SCENESETTER FOR UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BOGOTA 006914

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2015
TAGS: PTER SNAR PREL PGOV PHUM CO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL
AFFAIRS R. NICHOLAS BURNS

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

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Introduction
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1. (C) President Uribe and the Embassy welcome the visit of
Undersecretary for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns with
enthusiasm. Current hot topics include:

--U.S. support in out years

--Demobilization and reinsertion of almost 6,000 paramilitary
terrorists and several thousand more expected

--Human rights

--Growing concern about Venezuela

--Military progress and Plan Patriota

--Record-breaking drug eradication and seizures

--Status of U.S. hostages

--Free Trade Agreement negotiations

--Judicial reform

--Presidential re-election

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U.S. Support
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2. (C) Colombia faces a four front war -- narcos, FARC, ELN,
paramilitaries -- and a growing concern about Venezuela. It
is fighting each of the fronts with a slightly different mix
of political, military, and police measures, all of which are
expensive and at times controversial. The GOC will be
looking for private and public reaffirmation of sustained
U.S. support, including financial support. Requested U.S.
assistance tops $556 million in FY06, plus a number of other
agency operating accounts, continuing the steady decline from
about $602 million in FY03. The Colombian security forces
face serious helicopter shortages for counter-drug and
counter-terrorism operations and struggle to afford
maintenance, pilot training, and other support. President
Uribe and newly appointed Defense Minister Camilo Ospina may
ask for additional Blackhawk helicopters and increased
intelligence sharing to help the military kill or capture a
high value target.

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Demobilization and Reinsertion
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3. (C) The GOC has requested U.S. aid for the demobilization
and reinsertion process for the paramilitaries, especially
for securing the areas formerly dominated by the
paramilitaries. Although DOJ recently determined that
certain USAID assistance programs for demobilization and
reinsertion would not be in violation of the Patriot Act, we
are still consulting with Congress. In the meantime, the GOC
program reflects the lack of U.S. input.


4. (C) Since 2003, nearly 6,000 paramilitaries (AUC) have
demobilized collectively and another 7,000 from all illegal
armed groups have deserted. The GOC is confident that the
remaining 10,000 paramilitaries will demobilize by the end of

2005. But they have no place to go. The program is
under-funded and the OAS verification chief has issued an
international call for help. Although the Netherlands,
Sweden, and Ireland are providing modest bilateral
assistance, the EU refuses to help, partly at the behest of
NGOs, who have criticized the recently passed demobilization
law for being soft on paramilitaries. The controversial
"Justice and Peace" law passed Congress on June 22 and was
signed by the President on July 22. It calls for five to
eight years in jail, no benefits for intentionally concealed
crimes, and guarantees reparations to victims. Although not
perfect, if implemented correctly, it will dismantle the AUC,
provide for peace with justice, safeguard extradition, and
create mechanisms for demobilization and reinsertion of
ex-terrorists. The U.S. has urged the GOC to begin
implementation immediately, especially in a few exemplary
cases, to demonstrate commitment to holding the
paramilitaries accountable for their crimes. Your visit is
another opportunity to reiterate the point.


5. (C) In a related peace process, the ELN rejected Mexican
facilitation on April 18, ostensibly over the GOM's vote
against Cuba at the UN Commission on Human Rights. We
believe that the FARC influenced the ELN to end the talks and
that the ELN will engage in "forum shopping" to find a more
pliable facilitator. In early July, a Colombian Senator
claimed that former Spanish President Felipe Gonzalez had
offered to be mediator, but the Governments of Colombia or
Spain have not confirmed this. The FARC has steadily refused
peace talks or an acceptable humanitarian prisoner exchange.
A French mission, with GOC knowledge, recently met with a
FARC senior commander to secure the release of FARC hostages,
including dual French-Colombian citizen and former
presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt.

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Human Rights
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6. (C) The Uribe Administration continues to make progress in
human rights, but needs to do more to ensure accountability,
strengthen the military justice system, break military ties
to paramilitary groups, and end corruption. Human Rights
certification is pending. Your visit will be an opportunity
to review human rights issues with GOC officials and press
for the strongest possible case for certification.
Misunderstandings over the Justice and Peace demobilization
law and continued attention to the February 2005 massacre in
San Jose de Apartado have complicated the climate for
certification on the Hill. In addition to recent positive
steps on the Cajamarca and Arauca cases, the GOC recently
issued a useful statement on the Santo Domingo case. You
should press for further GOC action, including convoking a
meeting with NGOs here in Colombia to explain the justice and
peace law, and publicizing a chronology of GOC actions and a
statement of intentions regarding San Jose de Apartado.


