S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 003233

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2015
TAGS: PTER PINS MOPS PHUM FARC
SUBJECT: FARC ATTACKS LOCALIZED TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY

REF: A. BOGOTA 1812


B. BOGOTA 2011

C. BOGOTA 2304

D. IIR 6819 1790-05

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood,
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (U) This cable replaces Bogota 3073 which was
transmitted in error. Please destroy all prior copies.


2. (S/NF) Summary. FARC violence in the first quarter of
2005, although tactically aggressive, remained localized and
below 2004 levels in all categories: attacks against
military and police, attacks against civilians, and attacks
against infrastructure. Intelligence since November 2004 has
indicated the FARC's desire to increase violence and
disorder. It is not clear the degree to which these attacks
are orchestrated by the FARC Secretariat or, more likely, are
the product of a general order that operating units should be
more aggressive. Attacks are limited and asymmetrical, and
may arise from a variety of motives: to weaken Uribe during
the pre-election period, to force diversion of resources away
from the Plan Patriota offensive against the FARC stronghold,
to take advantage of the purported "security vacuum" left by
demobilizing paramilitaries, or simply to demonstrate
continued FARC capabilities after a bad 2004. But the FARC's
ability to achieve any of these goals through such pinprick
attacks remains doubtful. The FARC has succeeded in a
limited spike in violence, but not more than that. End
Summary.


3. (S/NF) Colombian military statistics indicate that, in
spite of anecdotal and press impressions of increased FARC
terrorism, FARC violence is still substantially below 2004
levels in all categories. Statistics show that first quarter
2005 attacks on military and police, and infrastructure, are
all below the 2004 quarterly average and the first quarter of

2004. FARC attacks on civilians are virtually identical to
the 2004 average or slightly higher (131 versus 124) than the
first quarter in 2004. By regions, FARC attacks in the first

quarter are significantly lower in the Caribbean and the
south, and dramatically lower (39 versus 86 incidents) in the
northwest. But attacks against civilians/civilians were
greater in the west, the south and the east. All of which
indicates that, although the number of attacks is down
overall, the FARC may be aiming at higher profile targets, or
conducting operations that result in higher casualties (we
don't have casualty information for the first quarter yet).


4. (S/NF) Evidence suggests that FARC leadership at the
highest levels planned and ordered the recent spike in
violence, although the level of senior leadership in
selection of targets and other operational decisions is
unclear. Some evidence suggests that FARC leaders simply
called for all fronts to increase levels of violence by any
means possible. It is also possible that the FARC is seeking
to increase attacks: in areas outside the Plan Patriota
offensive in order to force the government to divert
resources, to try to establish a presence in former
paramilitary areas, or simply to demonstrate their continued
capability for violence after a bad 2004. Nevertheless, to
what degree a strategic shift has occurred in FARC planning
is less relevant than to what degree the guerillas can carry
out attacks that influence the direction of the body politic.



5. (C) The attacks in first quarter 2005 demonstrate FARC's
classic terrorist strategy to hit where the enemy is weakest.
This has proven for the FARC to be targets of
opportunity--mainly elements of the Colombian military
(COLMIL) taken off guard outside of the Plan Patriota area of
operations, where the FARC remains weakened. The terrorist
organization has also shown slight strategic shifts with
regard to kidnapping and pipeline attacks. For example, the
FARC kidnapped 11 people over the Holy Week holiday season in
2005 in Colombia, but instead of the more typical roadblock
method, took people hostage on remote farmland in Antioquia
and Valle del Cauca. The kidnapping figure was 24 people
lower than in the same period of 2004, and showed the FARC's
inability to control major roadways, which requires effective
dominance of an area of territory. Also, with regard to
pipeline attacks, the FARC has increased the number of
attacks, but shifted some of the focus away from Arauca
Department in favor of attacks in Norte de Santander
Department (ref C), where the pipeline traverses more remote
and rugged terrain. Again, the FARC is moving to attack at
the weakest points, but it shows little capacity in the face
of a public security presence.


6. (S/NF) The possibility that the FARC is positioning
itself to take control of areas vacated by demobilized
paramilitaries is of public concern. First quarter attacks
have shown some evidence of this, but not enough to suggest a
pattern. Examples include the Holy Week kidnappings in
Calima, Valle del Cauca, and Salgar, Antioquia, former
paramilitary strongholds, and the pipeline attacks in Norte
de Santander. Nevertheless, the FARC has yet to show a broad
capacity to fill the purported "security vacuum" left by the
demobilization of thousands of paramilitaries. Rather than
gaining control of new territory, it appears the FARC is
conducting small attacks to divert attention and perhaps
resources away from the Plan Patriota area. The embassy will
continue to monitor the status of former paramilitary held
territory closely. For the moment it appears the battle for
public perception on the issue will be more defining than any
actual battle for territory.


7. (U) Despite FARC military activity, public support for
President Uribe during the first quarter of 2005 remained
very strong. In a Gallup/El Tiempo poll released March 17,
72 percent of Colombians polled had a favorable impression of
President Uribe, and 67 percent were in favor of the idea of
re-election for a second term. Further, 83 percent had a
favorable opinion of the COLMIL, 73 percent voiced support
for Plan Colombia, while 92 percent had a negative view of
the FARC (and only 3 percent a favorable view). Finally, 69
percent of respondents said that they feel Colombia is more
secure than one year ago, and 52 percent said they were
against any exchange of FARC prisoners for the release of
hostages.


8. (S/NF) Focusing more attention on the FARC's recent
failed attempts, rather than dwelling on its strategic
posturing, demonstrates that the FARC remains weakened and
limited primarily to attacking targets of opportunity. For
example, the FARC recently tried to destroy key electric
towers around Bogota in an effort to leave the capital city
dark for up to 24 hours. Not only were the explosive devices
ineffective and poorly constructed, they were discovered by
pedestrians who noticed suspicious packages in plain sight.
The attempt showed bold intentions, but weak capacity.
Another example was the FARC's inability to disrupt holiday
travel during Holy Week, a key indicator of security levels
and one felt personally by Colombians who remember what it
was like to be under siege in the cities. The FARC tried to
place an illegal roadblock on the road between Florencia
(Caqueta) and Neiva (Huila), but again proved incapable of
carrying out what could have been a significant attack.


9. (U) In the year leading up to elections, the spike in
violence in the first quarter of 2005 has already generated
significant public debate. The opposition is making
exaggerated statements like that of leftist Representative
Gustavo Petro that "what has happened is confirmation finally
that Democratic Security is a failure." The GOC response,
that these attacks are lamentable but have not undermined the
government's strategy, continues to resonate with most
Colombians.

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Comment
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10. (S/NF) No one should underestimate the FARC. After 40
years, they are patient. The FARC has managed to make
headlines in the first quarter of 2005, and the cost of their
attacks has been real. The COLMIL will need to avoid the
mistakes that have led to losses during recent periphery
attacks. But, while helping them review tactical security
issues, we are advising no change in their strategic approach.
WOOD