GOC REOPENS PEACE NEGOTIATION OPTION WITH ELN

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 010895 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2015 TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV CO SUBJECT: GOC REOPENS PEACE NEGOTIATION OPTION WITH ELN REF: A. BOGOTA 10498 ¶B. BOGOTA 10106 Classified By: Charge Milton K. Drucker, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (U) On November 13, in response to a letter from the guarantors group of the "Peace House" initiative with the ELN, Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo issued a call to the National Liberation Army's (ELN) Central Command leaders to begin negotiations with the government under the auspices of an international guarantor. He noted that talks would be on a parallel track with the ELN's civil society discussions in the "Peace House" in Antioquia department. Restrepo declared that the ELN's five "obstacles to peace," initially outlined in August, were issues that needed to be discussed, but should not become issues that preempt talks. He urged the ELN to respond to the GOC's offer, but as of November 18, the COCE had not replied. End summary. ¶2. (U) Begin informal translation of Restrepo's statement: Bogota, November 13, 2005 Peace House Guarantors Group Civil Facilitation Commission Dear Sirs, I received your letter dated November 11, which highlighted the need to prepare for a formal Government and ELN meeting in conjunction with the Peace House process. I understand that a similar letter was sent to the ELN's Central Command (COCE). We have evaluated your proposal with interest. It is necessary to advance a peace process with the ELN in the context of the Government's efforts. To this end, subsequent to the conversations in CUBA at the end of 2002, and the pre-negotiation process mediated by Mexico from June 2004 to April 2005, the Government offered the ELN the possibility of establishing a pre-negotiation dialogue abroad with an international guarantor, to discuss a cease-fire. Said group responded with a list of five barriers which, according to them, blocked the advancement of a peace process in Colombia: the denial of the armed conflict, the GOC's refusal of civil society participation (in negotiations),the denial of a humanitarian crisis, the inattention to social causes of the conflict, and the peace process with the paramilitaries. In response, the President has said he would accept the existence of a conflict, resolvable within a democratic process, if the ELN were to cease its hostilities. The government has never denied the serious humanitarian situation, a situation that has improved significantly during this administration. To allow discussions with civil society, we granted Francisco Galan a special three-month parole from prison. We have always maintained that a peace-friendly climate depends on social cohesion and equitable public policy. With respect to the process with the self-defense forces, we reiterate that, in doing so we accomplished one of the pre-requirements guerrillas demand to begin a peace process: the dismantlement of the paramilitaries. The justification for the five obstacles cannot become the reasons to take a step backwards in relation to the position taken by the ELN in June 2004, when it proposed moving forward with initial agreements with the government on military and humanitarian issues despite similar concerns. The ELN left the discussion about "transformations that the country needs in all sectors" for another occasion, the "National Convention." In the June 14, 2004 document titled "The Humanitarian Accord and Roads towards Peace," the ELN proposed setting aside concerns about initiating a potential peace process through action rather than interminable discussions. Using the structure suggested by the ELN, the Government responded in August 2004 with a proposed two-phase plan: an end to the ELN's hostility, including suspending response against offensive action taken by the military and police against the armed group; and the calling for a "National Convention" once the hostilities have ceased. To complement the humanitarian accord, we proposed joint demining programs, and judicial benefits in the form of decreased prison sentences for members of the ELN once the kidnapped persons were released. Early in 2005, to move the process forward, we insisted on a meeting between the Government of Colombia and the ELN, to have been held in Mexico as soon as the ELN agreed to a cease-fire. The ELN, once again, frustrated the Mexican's attempts to facilitate the negotiations by failing to suspend kidnapping and declining to participate in the meetings in Mexico. The central focus of the House of Peace in Antioquia has been discussing the five obstacles with different civil society groups. Although we value that endeavor, we believed you said your organization's points should be taken as an agenda to be brought to the table for discussion in meetings or at a National Convention, not to be taken as obstacles in the way of beginning a peace process. These "obstacles" are the same problems presented before, and have resulted in a rise in the perpetual violence plaguing this country. We think that these obstacles should be brought forth for discussion by the ELN, and should be dealt with in a civil manner, which is at the heart of democracy. We share your need to move forward with exploratory meetings between the COCE, the Government of Colombia and international observers, in a manner consistent with the efforts of the Peace House. I have authorization from the President to broach this matter with Mr. Francisco Galan and other pertinent contacts, under the auspices of international interlocutors agreed upon by both parties. I hope that this new step on the part of the Government to move a peace process with the ELN forward will be fruitful as everyone hopes. Luis Carlos Restrepo High Commissioner for Peace End text. ¶3. (C) It is worth noting that in a meeting with a group of chiefs of mission at the British Ambassador's residence, Vice President Santos expressed the government's frustration with the ELN's inconsistent and erratic approach to negotiations. He asked openly if the ELN was worth talking to since they were marginalized as a fighting force and under FARC influence. Most of the COMs present expressed the view that it would be politically useful to have a viable peace process with the ELN. DRUCKER