PEACE PROCESS WITH ELN STALLS

31082,4/19/2005 20:39,05BOGOTA3726,"Embassy Bogota",CONFIDENTIAL,05BOGOTA1775,"This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 003726 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2015 TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL CO MX ELN SUBJECT: PEACE PROCESS WITH ELN STALLS REF: A. BOGOTA 1775 ¶B. BOGOTA 3422 ¶C. CARACAS 0951 Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) On April 15, the Ambassador met with Mexican facilitator for the peace process with the National Liberation Army (ELN) Andres Valencia and Mexican Ambassador Chacon. Valencia said the peace process remained stalled due to the ELN's unwillingness to renounce kidnapping during talks. Nevertheless, the GOC and ELN were proceeding with his facilitation because neither wanted to walk away just yet. In March, Brazil, Venezuela, and Spain offered to mediate peace talks if the Mexican facilitation stalled, but the GOC rallied them behind Mexico's lead. Valencia noted an internal split between negotiation ready-ELN members, led by Francisco Galan, and more violent leaders such as Antonio Garcia, who were closely aligned with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Valencia also probed for more active U.S. involvement as a way to jump-start the process. ¶2. (U) On April 18, in a surprise move, the ELN rejected further Mexican facilitation due to the GOM's vote against a resolution criticizing Cuba's human rights record at the Commission on Human Rights last week. As a result, this cable is provided largely for the record. End Summary. Stalled Peace Process -------------- ¶3. (C) Andres Valencia told the Ambassador on April 15 after a week in Bogota that the ELN peace process, stalled since early February, was likely to remain stuck for the foreseeable future. ELN leaders remained adamant that the organization be allowed to continue kidnapping to finance its operations during talks, despite the GOC's refusal to accept that condition. (Note: the Mexicans agree with the GOC.) Valencia's March ultimatum message to the ELN demanded that the group agree to either negotiate or end the process. Valencia hoped that the threat would press the ELN to accept the necessary preconditions for negotiations set out by the GOC. Valencia did not end the talks, he said, because other nations would serve as mediators if he left and a year of negotiation would be wasted. The Colombian Government also threatened to end the process and reveal the ELN's culpability for the breakdown but decided not to since some officials feared returning to a two-front conflict with the ELN and the FARC. All three parties continue to participate in written negotiations despite frustrations with the progress. Uribe's Public Secret -------------- ¶4. (C) Valencia recounted ELN Leader Francisco Galan's irritation with President Uribe's comments on GOC talks with the ELN, broadcast during the March 29 four-party summit (ref C). Galan told Valencia he was upset that Uribe had made public statements about the process and claimed it undermined what little trust had existed between the two sides. Valencia told the Ambassador he was surprised by the broadcast but commented that, intentionally or not, Uribe's ""little secret with 26 million people"" had raised the process's visibility and the public's awareness of the ELN's kidnapping demand. Before the summit, imprisoned ELN leader Galan sent letters to the presidents of Spain, Venezuela, and Brazil requesting international support. In response, the presidents directed their ambassadors to Colombia to visit Galan in prison, but reaffirmed their faith in the Mexican facilitation process. The three urged the ELN to continue forward with the process rather than seek new facilitators. In this regard, Valencia also expressed concern that Cuba, active in negotiations up to 1999, was attempting to exert influence on the ELN and become a spoiler. He noted that Cuban attacks against Mexico following the GOM's vote at the Commission for Human Rights could work against his facilitation. ELN Divided on Way Ahead -------------- ¶5. (C) Valencia stressed that the ELN's internal divisions stymied his efforts to negotiate the terms for peace talks. As an example, Valencia mentioned a meeting with Francisco Galan where he received word that the ELN would consider suspending violent actions (including kidnapping) during peace talks in Mexico. Hours later, however, ELN leader Antonio Garcia retracted the offer. Valencia told the Ambassador that he believed Garcia had painted himself into a corner on the issue of suspending violent acts and needed some concession to save face. He raised the possibility of meeting the international community or a judicial pardon for imprisoned ELN members who worked towards peace. He acknowledged that either option would require the support of the international community, including the U.S. In more general terms, he suggested that U.S. involvement could be useful to jump-start the process, and urged the Ambassador to discuss it with Washington. ¶6. (C) The stalemate will continue, according to Valencia, since both sides enjoy the appearance of talks without concessions. He expressed cautious optimism that the ELN or GOC would find a way forward, but said he did not see either moving in the immediate future. He doubted that Mexico would be able to host peace talks, but said he was still working towards that goal. The Ambassador agreed that the process should be given every chance to succeed, but also underscored the importance of ending a failed process. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Despite the internal ELN divisions, Uribe's public comments, and increasing offers from others to restart the process, Valencia had managed, up to April 18, to keep the parties engaged. That said, the ELN's surprise announcement ending Mexican facilitation and Valencia's comments about divisions in the ELN leadership also suggest that a large part of the ELN may be now so dependent on the FARC, that the time has passed for meaningful negotiations with the GOC. ¶8. (C) Although Valencia expressed some concern about how harsh statements from Havana against Mexico following the Geneva vote might affect his facilitation, he gave no indication that it would lead to Mexico's dismissal. While this is mostly an ELN gambit, we do not underestimate Cuba's role here. We plan to tell the Colombians, still grateful to Cuba for helping resolve the crisis with Venezuela, that they would best keep their distance from the Cubans as an alternate facilitator, and that the episode proves Cuba is more interested in seeking retribution against Mexico than in helping the Colombian peace process. This latest development may also be helpful in dealing with the Cuban resolution on Guantanamo at the CHR in Geneva. ¶9. (C) Finally, Embassy believes we should be encouraging Ambassador Valencia to publish his voluminous, minute-by-minute history of the facilitation (per reftel), which will make clear the flexibility shown by the GOC in trying to get these talks underway, and discouraging the Brazilians and Spanish from filling the space left by Mexico's withdrawal from the peace process. WOOD