GOC EXPLAINS JUSTICE AND PEACE TO DIPLOMATIC CORPS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 006847

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KJUS PREL PTER PHUM CO
SUBJECT: GOC EXPLAINS JUSTICE AND PEACE TO DIPLOMATIC CORPS

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Summary
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1. (U) On July 15, Foreign Minister Carolina Barco, Peace
Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo, and Vice Justice Minister
Mario Iguaran presented the Law for Justice and Peace to the
diplomatic corps. Iguaran reviewed the law in detail and
tried to dispel accusations that it did not encourage full
confession, would be shot down on constitutional grounds, and
created impunity. He said the President would sign it by the
first week of August. Restrepo and Iguaran fielded questions
on a variety of issues, including an explanation of how all
illicit assets would be seized and why the law did not
acknowledge an armed conflict. They assured the Ambassador
that each ex-terrorist's free declaration would be cross
checked with all others to compile complete criminal
histories. The government was preparing to create the
institutions called for by the law, such as the special
Fiscalia unit, name a high-ranking demobilization "czar," and
demobilize the rest of the AUC. Restrepo emphasized that
resource shortages and security in the former AUC zones were
presssing concerns. End summary.

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Iguaran Explains Law
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2. (U) Vice Justice Minister Iguaran (who was named
Prosecutor General on July 19) explained the Justice and
Peace Law to the diplomatic corps on July 15 to dispel
confusion and accusations from critics about impunity, lack
of confession, and constitutional issues. His main points
included:

-- The President will sign the bill into law by the first
week of August.

-- "Ordinary" legislation: the GOC did not violate
constitutional norms by passing the law as ordinary, rather
than statutory, legislation. If the law had created a new
court to process ex-terrorists it would have been statutory,
but, instead, the already existing Superior District Courts
would be used. (Critics, such as Human Rights Watch, have
claimed the Constitutional Court will reject the law because
it deals with fundamental rights and therefore cannot be
ordinary legislation. Statutory legislation would have
required approval by absolute majorities in all four debates
within one legislative session.)

-- Confession: according to the Colombian constitution,
self-incrimination is prohibited. Confession therefore
cannot be forced. Instead, according to Iguaran, the GOC
found the next best option: no benefits are given for crimes
intentionally concealed; each accidentally omitted crime
results in a 20 percent increase in the alternative sentence;
and if an ex-terrorist refuses to give an open statement, he
is denied all benefits.

-- Impunity: the law does not let criminals go free.
Instead, it offers a reduced sentence and conditionally
suspends the original sentence only if the ex-terrorist
fulfills all obligations under the law.

-- Jail terms: Iguaran insisted the claim that ex-terrorists
would only spend one to two years in jail was false. The law
clearly prohibited all sentence reductions except that up to
18 months spent in a concentration zone would count against
the sentence.

-- Reparations: victims are guaranteed reparations.
According to Iguaran, the final text on reparations was taken
entirely from opposition draft laws.

-- Eligibility: the law explicitly states that only crimes
committed during membership in, and in service of, the
illegal armed group are eligible. Any crimes committed
before membership or for personal gain are prohibited. These
requirements were added to prevent narcotraffickers from
clearing their records.

-- International agreements: the law states that all
international treaties or agreements remain active and
intact.

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Logistics a Major Concern
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3. (U) In response to the Argentine Ambassador's question how
the remaining 60 percent of paramilitary groups would
demobilize, Restrepo took the opportunity to list resource,
personnel, and security shortages the GOC faces.


4. (U) Restrepo said he was confident, for the first time,
that all paramilitary groups in the country would demobilize.
The AUC's Central Bolivar Bloc, the single largest bloc with
over 5,000 members, the Middle Magdalena Bloc, and Jorge 40's
forces had all pledged to demobilize. The Elmer Cardenas
Bloc, which had refused to join peace talks, had also agreed
to demobilize.


5. (U) Restrepo warned, however, that the logistics of
demobilizing so many paramilitaries before the end of the
year presented a major challenge. For example, 400 public
officials were needed to demobilize the 594 members of the
Montes de Maria Bloc. Each demobilization takes seven to 21
days. Given personnel and resource restraints, the
government can only average two demobilizations each month.
Providing security in the former AUC territories was an added
challenge. For example, the Army had to displace two
counterguerrilla battalions to secure the Catatumbo Bloc's
former area of control. Restrepo said the military could not
afford to continually displace troops to secure the areas.
Instead, he estimated the government needed 5,000 to 10,000
new police, including some with special counternarcotics
training to prevent other illegal armed groups or cartels
from moving in. To complete the remaining demobilizations,
Restrepo believed the government needed 300 to 400 billion
pesos (between USD 130 to 174 million).

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Question and Answers
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6. (U) After Iguaran's lengthy presentation, Restrepo opened
the floor to questions:

Q: The Ambassador asked if the authorities would cross check
the open declarations to compile all criminal information
available.

A: Iguaran assured him the tribunals all would have
officials responsible for cross checking all information.

Q: When will law be implemented?

A: Restrepo reported that several tasks remained:

-- Institutions: Once the President signed it into the law,
the government would need time to create the institutions
called for by the law, such as the special Prosecutor
General's Office (Fiscalia) unit.

-- Intelligence: The Fiscalia would need sufficient time to
research the ex-terrorist so the appropriate questions could
be asked during the free declaration.

-- Demobilization: One of the law's conditions is that the
ex-terrorist must have demobilized. Sixty percent of the AUC
has yet to demobilize. Restrepo assured the audience that by
December 31, 2005, all of the AUC would be demobilized. If
not, active members remaining would not be eligible for any
benefits under the law.

-- Demobilization Czar: The government needed to name a high
level official to direct the law's implementation.

Q: How will authorities determine when an ex-terrorist
joined the illegal armed group?

A: Restrepo said there were two ways: (1) the ex-terrorist
is required to report the date he joined in his open
statement, and (2) judges have access to all intelligence and
criminal information on the ex-terrorist. Iguaran added that
illegal armed groups organized for the purpose of drug
trafficking or individuals principally devoted to drug
trafficking were not eligible for benefits.

Q: Are illicit assets seized only if they were acquired when
the ex-terrorist was working for the illegal armed group?

A: No. All illicit assets will be seized regardless of when
they were acquired.

Q: Are 20 prosecutors sufficient for the special Fiscalia
unit?

A: Iguaran noted that 20 is the number of prosecutors
officially assigned to the unit, but that the Fiscalia was
free to use as many prosecutors necessary to do the job.

Q: Why does the law make paramilitarism an act of sedition?

A: Restrepo emphasized that the article was added primarily
for practical reasons. Otherwise, it was not possible to
pardon paramilitaries guilty of only having belonged to an
illegal armed group. No major crimes could be considered
connected to sedition. He also said that, in the face of
complaints of government cooperation with the paramilitaries,
they wanted to make it clear that even membership was a
crime.

Q: Why does the law not recognize an armed conflict?

A: Restrepo said it was for political reasons, but would not
prevent the government from respecting all international
agreements and international humanitarian law.

WOOD