OPPOSITION A ROLL: FORCE CABINET TO QUIT, GET

S E C R E T BEIRUT 000541 DEPARTMENT FOR NEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2020 TAGS: PREL PGOV LE SY SUBJECT: OPPOSITION A ROLL: FORCE CABINET TO QUIT, GET SYRIA TO BIQA'A REF: A. BEIRUT 523 ¶B. BEIRUT 533 Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, based on 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Chattering away at a 2/21 dinner hosted by Boutros Harb, leading members of the Christian opposition and Walid Jumblatt's bloc were visibly buoyed by what they saw as three victories earlier that day: the largest anti-Syrian demonstration in Lebanon's history, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri's acquiesence to a confidence debate on the Karami government, and President Bush's strong call in Belgium for Lebanese independence. They told the Ambassador that, with the need to react to Hariri's death, legislative elections have fallen lower in their list of priorities. Now, they define their goals as 1) forcing a credible investigation into Hariri's assassination, 2) toppling the Karami government, including its intelligence chiefs, 3) achieving a significant Syrian withdrawal and shuttering of Syrian intelligence headquarters in Lebanon. Only then should legislative elections be held, they said, as only those achievements will tip the elections in their favor. The opposition politicians were divided on how loudly to call for UNSCR 1559 implementation, which they described as being increasingly, and successfully, portrayed as a "Christian" issue, with potentially divisive results. Most preferred to rest on the safer "Taif accord" principles of Syrian redeployment, while urging the U.S. and international community to keep the pressure up on UNSCR 1559. They were relatively relaxed about Hizballah, believing that getting Syria out of Lebanon would in itself force Hizballah to move into the Lebanese mainstream. End summary. UNCHARACTERISTICALLY, OPPOSITION IN UPBEAT MOOD AFTER "TRIPLE TRIUMPH" -------------- ¶2. (C) Christian opposition politician Boutros Harb hosted a 2/21 dinner that included (inter alia) the Ambassador; Qornet Shehwan Christian opposition politicians Nayla Mouawad, Gebran Tueni, Amin Gemayal and Nassib Lahoud; and -- in what he described as his first evening social event since the 10/1/04 assassination attempt against him -- Druse MP Marwan Hamadeh. Compared to their bleak moods since Hariri's assassination (and their generally doomsday, naysayer outlooks),the politicians were almost giddy over the day's events. ¶3. (C) They spent considerable time reveling in details of the day's demonstration (in which all had participated, Hamadeh leaning on a cane),the largest anti-Syrian gathering in Lebanon's history. They all remarked on how correct the security forces had been in general. "You could see it in their eyes -- the soldiers were proud of us!" Nayla Mouawad proclaimed, citing speeches that called for the Lebanese army to be the only army on Lebanese soil. They also figuratively slapped the Ambassador on the back in joy for President Bush's strong remarks about Lebanon delivered in Brussels earlier that day; several guests later got SMS text messages on their phones with quotes from President Bush's remarks with Jacques Chirac. ¶4. (C) Harb's dinner guests also spoke with pride about their session that morning with Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri, in a meeting before the formal demonstration. Berri had "tried everything" to get the 40-some opposition MPs to agree to resume work on the draft electoral law, Lahoud said. But the group had pushed for the Speaker's acquiesence with their call for a special session -- now scheduled for February 28 -- to debate the Karami government, with the possibility of a vote of confidence. (See ref a for Berri's version of this meeting.) Harb's guests all agreed that pushing Berri into the corner on this issue was a good show of strength. OPPOSITION PRIORITIES: WHAT IS NEEDED BEFORE ELECTIONS -------------- ¶5. (C) As he had with the Hariri family immediately prior to the Harb dinner (ref b),the Ambassador asked what was the purpose of the Parliamentary debate, when the pro-Syrian votes would presumably carry any vote of confidence. With others temporarily deferring to him, Lahoud said that the value of this postponement of the electoral law debate was clear only in the context of the overall opposition priorities, which he defined as follows: -- Full and credible international investigation into the Hariri murder. -- Resignation of the Karami cabinet, including security chiefs Jamal al-Sayyed at Surete General, Raymond Azar at the LAF