SCENESETTER FOR PRESIDENT URIBE'S VISIT TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 008516

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2015
TAGS: PREL SNAR PHUM MARR ETRD CO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR PRESIDENT URIBE'S VISIT TO
WASHINGTON


Classified By: DCM Milton K. Drucker, reasons: 1.4 B & B.

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Summary
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1. (C) President Uribe arrives in Washington September 14-15
for a visit with the legislative branch on the eve of a
Constitutional Court decision on his right to seek immediate
reelection. The military situation is at a strategic
standoff and both the GOC and illegal armed groups appear to
be assessing their recent performance and planning for future
operations. Uribe is likely to request the maintenance of
current U.S. funding levels and may seek additional
intelligence or military support. The GOC paramilitary
demobilization process is on track; almost 10,000 have
demobilized, and the GOC expects another 8,000 to demobilize
by the end of the year. Added to approximately 7,000
deserters from armed groups, some 25,000 fighters will have
been removed from the battlefield by December. U.S. and
other donor funding for their reintegration into society
remains a critical issue that Uribe is likely to discuss.
Uribe may raise again the possibility of U.S. funding for a
fourth aerial eradication package. He has instructed his FTA
negotiating team to lay all its cards on the table in
Washington talks. End summary.


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Reelection Decision Approaching
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2. (C) President Uribe arrives in the U.S. for an
essentially legislative branch visit September 14-15 on the
eve of a Constitutional Court decision (expected between late
September and early November) that will decide his immediate
political future; if he is allowed to run for reelection in
May, he will win. His approval ratings exceed 65 percent.
If he is not allowed to run, Uribe has said he will support
the democratic process, including supporting a presidential
candidate whom he believes would continue his policies.
Congressional elections will take place next March.

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Human Rights
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3. (C) Colombia has made steady but slow progress on human
rights cases involving military abuse or collaboration with
paramilitaries. The GOC has taken positive steps on several
outstanding cases. Uribe delivered an important human rights
speech August 27, in which he called for progress on a number
of prominent human rights cases that are of interest to the
U.S. The U.S.-backed switch to an oral trial system has had
a successful beginning, where it has been implemented. The
Colombian military justice system is reforming slowly.

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Military Balance
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4. (C) The military situation in Colombia is at a strategic
standoff in advance of the upcoming reelection decision.
Both the GOC security forces and illegal armed groups appear
to be assessing their recent performance and planning for
future operations. Colombian military efforts in the Joint
Task Force-Omega area of operations have ended FARC control
of this area, but this effort has ended. The ELN continues
to weaken, and paramilitary numbers are declining through
demobilizations. However, the FARC continues to conduct
terrorist attacks of limited scope as it attempts to
discredit President Uribe's Democratic Security policy. U.S.
security cooperation assistance has been instrumental in
attaining the current level of security in the country.
President Uribe is likely to insist that the next twelve
months are critical to the security effort and request the
maintenance of current U.S. assistance levels, and may even
make specific requests for additional intelligence support,
military equipment and advisory assistance.

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Free Trade
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5. (C) Negotiations on an FTA with Andean countries is
stalled but the September 6 meeting between Presidents Toledo
and Uribe and their trade teams may prove to have broken the
logjam. In what appears to be a breakthrough, Colombian
Foreign Minister Barco told Ambassador Wood September 7 that,
after being pressed by Peruvian President Toledo, President
Uribe has ordered the team to &lay all their cards on the
table.8 Uribe wants the negotiations to conclude in
October, because all four negotiating parties face elections
next year and because the WTO Hong Kong ministerial and other
priorities will distract USTR later this year. Barco
emphasized that Uribe wants to close this deal right away.
Uribe's instructions may present an opportunity to move the
process forward. If the GOC in fact presents an improved
offer, we should welcome it and follow through with a quick
response. If the GOC does not present an improved offer, it
would indicate that the President and his negotiating team
are not on the same sheet of music, in which case we should
bring the problem to Uribe himself during his visit.

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Paramilitary Demobilization
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6. (C) The paramilitary demobilization process is on track.
Almost 10,000 have demobilized to date and the GOC expects
another 8,000 to demobilize before the end of the year. When
added to approximately 7,000 deserters under Uribe, about
25,000 fighters will have been removed from the battlefield
by December. The estimated cost for the GOC's plan to
reinsert demobilized paramilitaries into society before the
end of 2007 is $171 million. Colombia plans to invest $88
million of its own resources and will request $48 million
from the U.S., with the balance to be covered by other
international donors and the private sector. The Colombian
budget covers the total costs of the AUC demobilization, as
well as initial reincorporation assistance, such as civil
registry and social services. The Colombian Government's
reinsertion plan is the weakest link in the demobilization
program. More than 9,000 paramilitaries require immediate
reintegration assistance and this number will double over the
next three months. The DR program is severely under-funded
for 2005 and 2006, which puts the peace process, and
international support of it, at risk. U.S. assistance is
urgently needed to fill critical needs in four interrelated
components and at the corresponding funding levels: (1)
reintegration of ex-combatants - $29 million; (2)
prosecution, legal processing and monitoring of ex-combatants
- $12.2 million; (3) verification of the DR process - $4.5
million; and (4) implementation of the victims, reparation
fund - $2.3 million. Both USAID and DOJ may redirect $19
million and $1.5 million, respectively, from their existing
programs to support DR. Deputies will meet October 5, to
consider USG support for their DR program.

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Aerial Eradication
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7. (C) As in previous visits, Uribe is likely to request
Washington assistance in providing funds for a fourth spray
package for the aerial eradication program. The GOC cost
estimate of $100 to $120 million is only for purchasing the
necessary air assets. It has never included the real costs
of training personnel, providing of intelligence and
security, and operating and maintaining the fourth spray
package. Chairman Hyde and several members voiced
congressional support for a fourth Colombia spray package in
a letter to the House Appropriations Committee Chairman Jerry
Lewis in July. A fourth spray package would certainly
increase the area that could be eradicated, but this could
only be done if there were sufficient money for the first two
years to operate and maintain the package. Post estimates
that the minimum total cost for purchasing and operating a
fourth spray package for two years to be $225 million. If
funding were made available, a fourth spray package would be
a valuable tool in combating the increasing replant rate of
coca in Colombia. However, an increase in air fleet size
will require additional pilots and mechanics and will delay
Post's training and Colombianization timetables.


8. (C) Various GOC officials have made the pitch for USG
assistance for manual eradication during their many visits to
Washington. While manual eradication can be an important
tool in eliminating illicit cultivation in Colombia, aerial
eradication is the only efficient and safe manner to
accomplish the mission. Embassy believes that manual
eradication is much more dangerous than aerial eradication
and it is quite limited in the amount of hectares that can be
eradicated in a year. We have provided limited equipment and
support to Colombia's manual eradication program and will
continue to do so in the future; however, aerial eradication
is still our primary eradication tool and we do not believe
that significant USG resources should be devoted to manual
eradication, since it will take resources away from our top
priority ) aerial eradication.
WOOD