PEACE COMMISSIONER DESCRIBES STATUS OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 007712

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2015
TAGS: KJUS PHUM PREL PGOV SNAR CO FARC ELN
SUBJECT: PEACE COMMISSIONER DESCRIBES STATUS OF
HUMANITARIAN EXCHANGE AND PEACE TALKS WITH FARC AND ELN

REF: BOGOTA 7415

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood.
Reasons: 1.4 (b,d)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo told
Ambassador Wood August 12 that the GOC was making a sincere
effort to reach an agreement with the FARC on the terms of a
humanitarian exchange, and with the ELN on peace talks, but
Restrepo is not confident of the GOC's short term prospects
for success. Restrepo said the GOC has strengthened its hand
with the FARC by, for the first time, obtaining support for
its initiative from most of the hostages' families. In
Restrepo's view, the FARC is not interested in striking a
deal and is likely to derail the talks if they get started
("romper la mesa"). Restrepo believes the FARC will
intensify its attacks if a Constitutional Court ruling
permits President Uribe to run again because they are
"obsessed" with preventing his reelection. In a late
development, the FARC has rejected the government's latest
offer, saying the proposed meeting could not take place "for
military reasons," and pressing for a suspension of
government military action for 30 days (vice the eight days
in the government's proposal). On the ELN front, Restrepo
characterized the GOC's latest offer as its strongest to date
and argued that the ELN had no option other than negotiate,
but internal divisions and uncertainty over Uribe's
reelection could delay decisions. End summary.

-------------- --------------
GOC HUMANITARIAN EXCHANGE INITIATIVE GARNERING SUPPORT
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Restrepo told the Ambassador that the GOC's latest
humanitarian exchange initiative is sincere and is garnering
more support than any of the previous five such initiatives.
(Note: The GOC has agreed to a proposal by a group of
hostages' families to meet the FARC at Aures, a town of about
150 inhabitants some 23 km from Caicedonia in the Valle del
Cauca. In Restrepo's view, families of the 14 Cali deputies
who have been held for about 40 months are behind the
selection of Aures. End note.) According to Restrepo, the
FARC should be able to reach the proposed site of the meeting
("lugar del encuentro") easily because Aures lies slightly
north and east of traditional FARC strongholds and has three
principal access roads. The GOC military is satisfied that
it can secure the area. Restrepo said the GOC will continue
to reject FARC demands for a demilitarized zone in which to
conduct talks ("despeje"),and will insist that FARC
prisoners exchanged as part of a deal do not return to
guerrilla ranks.


3. (C) Restrepo was especially pleased with the support the
GOC initiative is now receiving from a significant section of
hostages' families. In his view, the GOC has neutralized
family criticisms and has four of the five principal groups
of families on its side (with the exception of Neiva): those
representing Bogota; Villavicencio; Valle; and police/armed
forces detainees. He noted that family members whom he met
recently in Aures were wearing T-shirts with the GOC slogan
("Caicedonia - lugar del encuentro") and they did not use
FARC language ("despeje," or demilitarized zone) in their
statements. Restrepo characterized Yolanda Pulecio, mother
of prominent dual Colombian-French citizen and former Senator
Ingrid Betancourt, as being emotionally affected by her
daughter's captivity and said many hostage families view
Pulecio as being interested only in her own daughter's
release.


4. (C) Restrepo said neither France nor President of the
Colombian Episcopal Conference, Monsignor Luis Augusto
Castro, have played a constructive role in discussions
associated with the hostages. Restrepo characterized the
Monsignor's efforts as naive and unhelpful, in part because
he frequently tells the GOC that the FARC will not budge
therefore the GOC must make additional concessions. Restrepo
insisted that, as in the paramilitary negotiation, force in
the field and firmness at the table were necessary.
--------------
PROSPECTS FOR SHORT TERM SUCCESS ARE SLIM
--------------


5. (C) Restrepo doubted the FARC is interested in a
humanitarian exchange. They are "obsessed" with preventing
President Uribe's reelection. For the FARC, Restrepo said,
defeating Uribe would mean defeating Colombia's leadership
class and would force Uribe's successor to negotiate. Even
if the FARC were to agree to meet the GOC at Aures or
elsewhere, Restrepo said the two sides would need weeks or
months of discussions on security guarantees and other
matters before substantive meetings took place. Even if they
did take place, the FARC would seek to derail the talks
("romper la mesa"). In Restrepo's view, it would be logical
for the FARC to wait until the Constitutional Court has ruled
on Uribe's right to seek immediate reelection before making
significant decisions. In a statement dated August 14 from
"the mountains of Colombia," the FARC rejected Aures as a
meeting place for "military reasons". The FARC asked the
families who had proposed Aures to now press the GOC to
demilitarize the municipalities of Florida and Pradera for 30
days so that a meeting could take place there.

--------------
FARC PREPARING TO INTENSIFY ATTACKS
--------------


6. (C) Restrepo said the FARC may be planning 18-25
simultaneous attacks throughout Colombia. Their strategy
would be to "make Colombia ungovernable" and thereby persuade
Colombians that Uribe is incapable of ensuring their security
and delivering government services. The attacks would
include further operations against mayors, councilors, and
armed forces detachments.

--------------
RESTREPO SAYS GOC OFFER TO ELN STRONGEST YET
--------------


7. (C) Restrepo said the latest offer to talk with the ELN
is the GOC's strongest to date. The GOC offer, broached
about a week ago, includes discussions to be held outside the
country and a military cease-fire against ELN militants if
the ELN agrees to stop kidnapping and attacks against
civilians. Restrepo expressed the view that the ELN would
find it difficult to say no to an offer that included a
cease-fire. The ELN has yet to respond. The Peace
Commissioner was grateful for the Ambassador's reiteration of
USG support for the GOC effort.


8. (C) Restrepo said the GOC has offered to release
imprisoned ELN leader Francisco Galan into Medellin for two
months to try to persuade the group's leadership and other
ELN sympathizers to accept the GOC offer, and Galan seems
inclined to agree. Restrepo downplayed concerns that Galan
would "escape" since this is not the first time Galan has
been granted "parole" of this nature. Moreover, Galan enjoys
a spacious two-level "prison" with eight bedrooms, exercise
equipment, internet, and telephone services, and relishes his
status as a key player in peace talks.

-------------- ---
ELN HAS NO ALTERNATIVE BUT COULD DELAY DECISIONS
-------------- ---


9. (C) Restrepo compared the current state of the ELN with
the AUC of a few years ago; it is vulnerable and has no
alternative but to negotiate with the GOC. The ELN's
leadership is weak and Colombia's legal leftist parties are
increasing their pressure on the ELN to come to the table.
Restrepo warned, however, that divisions within the ELN could
make it difficult for the GOC to manage the process. For
example, the influential Occidental Bloc, known as the "war
bloc," is against discussing peace with the government. A
location for discussions has not been agreed upon, but
Restrepo said the ELN's preference for Venezuela as a meeting
place could cause problems for the GOC. As with the FARC,
uncertainty over Uribe's reelection could delay the ELN's
decisions.

WOOD