Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BOGOTA3636
2005-04-18 14:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bogota
Cable title:  

APIAY DRUG SMUGGLING INCIDENT

Tags:  MARR PREL SNAR CO 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 003636 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2011
TAGS: MARR PREL SNAR CO
SUBJECT: APIAY DRUG SMUGGLING INCIDENT

Classified By: DCM:MKDrucker, Reason 1.4 (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 003636

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2011
TAGS: MARR PREL SNAR CO
SUBJECT: APIAY DRUG SMUGGLING INCIDENT

Classified By: DCM:MKDrucker, Reason 1.4 (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: On March 28 cocaine was discovered on a
military aircraft arriving at Fort Bliss, Texas from
Colombia. After initial investigation three soldiers were
detained and returned to the US. Investigation is ongoing.
End Summary.


2. (C) On March 28, 2005 law enforcement authorities acting
on information obtained from the JTTF in Dallas, seized 34.9
pounds of cocaine hidden on a military aircraft arriving from
Apiay Colombian Air Force Base, at Fort Bliss, Texas. U.S.
military personnel at Apiay (in Meta Department, Colombia)
are providing support to Colombian counterinsurgency and
counterdrug operations. Law enforcement officials in CONUS
suspected that U.S. military personnel were involved in the
cocaine shipment. Early on the morning of March 29 at the
request of law enforcement personnel in Fort Bliss, the
Bogota MilGroup Commander requested that two U.S. military
personnel be detained at the U.S. Embassy and transported to
their unit at Fort Bliss in CONUS.


3. (C) The Embassy Force Protection Detachment (FPD)
contacted the military unit commander and verified that FPD
agents had authorization to detain and transport the suspects
and conduct local searches of the unit areas both in Bogota,
and at Apiay Air Base. At 5:19 AM the FPD detained Staff
Sergeant Daniel Rosas and Specialist de la Tejera (later
released in the United States),and informed the two U.S.
military personnel of their rights under Article 31, UCMJ.


4. (C) Mr. Rojas provided a voluntary, sworn statement that
led to the identification and detention of a third military
person, Sergeant Kelvin Irizarry, at Apiay Air Base, in
addition to other leads that are being pursued at this time.
Rosas also stated that he had cocaine samples in his living
quarters at Apiay. Both detainees provided written consent
to search their areas at Apiay Air Base and their hotel rooms
in Bogota. OSI agents at Apiay, conducted a search and
seized eight test tubes of cocaine from Rosas, quarters.
Evidence was collected and handed over to the Bogota DEA
office.


5. (C) At approximately 0845 hours, on March 29, 2005, the
FPD notified the unit leadership in the United States

regarding the third suspect and received authorization to
detain and transport him. The Ambassador requested that
all measures be taken to assure the safety and security of
everyone involved and that travel arrangements be expedited.
He offered full Embassy support to the investigation.


6. (C) Two suspects (Rosas and de la Tejera),departed
Colombia in a DEA aircraft later that afternoon on Tuesday,
March 29, 2005, approximately nine hours after their
detention and arrived in El Paso to be placed in custody of
U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) personnel.


7. (C) At the request of the FPD, the Defense Attache Office
transported the third suspect, and evidence, from Apiay to
Bogota. U.S. Air Force Security Policeman Luis Rucova
stationed at Apiay Air Base escorted the suspect and evidence
on board the DAO aircraft from Apiay to Bogota. On arrival
in Bogota, at approximately 18:41 hours the evidence was
turned over to DEA Bogota, and the suspect, Irizarry, was
turned over to representatives of his unit to await
transportation the following day. He left Bogota on a
commercial flight for Houston , Texas the following morning
(March 30).


8. (C) The RSO coordinated federal law enforcement team
linkup at Houston Bush Intercontinental Airport to provide in
transit security of the third suspect. The FPD agents in
cooperation with RSO and DEA in Bogota, Dallas, and Houston,
and the USDAO pilots, had interviewed the primary suspect,
developed information leading to the further identification
of the illegal ring and a third suspect, conducted searches
and seizures of evidence, and transported all suspects to
their military unit in El Paso.


9. (C) On April 4, 2005, the FPD and MilGroup Commander
briefed Colombian Air Force Commander General Lesmez, and
Colombian Military Commander General Ospina. Both Colombian
Generals assured the MILGRP Commander and FPD that the USDR
and FPD Colombia would receive all possible assistance in any
investigations and joint force protection measures. General
Lesmez said that Brigadier General (BG) Parga would be his
staff point of contact for the matter. BG Parga is currently
the Chief of Colombian Air Force Intelligence, but
ironically, was the Commander at Apiay when some of the
criminal activity was being conducted.


10. (C) On Tuesday, 5 April, FPD interviewed a U.S. walk-in
source at Apiay Air Base and obtained a sworn statement
providing further leads and suggesting that Rosas, the
primary suspect in the criminal case, had made mistakes in
intelligence missions in which he participated that could
have resulted in faulty analysis.


11. (C) On April 6 the Ambassador ordered the FPD to
organize and coordinate a threat working group to coordinate
investigative activity with selected U.S. law enforcement and
counterintelligence organizations, including host nation, to
determine the scope and nature of the criminal activity, and
to confirm or reject any security compromises occurring as a
result of the criminal activity. The working group met on
Wednesday, April 6, and exchanged information.

--------------
Conclusion
--------------


12. (C) This issue has become a matter of public
controversy here, based mostly on press and congressional
questions (including formal hearings) as to why the U.S.
servicemen implicated in the matter were not turned over to
Colombian authorities. Nationalism, resentment over
extraditions, and other factors have combined to allow some
to portray the removal of the servicemen as a unilateral
disregard for Colombian military law enforcement. Some have
even suggested that Colombia should seek the extradition of
the servicemen back to Colombia.


13. (C) Embassy, in coordination with Southcom and with the
cooperation of the Colombian Government, have kept details
out of the public record, on the grounds that the
investigation is still under way. We have noted, however,
that in keeping with a 1974 bilateral agreement the military
personnel had been notified by name in advance of arrival to
the Colombian Ministry of Defense and formally accepted by
the Ministry, which afforded them the privileges and
immunities specified in the agreement. Although this reduced
the shrillness of the public debate, it also re-focused it on
the agreement. We privately told the Minister of Defense
that, in the context of reviewing our defense relationship,
we would be willing to update the agreement (leading perhaps
to a full SOFA). The Minister has said publicly that the
1974 agreement might/might be in need of updating. This
issue will form an important part of the context for the
early May BWG discussions in Cartagena.


14. (C) The investigation continues in Texas and in
Colombia. It will be crucial--in light of politicization of
issue in Colombia--for all/all U.S. authorities working on
the case to cooperate with appropriate Colombian officials
through the Embassy. Embassy, of course, stands ready to
assist and coordinate here.


15. (U) Post wishes to express its appreciation to the
Office of the Legal Advisor for the copious assistance
provided during the night of March 28/29, 2005.

WOOD