VP SANTOS SEEKS ADVICE ON EXPLAINING JUSTICE AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 006682

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2015
TAGS: KJUS PTER PREL PGOV CO
SUBJECT: VP SANTOS SEEKS ADVICE ON EXPLAINING JUSTICE AND
PEACE LAW TO PUBLIC

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: On July 13, Vice President Francisco Santos
sought Ambassador's advice on how to gain support for the
Justice and Peace Law while not jeopardizing final AUC
demobilizations. The Ambassador urged the GOC to show its
seriousness, firmness, and procedural organization
immediately. He made several suggestions: (1) publicize a
coherent, concise description of the law; (2) decide and then
describe in detail implementation procedures, on an
accelerated basis; (3) demonstrate firmness by punishing a
notorious AUC criminal such as Don Berna or closing down the
concentration zone at Santa Fe de Ralito and jailing AUC
commanders; and (4) name a politically influential High
Commissioner for Demobilization to implement the process
objectively. Santos said he would raise the issues with the
President, the Ministry of Interior and Justice, Peace
Commissioner, and others. End Summary.


2. (C) Vice President Santos requested a meeting with the
Ambassador to discuss the Justice and Peace Law's
implementation. He sought the Ambassador's advice about how
to address local and international doubt about the law while
not jeopardizing the AUC peace process. He reiterated the
message President Uribe gave in Spain inviting the
international community to monitor the law's implementation,
but noted Peace Commissioner Restrepo's concerns that
applying the tougher aspects of the law too soon would lead
the remaining AUC blocs to abandon the process (septel).
Santos emphasized that the government would not let
paramilitaries guilty of major crimes go free, but that its
first priority was to disarm and identify them and then apply
justice.


3. (C) The Ambassador underscored that the GOC had to
immediately demonstrate it was serious about the process,
firm, and organized. He suggested several options:

-- Publicize a coherent, concise explanation of the law
addressing international misgivings.

-- Decide and explain in detail the implementation procedures
of demobilization on an accelerated basis.

-- Clearly demonstrate GOC firmness and commitment to justice
by making an example of a notorious AUC criminal. Ideally,
this would be senior AUC commander Don Berna because he was
in clear violation of the cease-fire when he murdered a local
government official in May and had committed countless crimes
prior to joining the AUC. The Ambassador noted that the
public believed, albeit mistakenly, Don Berna was in a
luxurious confinement area and would not be punished for his
crimes.

-- Another option to demonstrate government control would be
to close Ralito and put AUC commanders and others with
existing criminal charges in jail and begin processing them
under the Justice and Peace Law.

-- Appoint a politically popular and recognizable person, not
identified with the government, to manage demobilization and
reinsertion objectively and neutrally, leaving Restrepo to
the political task of negotiating.


4. (C) Santos agreed to discuss the Ambassador's suggestions
with President Uribe, the Minister of Interior and Justice,
and the Peace Commissioner immediately. Santos travels to
Washington on July 17 with Foreign Minister Barco to explain
the law. The Vice President also plans to go to Santa Fe de
Ralito to tell AUC leadership its obligations under the law.

WOOD