COLOMBIA: CODEL DAVIS MEETS WITH PRESIDENT URIBE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 005752

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL CO PBTS CODEL
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA: CODEL DAVIS MEETS WITH PRESIDENT URIBE

Classified By: Charge Milton K. Drucker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. CODEL Davis met with President Uribe on June
2 during a brief visit to Bogota (septel). CODEL Renzi, on a
separate trip, also attended. Uribe thanked the group for
U.S. support, outlined the improved security situation, and
briefly described Venezuela's approach to the FARC. Uribe
underscored his concern that more progress had not been made
militarily against the guerrillas, that high value targets
had not been captured, and that Colombian public forces had
not been able to rescue U.S. and Colombian hostages. As a
result, he planned to undertake a comprehensive review of
Plan Patriota. To address criticism from some in the U.S.
Congress that the GOC focused more on a military solution
over a peace process, Rep. Frank Wolf (R-VA) suggested Uribe
enlist the help of a outside group such as the Carter Center
or U.S. Institute for Peace to validate his efforts and send
a message that Colombia was willing to pursue progress on all
fronts. Uribe agreed to welcome a group into the process
"the U.S. trusted." Uribe said if he could not run for
re-election, he would support the candidate who "inspired
hope" and stayed closest to his "main line issues." In
response to a question on what further assistance he could
use, Uribe said he needed to expand the spray program and
increase support for manual eradication. Minister of Defense
Uribe requested U.S. advice on how to do a better job
capturing guerrilla leaders. End Summary.


2. (C) On June 2, Representative Tom Davis (R-VA),Chairman
of the House Government Reform Committee, Rep. Frank Wolf
(R-VA),Rep. Candice Miller (R-MI),Rep. Dutch Ruppersberger
(D-MD) and Rep. Carolyn Maloney (D-NY) met with President
Uribe for over an hour. Rep. Rick Renzi (R-AZ) and Rep. Mike
Rogers (R-MI) were also present. The CODELs were accompanied
by Ambassador and polcouns (notetaker). Uribe was
accompanied by Minister of Defense Jorge Alberto Uribe and
Vice Foreign Minister Camilo Reyes.


3. (C) Uribe opened by thanking the President Bush and the
Congress for their political and financial support. With the
help of the United States, he said, Colombia had made great
strides. U.S. support was crucial for Colombia's success
against terrorism.


4. (C) Rep. Davis asked for the President's views on Chavez,
Venezuela and FARC activity along the Colombian-Venezuelan
border. Davis said the CODEL arrived from Venezuela earlier
in the day and GOV officials were complaining about Colombian
problems spilling across the border. Uribe responded that
kidnappings were increasing on the Venezuelan side of the
border and decreasing in Colombia's Norte de Santander
Department and other border areas. He noted improvements in
relations with GOV legal authorities, citing the extradition
to Colombia of FARC leader Gentil Alvis Patino (aka
Chinguiro). Uribe had expected a long, drawn out legal
process but was surprised the GOV moved on the GOC
extradition request so quickly. Amb noted that pressure to
extradite Chinguiro came from not only from Colombia, but
also from Brazil and Spain.


5. (C) Uribe said he remained convinced that FARC and ELN
guerrillas continued to hide in Venezuela. While Chavez did
not directly protect them, it was clear there were FARC/ELN
sympathizers among his followers. Uribe underscored that the
best way to deal with these guerrillas was to tell Chavez
where they are and then pressure him to go after them.


6. (C) In a follow-up question, Rep Davis asked about the
military situation and whether the FARC was indeed weaker.
Uribe said "we are winning but need to stay the course." The
overall security situation had improved dramatically. When
he took office in 2002, 66 per 100,000 inhabitants were being
assassinated. In 2005, only 15 had been killed. If the
current trend continued, the total for the year would be
30-35. In 2002, 160 trade union activists were killed and in
2005, only three. In 2002, 11 journalists were killed and in
2005, only two. In 2001, there were 3050 kidnappings. In
2005, 280 so far. In 2002, Bogota endured weekly bombings.
In the last year and a half, there had not been one.


