PRESIDENT URIBE ACCEPTS "INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 011611

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER CO FARC
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT URIBE ACCEPTS "INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION"
SECURITY ZONE PROPOSAL FOR FARC TALKS; FARC RESPONSE PENDING

REF: A. BOGOTA 11461

B. BOGOTA 11435

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood.
Reason; 1.4 (b,d)

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Summary
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1. (C) President Uribe announced late on December 13 that
the GOC has accepted an "international commission"
(representatives from France, Switzerland, and Spain)
suggestion to establish a 65 square mile "security zone" in
the Valle del Cauca to conduct hostage exchange talks with
the FARC. The international commission handed the proposal
to the GOC and the FARC on December 13. Some 30 families
live in the proposed security zone, a rural area that
contains several small governmental facilities and a church.
Uribe said the proposal contemplates 40 international
observers in the security zone to verify that no armed actors
are present, either GOC forces or guerrillas. The security
zone would exist for seven days prior to any GOC-FARC meeting
(to allow the FARC to get to the zone) and for seven days
following the conclusion of the talks (to allow the FARC to
leave). The International Committee of the Red Cross would
observe the process, along with a committee representing the
European facilitators. In a meeting with the Ambassador
shortly before the public announcement, Uribe said his
acceptance of the security zone was a concession, taken to
demonstrate the GOC's good faith approach to FARC talks.
Uribe said the security zone would be significantly different
from former President Pastrana's demilitarized zone
("despeje") because Colombian sovereignty and law would
remain in effect and there would be no armed guerrilla
presence allowed. The GOC's principal concession would be to
withdraw the armed forces from the area for the duration of
the talks. If talks get underway, Uribe said he would not
accept any FARC hostage exchange offer that excluded the
three U.S. citizen hostages. The FARC has not yet replied to
the European proposal.


2. (C) With regard to the GOC-ELN peace process, Uribe told
the Ambassador that ELN military commander Antonio Garcia had
not yet arrived in Cuba to head the ELN delegation. Uribe
said he would be careful not to say anything in the coming
days (including during his December 15 trip to New York) that
would give Garcia an excuse not to attend the Havana talks.
Uribe said Garcia was apparently traveling to Cuba from
Venezuela so that he could arrive "in a dignified manner."
(Press accounts December 14 report that Garcia has now
arrived in Havana.) The GOC's initial objective during the
Havana talks would be to keep the ELN at the table. Turning
to the paramilitary peace process, Uribe said negotiations on
extradition was not and would not be on the table. U.S.
pressure on extraditions had helped him deal with the
paramilitary leaders. The December 12 demobilization of
almost 2,000 members of the Central Bolivar Bloc (BCB) was
important; BCB leader Macaco was now like "a bird whose wings
had been cut off." Demobilized paramilitaries are easier to
deal with than those who retain command structures and
military equipment, he said. End summary.

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Uribe Accepts Facilitators' Proposal
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3. (C) President Uribe announced during a press conference
at 8PM on December 13 that he had accepted a proposal by
three European facilitators (representatives from France,
Switzerland, and Spain) to establish a 65 square mile
"security zone" in a rural area in south east Valle del
Cauca, bordering Tolima Department, to conduct hostage
exchange talks with the FARC (see septel for full text of
Uribe's remarks and full text of the facilitators' proposal).
The "international commission" was formed recently to
explore mechanisms to facilitate such talks. According to
the GOC, about 30 families currently live in the security
zone, which also contains some governmental facilities (a
school, clinic, community center, and soccer field) and a
church. Uribe said the GOC had agreed to withdraw security
forces from the security zone during any talks with the FARC,
and for a period of seven days prior and subsequent to the
meeting. The proposal states that the FARC are not permitted
to have armed guerrillas in the security zone. Instead, some
40 international observers would be present to monitor
developments and verify compliance. (It is unclear how the
international observers would be selected.) Other than GOC
and FARC negotiators and the international observers, the
only people authorized to be in the security zone during the
negotiation period would be the International Committee of
the Red Cross, which is providing logistical support, and a
committee representing the facilitators.


