GERMAN REQUEST FOR MILAIR TRANSPORT OF GERMAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 000048 SIPDIS FROM AMBASSADOR COATS DEPT FOR EUR/AGS, NSC FOR DAMON WILSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2014 TAGS: PREL MARR ASEC IZ GM SUBJECT: GERMAN REQUEST FOR MILAIR TRANSPORT OF GERMAN BORDER POLICE AND DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL TO BAGHDAD Classified By: Ambassador Daniel Coats. Reasons: 1.4 (b) & (d) ¶1. (SBU) Paragraph 3 below provides an informal translation of a diplomatic note from the German Foreign Ministry requesting USG agreement for transport of German Border Police (BGS) and Diplomats via US military aircraft (MilAir) between Ramstein Airbase and Baghdad. The BGS agents will be providing security for the German Embassy in Baghdad. Use of commercial air traffic is not optional due to transport of required weapons and ammunition. The Germans propose that the first such transport would occur during the week of February 14, 2005. The FRG agrees to pay for the cost of transporting personnel, baggage and equipment. ¶2. (C) There are several good reasons why we should give this request serious consideration: -- The German Federal Border Guards (GSG-9) have a long history of close cooperation with the USG. They provided physical security for US military bases in Germany when US security forces were deployed to Iraq, thereby freeing thousands of US soldiers to conduct other tasks. -- Most USG flights into Baghdad transit or originate at Ramstein airbase in Germany. An average of 3-5 aircraft (C-17s or C-5s, etc.) fly out of Ramstein each week en route to Baghdad. USAFE advises that, given sufficient advance notice, it is possible to secure a block of 10-14 seats on flights from Ramstein to Baghdad. -- The Germans will pay for all transport costs. Although an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement cannot be used since the personnel involved are not military personnel, an arrangement for payment can be established, as outlined in the Deputy Defense Secretary's Memorandum of December 11, ¶2003. Thus the transport of German personnel would not entail an additional uncompensated cost to the USG and could in fact be used to offset costs. -- In addition to the ability to offset USG costs, we would dictate when the Germans fly in order to ensure that the transport of FRG personnel and equipment does not conflict with USG operational requirements. -- The convoy route previously used between Baghdad and Kuwait has been closed. Weight and security restrictions on commercial flights to Baghdad prohibit the transfer of weapons and equipment. The leasing of a commercial aircraft solely for this purpose would be prohibitively expensive. If Germany is unable to transport security personnel, ammunition and equipment to support its mission in Iraq in a cost effective manner there is a risk that they will close their Embassy. -- The loss of additional personnel in a situation similar to the April '04 ambush of a German diplomatic convoy from Kuwait to Baghdad, would place increased pressure on the FRG to justify their presence in Iraq, an operation that is already their most expensive overseas mission fiscally and one that is not popular domestically. -- It is in our interest to keep an active German diplomatic presence in Iraq. The presence of a German Embassy is a symbolic demonstration of USG progress towards forging a new Iraq. Closure or curtailment of operations of the German Embassy would undermine the perception that we are creating a more stable and secure Iraq. -- Even though the FRG has been difficult to work with on some issues, the Germans have made and are continuing to make significant indirect contributions to our efforts in Iraq by providing over-flight rights, unhindered use of our military facilities, base security and significant support for GWOT actions outside of Iraq. Without FRG cooperation and contributions our operations in Iraq would be greatly impaired. -- The FRG is also supporting our efforts in Iraq by training Iraqi police and military personnel in UAE. The FRG is considering participating in a proposed EU police-training mission. In addition, the FRG agreed to allow the NATO training mission in Iraq, although they have chosen not to participate. -- If we grant the request, it will symbolize a renewed spirit of cooperation. Given that the first transport has been requested for the week of February 14, just before the Bush-Schroeder Summit on February 23, the agreement could be presented as a simple, painless and cost free "deliverable" at the upcoming Summit and would offer a far greater return than any resulting inconvenience. 3.(SBU) Unofficial Translation: Foreign Office GZ: 301-320.21 IRQ Verbal Note The Foreign Office has the honor to submit to the Embassy of the United States of America the following request: The Foreign Office refers to the circular note of the Iraqi Foreign Ministry from June 11, 2003 to foreign missions, in which it stated "that the Coalition Provisional Authority has announced that members of Foreign Liaison Offices in Iraq enter and remain in Iraq at their own risk. The Coalition Provisional Authority cannot,(, guarantee the safety or security of a foreign liaison mission or its personnel." At the same time, the Iraqi Foreign Ministry pointed out in its circular note that "Foreign liaison officials may bring into Iraq and/or maintain their own security forces(". Notwithstanding the basic position regarding the status of foreign missions in Iraq, the Federal Government carries out its own security measures in Baghdad as well as upon entry and departure. Members of the Federal Border Police have been protecting the real estate of the German Embassy in Baghdad and the German diplomats working there. The diplomatic personnel of the German Embassy in Baghdad, including the officers of the Federal Border Police, currently use civil airlines for entry to and departure from Baghdad. Due to the security provisions required by the airlines, it is not possible to take along excess baggage, and, in particular, weapons and ammunition. Therefore, in light of the above-described position of the Iraqi Foreign Ministry, the Federal Government cannot sufficiently provide adequate security measures. Recent developments in the security situation in Iraq have increased the risks for the employees of the German Embassy in Baghdad. Without optimal security measures, the long-term presence of the German Embassy in Baghdad would be put into question. Therefore the Federal Government requests the Embassy of the United States of America and responsible U.S. Government Ministries or Agencies to permit United States Air Force transport of security personnel assigned to the German Embassy in Baghdad on military aircraft flights from Ramstein to Baghdad. The Federal Border Police rotates its security personnel at the German Embassy in Baghdad every three months. The next rotations will take place in February and May 2005, respectively. The rotation will be organized in two contingents of five officers each. Due to the required transfer of tasks on site, the timeframe for each rotation phase takes up to two weeks. The following schedule is planned for the personnel rotation in February 2005: Departure of five officers from Germany in the 7th calendar week (as of February 14, 2005),about a week later (as of February 21, 2005) another five officers should depart, and on the same day, five other officers should return to Germany. A week later (as of February 28, 2005),a return flight for the remaining five officers should be scheduled. The personnel exchange would then be completed. The officers are taking along baggage with a total weight of 150 kg per person. This includes command and control and operational equipment (including weapons and ammunition). The Foreign Office proposes that prior to each planned personnel exchange, Referat 107 of the Foreign Office will inform the Embassy of the United States of America, or another entity to be named by the Embassy of the United States of America, about all details of the planned exchange. The Foreign Office would appreciate receiving information on points of contact, on the - from your perspective - required time of notification for each request from the Foreign Office, and on any further details that may be required from the Foreign Office. In addition to the officers, exchange, transportation of unaccompanied command and control equipment would be appreciated in individual cases, for example, if essential equipment fails, provided that it can,t wait until the next rotation of personnel. As a matter of course, the Foreign Office is willing to pay the transportation costs of the officers and the baggage. In light of the situation in Iraq the Foreign Office would appreciate a swift response. The Foreign Office avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the United States of America the assurances of its highest consideration. Berlin, December 15, 2004 To the Embassy of the United States of America, Berlin COATS