SFRC STAFFER MEACHAM DISCUSSES DRUGS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 011743 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER SNAR KCRM CO SUBJECT: SFRC STAFFER MEACHAM DISCUSSES DRUGS, DEMOBILIZATION, EXTRADITION, AND VENEZUELA REF: BOGOTA 11611 Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood Reason: 1.4 (b,d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) SFRC staffer Carl Meacham discussed GOC counternarcotics efforts, paramilitary demobilization, extradition, and Venezuela with senior GOC figures during his December 11-14 visit to Bogota. (Meacham's meeting with President Alvaro Uribe is reported reftel.) Inspector General Edgardo Maya praised U.S. assistance efforts in Colombia but argued that U.S. counternarcotics aid was "too timid" and said the GOC needs more helicopters. Both Prosecutor General Mario Iguaran and Defense Minister Camilo Ospina said the GOC's manual drug eradication efforts had gone especially well in 2005 and could be expanded in certain circumstances; Meacham said the U.S. Congress is sympathetic to this argument. Maya expressed particular concern over the negative role that demobilized minors could play in fomenting gang violence if the GOC's reinsertion programs were ineffective. (He also predicted that Uribe would easily win reelection.) Iguaran said he expects the Fiscalia's Justice and Peace unit to crank up its work as soon as Iguaran receives from Uribe a list of paramilitaries whom the Fiscalia must assess for Justice and Peace eligibility; Iguaran expects the list in the coming weeks. OAS Verification Mission Director Sergio Caramagna said he plans to double the Mission's personnel beginning in January, and listed the growing number of countries who are contributing or have expressed interest ("even Ukraine" has asked how it can help). GOC Human Rights advisor Carlos Franco said the GOC is unsure of the nature and extent of paramilitary assets potentially subject to seizure for Justice and Peace reparations purposes. Iguaran said third party possession of such assets would be difficult to unravel unless the third parties were pardoned, otherwise they would resist disclosure for fear of being prosecuted for money laundering. He said extradition was essential to combat narcotics trafficking. In response to Meacham's questions on Uribe's decision to approve but suspend the extradition of Don Berna, Franco said Colombian public opinion would not approve Don Berna's extradition if he complied with his Justice and Peace obligations. If he did not, however, it would be easier for �00A;Uribe to extradite him. Maya charged that the GOC had an "understanding" with Don Berna not to extradite him and said the GOC should come out and say so. Vice Foreign Minister Alejandro Borda told Meacham that Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez was much more isolated at the Summit of the Americas than media reports suggested. Chavez was especially unsuccessful in enlisting Caribbean support, Borda said. -------------- Inspector General Edgardo Maya -------------- ¶2. (C) Maya said the U.S. plays a positive role in Colombia. U.S. aid is essential to combat the guerrillas. In Maya's view, "without the U.S. we would be involved in a savage war." Maya said, however, that U.S. drug eradication assistance is "too timid," arguing that Colombia needs more helicopters to intensify its eradication program. He told Meacham that narcotics traffickers were using national parks to grow cocaine; they must be "rooted out" of their physical locations and any government institutions they had penetrated, he said. With regard to paramilitary demobilization, Maya said he was especially concerned about the GOC's effort to reintegrate demobilized minors. Maya suggested Colombia would risk incubating its own generation of gang leaders, like in El Salvador, if it did not manage the reintegration process well. In response to Meacham's question about Uribe's decision to approve but suspend the U.S. extradition request for Don Berna, Maya said he suspects the GOC has an "understanding" with Don Berna that it will not extradite him to the U.S. If such an understanding exists, Maya said, it would be best to announce it publicly. ¶3. (C) Maya predicted that Uribe would easily win reelection in May. Maya saw his job during the campaign as monitoring the campaign activities of public employees (who are prohibited from engaging in politics under the Constitutional Court's recent Electoral Guarantees decision). He suggested there would be little "real debate" or "clash of ideologies" during the campaign. Maya said he is well aware that Uribe's popularity is high but noted that the Inspector General's office is concerned not with popularity but rather with ensuring that Uribe and other public employees abide by the constitution. -------------- -------------- OAS Verification Mission Director Sergio Caramagna -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Caramagna said the OAS mandate was to assist a peace process that was of a magnitude "unprecedented" in the region. The OAS had three principal tasks: (1) verify the cessation of hostilities; (2) verify disarmament; and (3) work with communities affected by violence. He plans to double the mission's personnel beginning in January. In particular, Caramagna plans to strengthen the mission's presence in the Departments of Casanare, Cauca, Cesar, Magdalena, Meta, and Narino. He said one of his main objectives is to assist the National Reconciliation and Reparations Commission to verify the dismantlement of paramilitary groups. ¶6. (C) Caramagna reported that the mission is receiving concrete and increasing support from a number of countries: Canada plans to give $1.3 million; the Netherlands $1.5 million; Sweden will donate an expert; South Korea will donate five Hyundai vehicles and 20 laptops; and Mexico said it would send an unspecified number of experts. Caramagna said the Bahamas, Brazil, Chile, Italy, Spain, "and even Ukraine" have asked how they can help. -------------- Human Rights Advisor Carlos Franco -------------- ¶7. (C) Franco discussed with Meacham matters not part of his portfolio but on which Franco has strong opinions. He said the GOC was working