4. (C) Uribe told Ambassador Wood and Carl Meacham of SFRC
staff shortly before making his public announcement that he
was accepting the proposed security zone to demonstrate he
was acting in good faith. Uribe hoped the FARC would accept
the European proposal; if they did not, "we will have to be
very firm with them," he said. In any event, he expressed
the belief that the proposal would put the FARC on the
defensive. Uribe emphasized that the security zone was
significantly different from the demilitarized zone
("despeje") that former President Pastrana established.
Uribe said in the security zone, unlike in Pastrana's
despeje, Colombian sovereignty and law would continue to
apply and no armed FARC guerrillas would be permitted. (The
Pastrana despeje allowed the FARC to assume control of a
territory the size of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode
Island combined.) Uribe described his acceptance of the
European proposal as a "concession," that contradicted his
previous statements on the issue, but that was required to
move the process forward. Uribe underscored to the
Ambassador that he would not accept any FARC hostage exchange
offer that omitted the three U.S. citizen hostages. The
FARC, which also apparently received the European proposal on
December 13, has not yet replied.


5. (C) Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo briefed
ambassadors on FARC, ELN, and paramilitary peace process
developments at an emergency G24 meeting December 12. With
respect to the FARC, Restrepo said representatives of the
international commission had been in Colombia scouting for
venues for talks. So far, the FARC is accepting the
Commission's role, which the GOC prefers because it cuts off
other channels, such as the Church or ex-presidents that the
FARC could turn to for a better deal or to neutralize GOC
efforts. (The French MFA released a statement last weekend
to the effect that the commission's work was independent,
apparently designed to reassure the FARC that the commission
was not a tool of the GOC. Restrepo, in contrast, told a
group of ambassadors that the facilitators had agreed to
follow the GOC lead.) Restrepo appears convinced that unless
there is some sort of FARC process in place, the ELN
initiative will eventually fail because the "big brother"
will prevent the "little brother" from closing on any deal.


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France, Betancourt Allies Welcome GOC Acceptance
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6. (U) A French Foreign Ministry spokesperson said December
14 that France "received with interest the Colombian
Government's positive response" to the facilitators'
proposal, and confirmed that France "is waiting on the FARC's
response, which we hope will be positive." Spokespersons for
supporters of hostage and dual French-Colombian citizen
Ingrid Betancourt (held since February 2002) praised the GOC
decision to accept the proposal and urged the FARC to accept
the same terms.

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The GOC's Strategy at the ELN Talks in Cuba
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7. (C) Uribe told the Ambassador that the GOC aimed to "keep
the ELN talking at the negotiating table" during the upcoming
Havana talks (refs A, B). He said he understood that ELN
military commander Antonio Garcia had not yet arrived in Cuba
from Venezuela. Garcia wanted to arrive "with dignity,"
Uribe said, but his apparent non-arrival gave Uribe pause.
Uribe would be very cautious in the coming days (including
during his December 15 private trip to New York) not to say
anything that would give Garcia an excuse not to show up in
Havana. (Press accounts December 14 show photographs of
Garcia in Havana.)


8. (C) The Ambassador underlined to Uribe his December 9
comments to the ELN "Peace House" facilitators (ref A): the
ELN should not get a deal that went beyond Justice and Peace
law provisions. If they did, they would essentially be
negotiating on behalf of the paramilitaries, because the GOC
would then be obliged to offer the paramilitaries the same
deal. Uribe agreed, saying that Colombian law requires
similarly situated people to be treated the same way; one
group of illegal armed actors could not get a better deal
than the others. He said many had criticized the Justice and
Peace law as bland and as lacking real sanctions. Now,
however, the paramilitaries are complaining it is too tough
and some say the ELN and FARC will never accept its tough
terms.

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Paramilitary Peace Process
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9. (C) Referring to the December 12 demobilization of almost
2,000 members of the paramilitary Central Bolivar Bloc,
including its leader Macaco, Uribe told the Ambassador and
Meacham it was easier to confront the paramilitaries after
they had demobilized than when they still had a command
structure and significant weapons. (Macaco's group turned in
two helicopters in working order, both fitted with 50mm
machine guns, as well as over 1,200 rifles, over 500
grenades, 13 rockets, and a large quantity of assorted
caliber ammunition; Uribe said Macaco was now "like a bird
whose wings had been cut off.") In response to Meacham's
question, Uribe said he had not and would not negotiate
extradition with paramilitaries; the subject was not and
would not be on the table. Uribe would decide at a later
date whether to extradite Don Berna to the U.S. He would
base his decision in part on Don Berna's complete compliance
with Justice and Peace law requirements, including full
disclosure of crimes and handing over of assets. If Don
Berna failed to comply, Colombian public opinion would
support Uribe's decision to extradite him ("si no cumple, se
va"). Uribe emphasized that he had created 384 enemies with
extradition decisions, referring to the families of those he
has extradited from Colombia, most to the U.S. Uribe said
U.S. pressure on extraditions had helped him to deal with the
paramilitaries.

WOOD