U/S BURNS MEETS WITH PEACE COMMISSIONER RESTREPO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 007415

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2015
TAGS: KJUS PHUM PREL SNAR CO
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS MEETS WITH PEACE COMMISSIONER RESTREPO

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (U) July 27, 2005, 7:00 - 8:30 am, Ambassador's residence,
Bogota


2. (U) Participants:

U.S.
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R. Nicholas Burns, U/S for Political Affairs
Ambassador William B. Wood
Jeffrey DeLaurentis, Political Counselor
Cynthia Echeverria, P Special Assistant
Sarah LaGier, notetaker
Luis Guio, Interpreter

Colombia
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Luis Carlos Restrepo, Peace Commissioner

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Summary
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3. (C) Under Secretary for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns
discussed the paramilitary peace process, Justice and Peace
Law, extradition, and the U.S. hostages held by the FARC with
Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo on July 27. U/S
Burns expressed admiration and support for the GOC's efforts
to establish peace and security after a 40-year conflict. He
warned that many U.S. Congressmen and human rights NGOs
believed the Justice and Peace Law was too lenient and that
changing this perception was key to U.S. assistance. He
underscored that the law could not harm the excellent
U.S.-Colombia extradition relationship. He inquired if
Restrepo had any information on the three U.S. hostages.
Restrepo asserted that the Justice and Peace Law put in place
all necessary mechanisms to hold ex-terrorists accountable
for their crimes, including confession, investigation and
trials, time in confinement, and reparations to victims. It
would not impede extradition, although the President could
suspend certain extraditions while AUC commanders fulfilled
their obligations under the peace process. He expressed
concern for the logistical and security challenges presented
by demobilizing the remaining 60 percent of the AUC before
the end of the year. Restrepo assured Burns that the GOC
would demand the release of the three U.S. hostages under any
humanitarian accord reached with the FARC. End summary.

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The AUC Peace Process
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4. (C) U/S Burns asked for Restrepo's views on the
paramilitary peace process, including what motivated the AUC
to negotiate and the GOC's long-term security strategy.
Restrepo explained that military pressure from the security
forces and political pressure from the international
community had forced the AUC to negotiate. He noted that
extradition had been a key source of pressure. According to
Restrepo, the AUC had grown at an alarming rate for the 10
years before Uribe took office. He emphasized that
paramilitaries posed an even greater threat to democracy than
the guerrillas because they attempted to disguise themselves
as allies of the government when, in reality, they were the
government's worst enemies. President Uribe's strategy was
to demobilize the AUC and secure former AUC territories while
simultaneously applying military pressure on the FARC and ELN
until they agreed to negotiate under GOC conditions.


5. (C) Restrepo expressed confidence that all paramilitaries
would demobilize, bloc by bloc, by the end of 2005.
Approximately 40 percent (5,800 paramilitaries) had already
demobilized and seven more bloc demobilizations were planned
in the next weeks. He expressed concern for the security and
logistical challenges presented by demobilizing the remaining
60 percent within in two to four months. Each bloc
demobilization required at least 400 government and security
officials. Without additional resources, the GOC could only
manage four demobilizations per month. Providing security in
the former AUC territories presented an additional challenge.
Restrepo estimated the GOC needed 5,000 to 10,000 new police
to secure the areas and conduct specialized counternarcotics
operations to prevent traffickers or guerrillas from taking
over former paramilitary drug routes. He warned that even
one guerrilla massacre in a former AUC area could halt the
entire peace process and expressed hope the U.S. could
provide support for security.

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Justice and Peace Law
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6. (C) U/S Burns acknowledged that finding a balance between
peace and justice was difficult, but warned that addressing
concerns in the U.S. Congress that the law was too lenient
was key to U.S. assistance to Colombia. He noted that many
in Washington saw a direct link between human rights
certification and the Justice and Peace Law. He encouraged
Restrepo to visit the U.S. to explain the law in detail.

