ELN PEACE TALK'S ADVANCES AND RETREATS

27613,2/24/2005 16:09,05BOGOTA1775,"Embassy Bogota",CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN,05BOGOTA1081,"This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 001775 SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER CO MX ELN SUBJECT: ELN PEACE TALK'S ADVANCES AND RETREATS REF: A. BOGOTA 1081 ¶B. BOGOTA 863 Classified By: Charge Milton K. Drucker, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C): Mexican facilitator for the peace process with the National Liberation Army (ELN) Andres Valencia met with the Ambassador on February 18 to report on progress this year. Although January saw positive commitments by both the ELN and GOC on negotiation pre-requisites (ref a),the process stalled in early February. Valencia said the negotiations shifted from a discussion of word choice for a communique in January to an introspection by the ELN on whether it was ready to talk at all. Valencia is taking a ""wait and see"" approach towards the latest setbacks and told the Ambassador he appreciated the ongoing support from the United States. End summary. You say ""cease-fire""; I say ""military action freeze"" -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Valencia reported to the Ambassador on the excellent progress made in January toward reaching an agreement on a face-to-face meeting between the ELN's Central Command (COCE) and Valencia in Mexico. Valencia read out twenty-three pages of details he compiled on his efforts to bring the GOC and ELN towards compromise: the GOC softened its demand for a temporary cease-fire and accepted the ELN's offer to refrain from military actions other than acts of self-defense during talks in Mexico. The GOC agreed to suspend arrest warrants and allow the Red Cross and Valencia to provide safe transit for ELN negotiators. By January 24, after seven months of written haggling, it appeared that the two sides were approaching the face-to-face negotiation stage. Let's call the whole thing off -------------- ¶3. (C) However, the ELN again retreated from talks by issuing a February 4 ""clarification"" communique to Valencia, attacking his facilitation efforts and demanding that their concerns be addressed. ELN leadership's message (1) claimed Valencia was acting on behalf of the Mexican Government rather than serving as a neutral facilitator; (2) complained that Valencia was hard to contact (since the ELN is underground); (3) asserted he had made no progress on talks; and (4) accused him of going public with negotiation details. Valencia did not respond. On February 8, the ELN wrote another message asking why they had not received a reply and insisting on an apology from Valencia. ¶4. (C) Later that week, the GOC responded by attacking the ELN for endangering the prospects for talks. President Uribe's speech to the International Symposium of Restorative Justice in Cali on February 12 accused ELN leader Antonio Garcia of repeatedly sabotaging negotiations and called on the ELN to take the necessary steps to begin face-to-face talks soon. Uribe reiterated the GOC's willingness to negotiate in either Colombia or Mexico after the ELN began a cease-fire. On February 19, Peace Commissioner Restrepo added his commentary in an op-ed printed in leading daily ""El Tiempo."" He stressed that the GOC remained willing and open to negotiations with the guerrilla group, but acknowledged that, in its own way, the ELN process was as complicated as creating a process with the FARC would be. Restrepo reiterated the call on the ELN leadership to end the never-ending cycle of communiques and agree to talks. ¶5. (C) Valencia told the Ambassador that Uribe's comments, although accurate, further damaged negotiations and returned both sides to their original positions. Valencia added that he would not end the negotiation process without the ELN officially ending Mexico's facilitation role. According to Valencia, the ELN's vacillating communiques proved that the group lacked internal consensus on its readiness to negotiate. He juxtaposed the words of imprisoned ELN leader Francisco Galan, who played the ""good cop"" during talks, with leader Antonio Garcia's hostile ""bad cop"" comments. Valencia said such contradictory messages made it difficult to gauge the ELN's true position. ¶6. (C) Valencia speculated that psychological barriers or third party actors could be responsible for the latest ELN retreat. The ELN has spent decades outside the democratic system and could see talks in Mexico as marking the end of their struggle. He said the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) or the Cuban Government also could have scuttled the talks, the latter in an attempt to win back the role facilitator. In either case, Valencia said the GOC emerged appearing flexible and willing to negotiate as the ELN attacked the process. ¶7. (C) The Ambassador commented that the ELN's internal indecision was not sustainable -- ELN's military weakness would guarantee that, if talks failed, it would have to align itself with FARC forces and lose its autonomy and identity. The Ambassador asked Valencia to solicit the Catholic Church's good offices to return the ELN to talks. Valencia said he planned to meet with several Church leaders before returning to Mexico on February 23. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Valencia has maintained a balanced, facilitating role and kept communication open despite the ELN's personal attacks. Mexico, with U.S. support, will keep the door open to the ELN for awhile, leaving room for COCE to come to terms with itself. If the ELN is unable to do so, Valencia may be inclined to publicize the recent train of events, exposing the ELN as responsible for the setback. End comment. DRUCKER