7. (C) Uribe stressed that, while the statistics were
encouraging, he remained concerned that more progress had not
been made militarily. He planned to institute a permanent
review of military operations. In the short term, with the
assistance of SOUTHCOM, he was going to thoroughly review
Plan Patriota, to assess what had gone right and how to
correct what had not. He expressed particular concern about
the lack of progress in Narino and Cauca Departments and the
borders with Brazil and Venezuela which were primarily
jungle. He also said he wanted the review to focus on high
value targets (HVTs) and the three kidnapped Americans. On
the former, he needed to understand why COLMIL had failed to
capture HVTs. On the latter, he was disappointed that no
clear opportunities had emerged to rescue the U.S. hostages
or the 70 Colombian citizens the FARC held.


8. (C) Rep. Wolf agreed that the guerrillas -- the FARC in
particular -- were Uribe's major problem. Nonetheless, many
of his colleagues in the U.S. Congress were concerned the GOC
was focusing on a military solution and ignoring the peace
process. He often sat in hearings and listened to colleagues
complain about COLMIL's alleged human rights violations and
other issues. He asked Uribe whether it made sense for the
GOC to involve an outside group in the peace process -- a
special envoy, the Carter Center, the U.S. Institute for
Peace -- to act as a broker, a mechanism successfully
deployed in other conflict situations. Wolf believed
Congressional criticism would diminish if the GOC accepted
the involvement of a third party, sending a clear message
that Colombia was willing to open itself up to the
international community and do everything possible to achieve
movement with the guerrillas. A respected third party could
validate what Uribe was already doing.


9. (C) Uribe said he was not opposed to the idea, but
maintained that the situation in Colombia was unique to other
experiences in Latin America. In the past, insurgents fought
against dictatorships on the continent. In Colombia, they
are fighting against a strong, legitimate democracy.
Although past peace processes did not focus on the promotion
and protection of human rights, he had made it an integral
part of his democratic security policy. That said, he
encouraged Rep. Wolf to pursue the idea and would welcome a
group "the U.S. trusted" to engage.


10. (C) Rep. Maloney noted that everyone she had met on the
trip was complimentary of the President but also expressed
concern he was not taking enough precautions for his own
security. Uribe, visibly touched by the comment, said
because Colombia had 52 percent poverty and 12 percent
unemployment (down from 20 percent when he took office),it
was difficult to legitimize the government. His mission was
to convince people democratic institutions deserved the
people's confidence. As a result, he sought out
opportunities to interact with as many citizens as he could
"to "walk with them." He knew it involved risk but had to
take it. He expressed appreciation for the great efforts of
his (U.S. supported) security team and gratitude to the U.S.
for helping keep him and his family safe.


11. (C) Rep. Ruppersberger asked Uribe what we would do to
keep the momentum going and his legacy alive if he could not
run for re-election? Uribe responded that he would support
the candidate who "inspired hope" and stayed closest to his
fundamentals, his "main line issues."


12. (C) Rep. Miller told Uribe she hoped he could run for
re-election. (Note: the Constitutional Court will likely
render its verdict on legislation approving presidential
re-election in September or October. End Note.) She
stressed that after September 11, the U.S. looked around to
find allies in its fight against terrorism and immediately
found President Uribe. She expressed the gratitude of the
U.S. Congress. Noting the financial constraints of
Afghanistan and Iraq, she expressed the hope that Congress
could do more to help Colombia, and asked Uribe what more he
needed?


13. (C) Uribe said he needed perseverance. And for that, he
needed the support of the Colombian people and the
international community. So far, the only practical support
came from the U.S. From the others came mostly rhetoric. We
have to stay the course, he said, and he hoped the U.S. would
stay on it with him. With that and the courage of the
Colombian people, we can win. To respond directly to Rep.
Miller's question, Uribe said he wanted to provide more
results. He had asked the Secretary for a new spraying base
to expand the spray program. The additional technical
support would allows him to spray more faster. He also
wanted to see more manual eradication. MOD Uribe said
COLMIL's top priority was to capture high value targets, and
he welcomed U.S. advice. Rep. Davis said he and his
colleagues would work to get the resources Uribe needed to
complete the job.
DRUCKER