7. (C) The vast majority of human rights crimes are
attributable to the illegal armed groups; e.g., in the second
week of April 300 FARC attacked an Indian village, killing a
number of civilians and local police. The government has a
difficult but active dialogue with NGOs, the United Nations,
and foreign governments. Human rights training is mandatory
for all members of the military and police. The Embassy vets
all units that receive U.S. assistance, in accordance with
the Leahy Amendment. In 2004, homicides fell by 16 percent,
kidnappings by 42 percent, and forced displacements by 37
percent.

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Venezuela
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8. (C) Colombia remains concerned about Venezuela's arms
build-up, and is tempted to divert needed resources away from
counter-drug and counter-terror priorities. You should
encourage regional counter-terror and counter-drug
cooperation, a major theme of March's summit among Presidents
Chavez, Lula, Zapatero, and Uribe. Colombia has proposed a
closer bilateral defense relationship as a partial solution
to what they perceive as Venezuela's threat.

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Military Progress and Plan Patriota
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9. (C) Plan Patriota: The military's multi-phased campaign
plan to re-take areas dominated by the FARC is entering its
third year and focused on traditional FARC strongholds in
southeastern Colombia. The FARC are being pressured
militarily and financially, but the logistical strain of
keeping 15,500 troops in the dense, hostile jungle, hundreds
of miles from their supply bases, is a huge challenge. The
priority for DOD funding is to provide assistance for forces
involved in Plan Patriota. President Uribe has continually
pressured the military to kill or capture a senior FARC
member. Upon being named Defense Minister on July 8, Camilo
Ospina sought Embassy advice on how to best go after high
value targets and make the most of U.S. assistance. Ospina
has served as Uribe's legal adviser and been a solid Embassy
contact.

10. (C) FARC violence in the first seven months of 2005,
although tactically aggressive, remained localized and below
2004 levels. The FARC attacked indigenous towns, a meeting
of rural councilman, electrical towers and rural highways in
addition to military and police outposts. The attacks were
partially directed at military targets and to divert
resources from Plan Patriota, but civilians were also
indiscriminately killed. On June 26, for instance, a
contingent of 250-300 FARC members attacked an army outpost,
killing 21 and wounding another 11.
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Drug Eradication/Interdiction
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11. (C) Cooperation with Colombia remains excellent,
complicated at times by the competition for scarce
helicopters between the counter-terror and counter-drug
priorities. Eradication and interdiction are at record
levels. Over 92,000 hectares of coca and 1,000 hectares of
opium poppy have been sprayed since the beginning of the year
and 8,000 hectares of coca and poppy were manually
eradicated. In 2004, over 136,000 hectares of coca and 3,000
hectares of poppy were sprayed, and almost 200 metric tons of
cocaine and cocaine base were seized inside Colombia. Ground
fire against spray planes is below 2003 levels but remains
problematic.

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U.S. Hostages
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12. (C) The three U.S. contractors captured by the FARC in
February 2003 are now the longest U.S. terror captives in the
world. Their safe release continues to be one of our top
priorities. The Colombians are providing full assistance.
They have assured us that our hostages will be included in
any humanitarian exchange and have done their best to avoid
military operations that might unnecessarily jeopardize the
hostages.

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Free Trade Agreement/Economy
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13. (U) Tremendous gains in security have helped the
Colombian economy. In 2004, Colombia's gross domestic
product (GDP) increased by 4.1 percent to nearly USD 90.8
billion. Colombian exports grew 26 percent in 200 to USD 16
billion. Exports to the U.S. grew by USD 1 billion. The
Colombian Congress recently passed a pension reform package
that will improve the long-term sustainability of the
country's retirement system. Although the International
Monetary Fund has recommended that Colombia revamp its tax
system, fiscal reform was not addressed during this session
of Congress. Unemployment remains high at 12 percent, but
the rate has been declining since the beginning of the Uribe
administration.


14. (U) The tenth round of negotiations toward a free trade
agreement with Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru took place in
Ecuador in March. The talks are progressing slowly, with
agricultural issues representing the biggest stumbling block.
As the Colombian political season approaches, negotiators
are concerned that significant delays in completing the
agreement this year could put the FTA on hold until late
2006, at the earliest.

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Judicial Reform
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15. (C) The U.S.-backed switch to an oral trial system has
been successful. The Colombian military justice system,
however, is unreformed, giving rise to justified accusations
of impunity in selected cases. In March, the military
submitted a "shock" reform package to Congress as the first
step towards streamlining military justice. You should press
for more rapid, effective progress with newly installed
Minister of Defense Ospina.

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Presidential Reelection
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16. (C) Congressional elections will take place next March;
presidential elections next May. The Constitutional Court
will rule on the possibility of presidential re-election in
September; the outcome is uncertain. Positioning relating to
the elections is dominating and confusing politics. If Uribe
can run, he will win. He is above 65 percent approval in
polls. We expect that, if it is not Uribe, all candidates
will take a leaf from his book by trying to combine security
with social issues. If he cannot run, Uribe will play an
important role in anointing his successor.
WOOD