to identify paramilitary assets (including land) but had no clear idea yet of the scope of such assets. (Press reports recently suggested that many paramilitary assets are in the hands of third parties, who may be reluctant to come forward for fear of being charged with money laundering. Some GOC sources suggest that the Justice and Peace law's implementing regulations will address this issue; on December 13 Uribe told the Ambassador and Meacham that he expects to sign the regulations "in the next few days.") Meacham offered U.S. assistance in identifying paramilitary assets (through a GAO study) if the GOC thought it useful. On extradition, and in response to Meacham's question, Franco said the Colombian people would not accept Don Berna's extradition if Don Berna complies with all relevant Justice and Peace law requirements. If, however, Don Berna fails to comply, then it would be easier for Uribe to extradite him. More generally, Franco said the GOC needed to coordinate better its Justice and Peace implementation efforts, especially within the Fiscalia. Franco volunteered that Colombia should expand manual drug eradication efforts as much as possible, saying that about one quarter of the area the GOC eradicated in 2005 was done manually. Meacham said he had heard similar positive things about manual eradication from Defense Minister Ospina, "and we in the U.S. Congress share those views." In response to Meacham's inquiry about GOC efforts to reestablish a presence throughout the country, Franco said one brigade is responsible for an area of about 42,000 square kilometers (16,000 square miles),an area twice the size of El Salvador; such a brigade generally has only one helicopter, he said. -------------- Defense Minister Camilo Ospina -------------- ¶8. (C) Ospina said the FARC would remain uninterested in peace negotiations as long as it continues to benefit economically from the drug trade; for this reason, it was especially important for the GOC to continue eradication efforts. Ospina said he strongly supports aerial eradication, but the cost was "astronomical." For cost and environmental reasons, Ospina supports manual eradication where feasible, especially in national parks. Ospina asked Meacham how best to inform U.S. interest groups and members of Congress of the links between drug cultivation and the environment (three hectares of jungle are destroyed for every hectare of coca planted). Meacham recommended Ospina focus on interest groups and members of Congress aligned with the Democratic Party, and encouraged Ospina to work with Ambassador Pastrana to design a public relations campaign on this issue. Ospina said the paramilitary demobilization process would enable the GOC to distinguish between "real" paramilitaries and narcotraffickers and fight against both. ¶9. (C) Ospina said the GOC has chosen to "manage" its relationship with Venezuela rather than confront Chavez. Ospina was not concerned with a Venezuelan military invasion, but rather with Chavez's political interference in Colombia (in the same way Chavez was involved in Bolivia, Ospina said). Ospina claimed Chavez called Uribe and invited himself to the December 17 175th anniversary of the death of Simon Bolivar, to be held in Colombia. According to Ospina, there is increasing regional concern about Venezuela's involvement with drug trafficking. ¶10. (C) Ospina told Meacham that the U.S. needs a clearer approach to relations with Latin America (he mentioned the Kennedy Administration's Alliance for Progress as an example). He advised that "job creation" would sell better than "trade" arguments, which "appeal to only a few." In Ospina's view, the U.S. should de-emphasize globalization/trade/democracy language and talk more in terms of "the social interests of the people." -------------- Prosecutor General Mario Iguaran -------------- ¶11. (C) Iguaran said he strongly believes in extradition because it is "an efficient and threatening tool" that discourages narcotics trafficking. In response to Meacham's question on Don Berna, Iguaran said the final decision to extradite or not rested with Uribe. Iguaran was responsible for determining if Don Berna is eligible for processing under the Justice and Peace law, since the law generally excludes narcotrafficking. ¶12. (C) Iguaran said the Fiscalia's Justice and Peace unit is beginning to work, albeit with limited resources. Iguaran expects to receive shortly a GOC list of paramilitaries for whom the Fiscalia must assess eligibility for Justice and Peace processing, following which he expects the unit's resources to be increased. Iguaran said the GOC needed to coordinate better its assessment of Justice and Peace eligibility; the Fiscalia cannot do all the work itself and the police and military must be involved. Iguaran said "third party control" of paramilitary assets would be one of the toughest issues to resolve. He suggested the GOC should consider pardons for such third parties who turn over assets. One of his biggest challenges is compiling an adequate database that includes information from various GOC agencies. Iguaran said the Fiscalia must also take statements from demobilizing paramilitaries ("version libres"),a massive task that would further strain his resources. -------------- Deputy Foreign Minister Alejandro Borda -------------- ¶13. (C) Borda told Meacham the GOC had raised drug processing's negative impact on the environment at a recent meeting of Amazon foreign ministers, but Brazil, in particular, had resisted. Borda said FM Barco had told her Ecuadorian counterpart recently that the GOC's suspension of aerial eradication on the Colombia-Ecuador border was only temporary and depended on evidence that the suspension did not result in increased coca planting. Borda told Meacham the GOC had done a good job of returning a state presence throughout Colombia and thanked the U.S. for its assistance. He emphasized the importance of Plan Colombia II. In response to Meacham's question, Borda said the Mar del Plata Summit of the Americas has turned out much better than media commentaries would suggest; in Borda's view, Chavez had been isolated and his overtures to Caribbean countries, in particular, had fallen on deaf ears. WOOD