U/S BURNS MEETING WITH COLOMBIAN MOD OSPINA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 007359

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2015
TAGS: PGOV MARR MOPS PHUM SNAR CO
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS MEETING WITH COLOMBIAN MOD OSPINA

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood; reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)


1. (U) July 27, 2005, 10:00-11:00 am, Ministry of Defense,
Bogota


2. (U) Participants:

U.S.
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Nicholas Burns, U/S for Political Affairs
Ambassador William B. Wood
Jeffrey DeLaurentis, Political Counselor
Cynthia Echeverria, P Special Assistant
Peter Husta, Acting MilGroup Commander

L. Scott Gage, Deputy Defense Attache
Dana Brown, notetaker
Luis Guio, Interpreter

Colombia
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Camilo Ospina Bernal, Minister of Defense
Jorge Eastman, Vice Minister of Defense
Vicente Echandia, International Defense Office


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Summary
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3. (C) Defense Minister Camilo Ospina briefed U/S Burns on
his priorities during his tenure: fighting terrorism,
locating hostages and guerrilla leaders, reforming military
justice, strengthening U.S.-Colombian defense relations, and
proceeding with paramilitary demobilization. Under Secretary
Burns emphasized our support for those initiatives but warned
that the GOC needed to continue improving human rights
efforts to secure future U.S. assistance. Ospina agreed to
work further with the Afghani government on their
counternarcotics strategy. He agreed to confirm the GOC's
interest in moving ahead with bilateral military agreement
talks and promised to respond by July 28. Burns recommended
that the GOC consider future areas of cooperation in advance
of President Uribe's visit to Crawford. End summary.

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Counterterrorism Priorities
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4. (C) Minister Camilo Ospina stressed his interest in
defeating the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
and noted progress made during the Uribe Administration.
Vice Minister Eastman added that by "defeating," Ospina meant
forcing the FARC to the negotiating table under the GOC's
terms rather than actually eliminating each member.
Nevertheless, Ospina said one of his highest priorities as
minister was to locate and capture FARC leaders. He hoped
high-level captures would help drive the FARC to the table.
Another key mission, he noted, was locating the hostages and
returning them safely. Ospina said he was intent on
including American citizens in any hostage release program
and/or freeing them separately.


5. (C) Ospina discussed the problem of guerrillas using
Venezuela and Ecuador as refuges and supply sources. He said
the guerrillas had been displaced into the jungles and across
the borders by the Colombian military offensive, Plan
Patriota. Displacement into Venezuela was a threat because
the majority of Venezuela's military reservists used
ammunition compatible with the FARC's weapons. Ecuador had a
more cooperative relationship with Colombia, but that their
dollarized economy lent itself to money laundering.
Venezuela was the more volatile of the two neighbors, and
more likely to generate a border crisis as a way of diverting
attention away from internal problems. At the same time, he
recognized Venezuela's recent cooperation and extradition of
FARC leader Chiguiro.

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Military Justice Remains a Vulnerability
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6. (U) U/S Burns asked Ospina about the status of military
justice reforms and human rights cases against the military.
Ospina briefed on the status of the Cajamarca, Arauca, San
Jose de Apartado, and Mapiripan cases involving the military
and stressed that all four were pending resolution in the
civilian justice system. He added that the number of
civilian complaints against the military had fallen almost 50
percent since 2004 and credited human rights training for the
improvement. Burns advised Ospina that military justice
flaws could be a serious impediment to continuing U.S.
assistance to the Colombian public forces. He urged that the
military respond to charges in high-profile cases involving
the military even as it waits for the final verdict. The
United States would not be providing assistance to the 17th
Army Brigade because of human rights issues, and a failure to
improve military justice in the near future could create
other difficulties. Ospina responded that he hoped to have
the military justice reform package approved by the end of
the year and believed the accusatorial system would help the
military evaluate future cases much more efficiently.
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Colombia Seeks to Strengthen Defense Relations
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7. (S) U/S Burns raised the issue of an enhanced defense
relationship. Ospina requested the United States consider
negotiating some formal military bilateral agreement in the
near future. A Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) or other
enhanced defense relationship would not only improve our
defense cooperation but also enhance regional stability.
Neighboring nations might be concerned initially with such an
agreement, but an agreement would be helpful in the
long-term. Burns responded that the United States had put
plans to discuss these options on hold per Colombia's
request, but would be happy to advance them if the Colombians
were ready. Ospina promised to consult President Uribe and
confirm the GOC's interest before Crawford.


8. (S) Ospina requested additional intelligence assistance
and technical capabilities to allow observation of guerrillas
under triple canopy jungle cover. He said such information,
and any intelligence on the whereabouts of high value
targets, would be used to locate and defeat guerrilla forces.


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Colombian Role Abroad
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9. (C) Burns thanked Ospina for Colombia's efforts to share
aerial eradication techniques with Afghanistan. He
congratulated Ospina on Colombia's aerial eradication
missions that have already eradicated more than 100,000
hectares this year, which is ahead of last year. He
contrasted Colombia's efforts with efforts in Afghanistan,
which only eradicated 200 hectares. He noted the Afghan
government's refusal to consider aerial eradication missions.
Burns encouraged Colombia to continue its role as mentor to
Afghanistan. Ospina said Colombia would be willing to send a
counternarcotics team there to assess the situation and offer
advice. Burns inquired informally whether Colombia would be
willing to send troops to Iraq, and Ospina said he would look
in to the possibility.

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Demobilization and Peace
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10. (C) Ospina reported that the Colombian government had
demobilized over 13,000 illegal fighters during the Uribe
Administration, and hoped to demobilize another 8,000 this
year. The GOC had three tasks involved in the demobilization
process: (1) reduce the presence of illegal armed groups
active, (2) protect civilians' rights while dismantling drug
structures, and (3) prosecute terrorist leaders under the
appropriate demobilization law. Burns recognized that
balancing peace with justice was difficult, but warned Ospina
that the GOC had to rigorously and energetically implement
the law so that the guilty were punished in Colombia or
extradited as appropriate. He stressed that all those who
violate U.S. laws should be tried in the United States and
underscored the importance of maintaining our extradition
relationship under the new Justice and Peace law.


11. (U) This message has been cleared by Under Secretary
Burns.
DRUCKER