EMBASSY DELIVERS STERN MESSAGE TO GOC ON DON BERNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 005753 SIPDIS FOR P, WHA, WHA/AND E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2015 TAGS: PHUM PREL PTER CO KJUS AUC SUBJECT: EMBASSY DELIVERS STERN MESSAGE TO GOC ON DON BERNA Classified By: Charge Milton K. Drucker for reasons: 1.4 (b) & (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Charge delivered message to President Uribe on June 13 and Uribe advisers on June 14 that AUC commander Diego Murillo ("Don Berba") should not be released into the concentration zone for demobilized AUC leaders (as press reports were suggesting),should no longer participate in the peace process, and ought to be tried for his alleged involvement in the murder of a Cordoba Department official. Anything short of that would damage the credibility of the peace process and jeopardize U.S. support for demobilization. Charge also insisted that the GOC do a better and more thorough job of processing the demobilized than it had done in earlier rounds. Uribe assured Charge that Don Berna would not go free. Advisers Juan Lozano and Jaime Bermudez said the GOC's arrangement with Don Berna, made public on June 13 (septel),assured his detention, his submission to Colombian justice, and the demobilization of his troops. They also asserted the President's toughness going after Don Berna put other paras on notice. Director of Communications for the Presidency Bermudez also reported that the total number of those to be demobilized from Don Berna blocs was less than the 4000 reported. The GOC would publish the correct number when it was confirmed. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Following news reports over the weekend suggesting that AUC commander Diego Murillo ("Don Berna") could be released back into the concentration zone of demobilized AUC leaders in Santa Fe de Ralito, Charge spoke to President Uribe during a June 13 Colombian-American Chamber of Commerce luncheon about the need to ensure Don Berna was no longer a part of the peace process nor would he be allowed to leave his "finca of detention." Uribe noted that Don Berna had promised to demobilize 4000 men. Charge responded that Don Berna was accused of murdering a local Cordoba Department official and countless other crimes, and had to face justice. At the end of the lunch, Uribe approached Charge to assure him that Don Berna would not go free. Charge said he would be meeting the following day with the President's chief of staff, Juan Lozano, to emphasize in more detail U.S. concerns. ¶3. (C) Several hours later, the Prosecutor General issued a custodial measure against Don Berna formally detaining him, and the High Peace Commissioner announced that Don Berna's status as a demobilized combatant would be maintained to conclude the demobilization of his blocs. ¶4. (C) On July 14, Charge and polcouns met with Juan Lozano to clarify Don Berna's status. Presidential Communications Director Jaime Bermudez joined the meeting. Charge stressed that the credibility of the entire process was at stake. If Don Berna could murder a deputy and return to Santa Fe de Ralito unsanctioned, the peace process was doomed and U.S. efforts to support demobilization would be jeopardized. Don Berna needed to be tried, and tried in a fair court expeditiously. And while this was happening, he could not be part of the peace process. Also, the executive branch had to do what it could to ensure this did not become another endless, multi-year, court case. The GOC's credibility would be damaged beyond repair abroad with respect to the peace process if it did not ensure Don Berna's treatment was consistent with the rule of law. ¶5. (C) Lozano said he took the point but stressed that it had been Uribe who made the tough call to go after Don Berna in the first place, to make him subject to a legal process regarding the incident in Cordoba. Now, Don Berna was in the custody of the GOC (albeit in a house instead of a jail), under the control of GOC public forces, and at the disposition of the judicial branch. The legal process would go forward and he could not avoid it. And, said Lozano, Don Berna is still going to demobilize his troops. Charge underscored how important it was to signal to the Colombian public, the political opposition and the other paramilitaries that things had changed in Colombia and Don Berna would have to pay for his crime if he ordered the deputy killed. ¶6. (C) Charge also insisted that the GOC had to do a better job of processing the demobilized than earlier rounds. The process had to be credible and the GOC was not ready. Without additional effort and resources, the demobilization of 4000 men would overwhelm the system. Then Senator Pardo's charge that the demobilizations were not dismantling the networks would stick, he said. In addition, the Fiscalia had to be more engaged in greater numbers to move the ex-combatants through the process. Both Lozano and Bermudez agreed that ought to happen and said they would work on it. ¶7. (C) Bermudez admitted that the President had taken a big risk in leaving Don Berna where he was. In GOC internal deliberations, two choices emerged: either keep Don Berna under GOC control and confront charges of special treatment while significant demobilizations proceeded, or put him in jail and risk derailing the demobilization of his blocs. They decided on the former, believing it not only salvaged additional demobilizations, but also sent the right message to other paramilitaries. According to Bermudez, High Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo visited with demobilized AUC leaders in Ralito to discuss Don Berna's case, and found them acknowledging the President's "guts" in going after him, and making it clear that they did not want the same thing happening to them. ¶8. (C) Bermudez said Don Berna would be brought to Medellin later in the week to attend a public hearing related to his case. We understand that the process will be scrutinized carefully both here and abroad, he stressed, and intend to make sure it comes out right. He also said the GOC intended to be as transparent about the process as possible. For example, the number of those demobilizing from Don Berna's blocs turns out to be lower than 4,000. He intended to release the new figure as soon as he could confirm it. ¶9. (C) Comment: Lozano and Bermudez understood that they were in a high stakes game and the political space for this sort of maneuver was closing fast. A failure with Don Berna would leave the President exposed in domestic politics as never before in his presidency. DRUCKER