director for
the Presidential Human Rights Program and the General
Coordinator of the four main structures of the CNRR:
Reparations, Reconciliation, Institutional Strengthening, and
Administrative Support. A coordinator for each of these
structures will be named to manage the other
inter-institutional support agencies that will support this
process.


9. (C) A representative from the Vice President's Office told
us that USD 1.4 million is the total estimated budget needed
for the CNRR in the next seven months. This projection does
not include USD 652,000 estimated as being required for the
Reparations Fund. Emboffs were told that the estimates were
conservative figures that the GOC has already budgeted to pay
for this commission. GOC representatives explained that the
Vice President's Office is also trying to reach out to the
private sector to attract financial support for CNRR. So
far, they informed us that five of the country's main trade
associations ("gremios") have expressed their willingness to
contribute to CNRR, but could supply no further details.

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VICE PRESIDENTS OFFICE: NEXT STEPS
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10. (C) President Uribe will shortly approve the design and
composition of the commission. Emboffs were told that it has
been hard to develop a preliminary list of individuals due to
salary constraints. According to representatives from the
Vice President's Office, the challenge will be to translate
this structure from paper into practice. Vice Presidency
officials cautioned us that the commission's success is
subject to the ability of the Fiscalia's J&P units to get
started as well. They add that the Vice President's Office
would like as much as possible to be working in parallel with
the Fiscalia, but they foresee delays given the complexity of
the justice side of the law.


11. (C) Embassy will continue to maintain close contact with
GOC and Fiscalia officials as implementation rolls forward.

DRUCKER