PEACE COMMISSIONER'S CONCERNS ABOUT DEMOBILIZATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 001706

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2015
TAGS: PTER PHUM KJUS PREL PGOV CO
SUBJECT: PEACE COMMISSIONER'S CONCERNS ABOUT DEMOBILIZATION
LAW


Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: On February 17, President Uribe rejected
Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo's offer to resign and
authorized him to suggest changes to the GOC's draft
demobilization law. Restrepo explained to the Ambassador
that he fears the current GOC draft law would discourage
demobilization. Restrepo's negotiating strategy is to get as
many paramilitaries to demobilize as possible by requiring
relatively few hurdles at the onset. Once the state has
identified and disarmed them and put them under firm state
control, it can then focus on identifying and punishing the
major criminals and dismantling paramilitary economic and
political power. Restrepo's main concern with the draft law
is that, if all paramilitaries are required to confess all
crimes and undergo an investigation immediately upon
demobilizing, they will refuse to do so. He noted that the
GOC has no identifying information on approximately 95
percent of the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).
Restrepo is also concerned that the law is too focused on
punishing paramilitary sympathizers and that the reparations
mechanism is ineffective. He is a strong advocate of
mandatory time in confinement for paramilitaries who
committed major crimes. End Summary.

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Restrepo's Negotiating Strategy
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2. (C) On February 14, Peace Commissioner Restrepo offered to
resign over his disagreement with the GOC-sponsored
demobilization bill ("Law for Peace and Justice"). On
February 17, President Uribe rejected the resignation and
authorized Restrepo to suggest changes to the law to Minister
of Interior and Justice Sabas Pretelt and to Congress. Uribe
assured Restrepo that he would personally oversee the
Congressional debate on the bill to ensure a viable draft is
passed. On February 18, the President held an initial
meeting with Restrepo, Pretelt, Vice President Francisco
Santos and some pro-Uribe Congressman to discuss the draft.


3. (C) Restrepo explained to the Ambassador on February 17
that the current draft jeopardizes his negotiating strategy
with the AUC. His objective is to get as many paramilitaries
as possible under state control, by offering incentives to
demobilize rather than imposing strict requirements at the
onset. According to Restrepo, the GOC has no record of about
95 percent of the AUC. Once they demobilize, the state can
identify and disarm them and put them under firm state
control. After this is done, the GOC can begin finding and
punishing those who committed major crimes and dismantle the
AUC's economic and political power structure. In short,
Restrepo is working to persuade the paramilitaries to turn
themselves over to the state by delaying the investigation
and punishment phase until it is too late for them to flee.

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Main Concern: Encourage Demobilization
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4. (C) Restrepo's principle problem with both the government
draft and the version submitted by Senator Rafael Pardo is
that it would discourage demobilization by imposing too many
legal requirements immediately after demobilization. The GOC
and Pardo draft laws call for demobilizing persons to confess
all crimes and for the Prosecutor General's Office (Fiscalia)
to open an investigation on each individual. Restrepo
explained that if this were the case, the paramilitaries
would instead forgo demobilization knowing that there was
little chance the authorities would ever be able to capture
them. Moreover, the requirement to investigate all
demobilizing individuals would make Law 782 obsolete. Law
782 authorizes the state to pardon members of an illegal
armed group who demobilize and who are guilty only of
rebellion against the state and other related, minor crimes.
Under Law 782, the Fiscalia debriefs the individuals but a
formal investigation is not conducted. Restrepo emphasized
that Law 782 was working well to facilitate demobilization
and screen out the major criminals, and that he wanted it to
stay in place.

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Confession and Reparations
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5. (C) Restrepo has two other concerns with the drafts. He
is worried that, by requiring a full confession, the law
would call for paramilitary supporters to be punished. He
noted that in some AUC-dominated areas nearly the entire
community collaborated with the paramilitaries, including
politicians and military personnel, because they had no
choice. He expressed concern that some leftist politicians
are eager to expose and punish these sympathizers. Instead,
Restrepo asserted that the state should focus on sensitizing
the population on responsible civilian behavior and building
confidence in legitimate authority. He emphasized that any
sympathizers who committed major crimes would be punished.


6. (C) Lastly, Restrepo said the reparations mechanism in the
draft laws was ineffective because it simply demanded full
disclosure of illicit assets. Most AUC members have very
little property held in true name and would be unlikely to
turn over even a small percentage of their assets. Instead,
Restrepo wants to strengthen the current asset forfeiture law
to give the state greater and permanent power to seize all
illicit assets. In Restrepo's view, the state would then be
responsible for giving reparations to victims from those
seized assets. He underscored that dismantling the AUC's
economic power was key to a successful peace process.
Otherwise, the AUC would retain its power because of its
capacity to buy off people.

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Holding Criminals Responsible
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7. (C) Restrepo will insist that paramilitaries guilty of
major crimes are fully investigated, serve a mandatory time
in confinement, and have all illicit assets seized. He is a
proponent of some sort of truth commission that would offer a
judicial benefit, such as a reduced sentence, for major
crimes for those who demobilize and collaborate with
authorities. He noted that President Uribe wants the
alternative sentence to be served in an official prison, but
that the AUC leaders would demand a less restrictive
confinement center.

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Committed to His Positions
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8. (C) Restrepo is aware that his views may lead to
accusations that he is a paramilitary supporter, especially
since he cannot reveal his negotiating strategy publicly. He
said, however, he could not allow a draft law to pass that
would compromise his strategy. The Ambassador reiterated
that the USG would like to see a law that dismantles the AUC,
punishes major criminals, and is transparent.


DRUCKER