PLAN PATRIOTA PHASE 2B UPDATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 005207

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2015
TAGS: PTER MOPS PREL CO FARC
SUBJECT: PLAN PATRIOTA PHASE 2B UPDATE

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons
1.5 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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1. (C) General Fracica took control of the Joint Task Force
Omega (JTF-O),responsible for carrying out Plan Patriota's
Phase 2B in Southeastern Colombia, in December 2004.
Progress in the area of operations was slow in early 2005;
changes by Fracica prompted some limited advancements but
progress then slowed once again as the FARC adapted to
COLMIL's strategy. Fracica implemented a re-zoning of the
mobile brigades in the 2B area and concentrated his forces in
the southern zone in an attempt to pursue senior FARC
leadership. COLMIL has improved inter-service cooperation,
made good use of information from deserters, and seized
significant weapons and food caches. The coming months will
pose even greater challenges for the JTF-O as the FARC adapts
to COLMIL operations.

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Phase 2B Operations
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2. (C) Plan Patriota is, in many ways, a tactical battle.
The first three months following the appointment of General
Fracica to the Joint Task Force Omega (JTF-O) in December
2004 saw slow progress in the Plan Patriota Phase 2B area.
Fracica then implemented changes that allowed limited success
before progress slowed once again as FARC forces adapted to
COLMIL strategy. Fracica ordered a re-zoning of the brigades
in the 2B area of operations in March 2005 to give his
commanders more control of their own battlespace and the
opportunity for more flexibility. Operation Cazador del
Caguan in April and May 2005 moved the force structure in the
2B area of operations from the east of the Caguan River to
the west by redeploying the First and Second Mobile Brigades
to the area around Remolinas del Caguan. The Rapid
Deployment Force (FUDRA) headquarters was moved from La
Macarena to Tres Esquinas and took control of the First,
Second, Sixth, and 22nd Mobile Brigades. Fracica's focus on
the southern part of the area of operations was driven, in
part, by a belief that a concentration of FARC senior
leadership was located there. Operation Cazador del Caguan
was most successful in its first two weeks, but progress
slowed in the following period. In the end, the operation
resulted in 29 enemy combatants killed in action, 40 wounded,
and the seizure of 98 tons of food. The mid-May Operation
Romeo that took place between Tres Esquinas and Larandia
officially resulted in 16 enemy combatants killed in action,
although unofficial reports are as high as 80.


3. (C) Under pressure from President Uribe and the High
Command to produce greater results, Fracica in mid-May
ordered his troops against known FARC structures or mobility
corridors. His goal was to have his units actively seeking
combat. In April 2005 a similar strategy targeting FARC
logistical infrastructure in the Sunsilla River area produced
notable success, helping to make April the month with the
greatest operational results in 2005 (29 FARC killed in
action, 40 FARC captured). The FUDRA is now directing all of
its units--Mobile Brigades 1, 2, 6, and 22--to undertake the
new objectives; the commanders in areas one and three are
also planning for new operations to target known FARC
structures.

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Positive Developments
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4. (C) Inter-service cooperation at tactical and strategic
levels has improved. The Army's 4th and 6th Divisions,
located north and south of the JTF-O, respectively, have
provided increased support to JTF-O forces in 2005 by moving
to cut off mobility corridors in support of 2B operations.
The Second Colombian Air Combat Command (CACOM 2) at Apiay
plans to build a joint intelligence center run by the Air
Force and staffed by all services. The center will service
CACOM 2, the Army's Fourth Division, and Plan Patriota Phase
2B operations. On a strategic scale, the High Command of the
Armed Forces reinforced its commitment to inter-service
coordination in May 2005 with the dismissal of four top
generals who opposed the creation of coordinated commands.


5. (C) The Seventh and Tenth Mobile Brigades captured at
least twenty combatants from the FARC's First Front using
intelligence gathered from guerrilla deserters. The Armed
Forces succeeded in finding significant supply caches; in
mid-January, the Ninth and Tenth Mobile Brigades found the
largest food and weapons cache so far, containing machine
guns, uniforms, and food.

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Persistent Challenges and Constraints
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6. (C) The terrain in the 2B area of operations is difficult
and impedes intelligence collection, tactical surprise, and
support for the 15,500 troops in the area. Leishmanaisis
continues to have a major impact as hundreds of soldiers, and
even critical mine-sniffing dogs, contract the disease.
COLMIL forces are getting little intelligence from the 2B
area, which is making it difficult to know where the enemy
is. FARC three-man groups track and report on COLMIL
movements--plus the large size of JTF-O force units--making
it difficult to achieve tactical surprise. As a consequence,
COLMIL is forced to expend a great deal of effort on denial
and deception activities. Finally, air support to operations
in the area continues to be a problem. By reallocating
priorities to the JTF-O area, Minister of Defense Uribe and
the military high command increased contract air hours for
rotary wing support from 85 to 100 hours per month. Fracica
wants to further increase contract air hours in the JTF-O
area of operations to 120 hours per month, but other programs
will be impacted if this occurs. COLMIL receives an
additional 75 hours per month in contracted fixed wing
support; the Colombian Airforce also provides another 80
hours per month of rotary wing support and 140 hours per
month of fixed wing support. Even this, however, is
insufficient to support a 15,500 troop operation.

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An Uphill Battle
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7. (C) Because the FARC have adapted to COLMIL offensive
operations, JTF-O forces will have to make changes in order
to go beyond what former JTF-O Commander General Castellanos
was able to achieve. It has become a war of attrition in
which the most accessible camps and supplies caches already
have been neutralized. Moreover, the coming rainy season
lasts until November.


8. (C) Fracica expects this phase of Plan Patriota to
conclude by the end of 2005, when the JTF-O will turn the
mission over to the Fourth and Sixth Army Divisions.

WOOD