7. (C) Restrepo asserted that the Justice and Peace Law put
in place all the necessary mechanisms to hold demobilized
terrorists accountable for their crimes. He expressed
confidence that the justice system would apply the law fully
to prevent impunity. The law offers demobilized terrorists a
five to eight year sentence followed by a 2.5 to four year
parole period only if they fully demobilize, turn over all
illicit assets, release all hostages and child soldiers, and
give reparations to victims. Individuals or groups organized
for drug trafficking or illicit enrichment would not be
eligible for reduced sentence. Only crimes committed during
membership in, and in the service of, the illegal armed group
were eligible. The GOC could nominate potential
beneficiaries, but judges would independently decide if the
nominee met all the law's requirements.


8. (C) Restrepo explained that paramilitaries would have to
confess all their crimes to benefit. Although the
constitution required these confessions to be given freely,
the ex-terrorist would be tried under the normal criminal
code for any crimes he did not confess unless a judge
determined that the omission was unintentional, and the
ex-terrorist had fully collaborated with authorities and
committed to giving reparations to victims. In this case,
the ex-terrorist would still receive a 20 percent higher
sentence. Restrepo emphasized that all the demobilized
paramilitaries (not just those already known to be guilty of
major crimes) would be advised to confess their crimes.
Later, if they were discovered to be guilty of a crime they
did not confess, they would be tried under the normal
criminal code. Restrepo estimated that 300 to 400 AUC
commanders were implicated in major crimes, but said he
expected the number to rise once confessions began.


9. (C) Restrepo noted his job was to disarm, identify and
demobilize the paramilitaries, and turn them over to justice.
He warned, however, that the AUC leadership had not yet
realized just how tough the law was. Applying the law before
the entire AUC had demobilized could lead the remaining,
armed paramilitaries to abandon the process.

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Extradition
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10. (C) U/S Burns expressed appreciation for the excellent
U.S.-Colombia extradition relationship and emphasized that
the Justice and Peace Law should not block extradition in any
way. The U.S. would pursue the extradition of any
demobilized terrorist who had violated U.S. law or harmed
U.S. citizens. Restrepo agreed that extradition was a
powerful tool in combating the illegal armed groups and had
been a key factor in getting the AUC to demobilize. He
assured Burns that the law would not block extradition in any
way and that extradition would never be negotiated with any
terrorist group. However, on a case by case basis, President
Uribe could decide to suspend extradition for certain AUC
commanders while they fulfilled their obligations under the
peace process and Justice and Peace Law. The GOC would
revoke this suspension at any time if necessary. He likened
the threat of extradition to a guillotine that would come
down if the paramilitaries violated the terms of the peace
process. (Note: There has never been a legal or political
commitment to extradite every criminal requested. President
Uribe has always had the ability to suspend or refuse
extradition of any individual or class of individuals at any
time. His decisions have produced the best extradition
record in the world.)

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U.S. Hostages
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11. (C) U/S Burns noted that the safe release of the three
U.S. hostages being held by the FARC remained a key USG
priority and inquired if Restrepo had any news he could pass
on to the families of the hostages. Restrepo assured Burns
the GOC would insist the three U.S. hostages be released
under any humanitarian exchange reached with the FARC. He
explained that the FARC held 63 political prisoners,
including the three U.S. citizens, a German, and Ingrid
Betancourt, a dual Colombian-French citizen. In exchange for
their release, the GOC had offered to release imprisoned FARC
guerrillas who pledged to not return to crime and who were
eligible for pardon because they were guilty only of
rebellion or who met the Justice and Peace Law requirements.
In order to negotiate a release, the GOC had offered to meet
with the FARC and guarantee safe passage to the meeting
place, verified by the international community.


12. (C) So far, the FARC had refused. Instead, the FARC
demanded the release of all imprisoned guerrillas without any
conditions and a demilitarized zone of two municipalities in
Valle del Cauca Department. Restrepo explained that these
two municipalities had 110,000 inhabitants and connected FARC
strongholds in southern Colombia (currently under heavy
pressure from the military) to the drug trafficking corridors
on the Pacific coast. The GOC would not demilitarize this
area under any circumstances.


13. (C) This cable has been cleared by P.
DRUCKER