GENERAL CRADDOCK MEETS WITH PRESIDENT URIBE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 004570

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2015
TAGS: PTER ASEC PHUM KJUS SNAR CO
SUBJECT: GENERAL CRADDOCK MEETS WITH PRESIDENT URIBE

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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1. (C) On May 11, President Alvaro Uribe discussed
counterdrug strategy, guerrilla attacks in southern Colombia,
the AUC peace process, and recent arrests of U.S. military
personnel with SOUTHCOM Commander General Bantz Craddock.
Uribe expressed concern that if the GOC did not significantly
reduce drug production this year, public opinion would turn
against aerial eradication and extradition. Craddock agreed
that it was important to win both the military and political
battle in support of couterdrug policies and assured Uribe
that the U.S. Congress was pleased with his administration's
progress. Uribe emphasized that the security forces were
attacking all paramilitary groups that did not respect the
cease-fire and that record numbers were being killed or
captured. He said he trusted the U.S. to fully prosecute
detained U.S. military personnel found guilty of trafficking
arms or drugs, but urged the USG to keep him fully informed
so he could reassure the Colombian public there would be no
impunity. General Craddock pledged to keep Uribe as informed
as possible. End summary.

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Eager for Better Counternarcotics Results
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2. (C) Uribe expressed frustration that, despite ongoing
counternarcotics operations, the price of drugs had not
increased and the Counter Narcotics Center (CNC) had reported
that the coca crop stayed stable in 2004. He warned that
public opinion and his political opponents would question
aerial eradication and extradition if the GOC failed to
significantly decrease drug production in 2005. He said
former minister and presidential hopeful Alvaro Leyva was
already trying to form alliances with the FARC and the ELN on
an anti-extradition platform. Uribe reiterated his
committment to extradition and said he would not change this
policy to gain support for his re-election. He urged
Craddock to review Colombian counterdrug policies to make
them more effective.


3. (C) General Craddock said he was surprised by CNC's crop
estimate. He speculated that perhaps the quality of the coca
crop had decreased or that the profit margins of drug
trafficking were so high that the traffickers did not have to
increase the price even though supply had gone down. He
assured Uribe that the U.S. Congress was impressed with the
high volume of eradication and interdiction operations
Colombia was conducting with U.S. support, and that support
would continue.

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Operations Continue in the South
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4. (C) Uribe said U.S. helicopters had been crucial in
transporting troops to combat recent guerrilla attacks
against security forces and civilians in Cauca and Narino
Departments. In response to the Ambassador's inquiry if the
GOC would divert resources away from Plan Patriota to focus
on Cauca and Narino, Defense Minister Jorge Uribe said they
had no plans to do so, but would consider it if necessary.
General Craddock noted that Cauca and Narino could be
considered a subset of the Plan Patriota area of operations
and encouraged the security forces to adapt to changing
guerrilla tactics. He said minor setbacks were to be
expected and that the attacks in Cauca and Narino were a
clear indication that the FARC was feeling pressure in the
Plan Patriota area.

5. (C) Minster Uribe noted that killing or capturing high
value targets continued to be a top priority. Armed Forces
Commander General Ospina had moved Plan Patriota troops to
the south of the area of operations to target the FARC
leadership. MILGRP Commander Colonel Trombitas said the
Embassy was impressed with Special Forces Commander Colonel
Mejia's skill and determination to go after high value
targets. President Uribe emphasized that he wanted to follow
U.S. advice on how to best combat narcoterrorists.

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AUC Process
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6. (C) In reaction to UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
Louise Arbour's statements about AUC cease-fire violations,
the Minister of Defense reported on military successes
against the paramilitaries: during Uribe's term, 9,804
paramilitaries had been captured and 1,125 killed; in the
last 12 months, 4,231 had been captured and 449 killed; and
in the first four months of 2005, 1,060 had been captured and
132 killed. Uribe underscored that any illegal armed group
not respecting a cease-fire would be pursued militarily. The
Ambassador agreed that security forces were tough on the AUC,
but noted that the imperfectly observed cease-fire, the
weakening of the demobilization law, and the inefficiencies
in the military justice system, including the lack of a
conclusion in case of the murder of trade unionists in Arauca
Department, had created confusion about the GOC's position on
paramilitaries.


7. (C) With respect to the demobilization law, President
Uribe explained that, from the time he began campaigning for
the presidency, he had disagreed with different treatment for
guerrilla or paramilitary group members. Ideally, he noted
that membership in any illegal armed group should simply be
terrorism. He said the GOC would work to create the best
legislation possible for demobilization.


8. (C) Uribe defended the Arauca trade unionists case and
said the suspects would remain detained until a decision had
been made. Minister Uribe reminded Craddock that the case
was moving at a much faster pace than was typical for the
military justice system. The Ambassador agreed that the case
was going well, but said a conclusion would be help ease
concerns about military justice.

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Arrests of U.S. Military Personnel
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9. (C) Uribe said he trusted the U.S. justice system to fully
prosecute all U.S. military personnel found guilty of
trafficking drugs or arms in Colombia. It was important to
demonstrate to the Colombian public that immunity for U.S.
personnel in Colombia did not mean impunity. Otherwise, the
incidents would threaten support for a strong extradition
policy. He urged General Craddock and the Ambassador to keep
him informed on the cases so he could show the U.S. was
holding the guilty parties accountable. General Craddock
expressed dismay at these incidents and assured Uribe that
the U.S., in close collaboration with Colombian authorities,
were investigating the cases carefully. He pledged to keep
Colombia informed of developments and said he hoped to
arrange some sort of observer status for Colombia at public
sessions.
WOOD