G-2. -- Significant Syrian withdrawal ("preferably all the way" to Syria but at least to the Biqa'a Valley),with a closing down of the Syrian Military Intelligence headquarters in Lebanon. Only then, Lahoud specified, did the opposition want to face elections. If legislative elections have to be delayed beyond the April 17 commencement in order to finish the list of priorities, "we can live with that," Lahoud said. STRIVING FOR A TECHNOCRATIC CABINET TO OVERSEE THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS -------------- ¶6. (C) The Ambassador asked what the point was of toppling an unpopular, ineffective, directionless government like the cabinet of Prime Minister 'Umar Karami. "It would be a victory!" Mouawad said. "The people would see that they don't have to live with what Syria forces on us!" Others agreed that it would be a rallying call for the opposition, just as the other steps would be as well. The Ambassador noted that assembling a new cabinet would require consultations with President Lahoud, whom all of them had largely avoided since Lahoud's 9/3/04 term extension: would then agree on consultations with Lahoud? Yes, Hamadeh responded, "we will follow the constitution" (and its call for Parliamentary consultations with the President); we have to respect the constitution." ¶7. (C) Everyone agreed that what they desired was a "technical" cabinet headed by a Prime Minister and composed of a small number of ministers holding multiple portfolios, but none of whom (including the PM) would be a candidate for legislative elections. The Ambassador noted that Minister of Justice Adnan Addoum, a Sunni not running for Parliament, would appear to fit the criteria they described. "No!" cried Mouawad. Lahoud said that "you know what we mean -- people not involved in politics." When the Ambassador asked who, specifically, could serve as the non-political Sunni Prime Minister, Hamadeh said, "well, it could have been (current Minister of Economy and Trade) Adnan Kassar, if Adnan hadn't been part of this government." DISMANTLING THE 'MUKHABARAT' REGIME -------------- ¶8. (S) As part of the cabinet-toppling exercise, Lahoud emphasized that Jamal al-Sayyed (chief of Surete General) and Raymond Azar (head of the LAF's Deuxieme Bureau, or G-2) "have to go." They are the ones, "especially Jamil," who enforce the Syrian domination of Lebanon. The opposition strives to rid Lebanon not only of Syrian interference but also the "whole culture of a 'mukhabarat' (intelligence) regime." Jamil will "not go quietly," but he should be forced to leave, even if only on the excuse of the enormous breach of security that occurred with Hariri's murder. "Everyone knows" Jamil al-Sayyed had to have been complicit in Hariri's murder, Hamadeh insisted, adding that Presidential Security head Mustafa Hamdan (rumored to have plotted the attack against Hamadeh) should be added to the list of security chiefs to be sacked prior to elections. Only if these security chiefs go can the opposition be assured that they won't be defeated by "dirty tricks." CLOSING DOWN RUSTOM'S HOUSE OF HORRORS -------------- ¶9. (S) Regarding Syrian withdrawal, Harb's feisty dinner guests made the same arguments as Hariri's family had earlier in the evening (ref b): the goal is total withdrawal of all Syrian forces, but a redeployment to the Biqa'a Valley would be sufficient to build support for opposition candidates in the elections. They spent considerable time emphasizing the need for the Syrian Military Intelligence (SMI) headquarters in Anjar be closed and its head, Rustom Ghazaleh, be withdrawn to Syria. Gemayal noted that, with SMI having penetrated so much of Lebanese institutions, Syrian influence would still be great. But Ghazaleh's departure would change the atmosphere to the point that the opposition would benefit. TAIF VS. 1559 -------------- ¶10. (C) On the question of a redeployment to the Biqa'a, the Ambassador cautioned the opposition figures that the U.S. would continue to look for ways to push for full implementation of UNSCR 1559. The dinner guests expressed relief and support for that position but then launched into a lengthy debate about their own public positions. All agreed that UNSCR 1559 implementation was essential to their hopes for Lebanon. Some -- most vocally Gebran Tueni, joined by Mouawad -- pressed for the opposition to include support for UNSCR 1559 explicitly in its platform. But Gemayal, Lahoud, and Hamadeh pushed back. UNSCR 1559 can divide the opposition, they cautioned; the Sunnis and Shias in particular are suspicious of it. The Syrians have persistently and successfully portrayed UNSCR 1559 as a Franco-American/Zionist tool in order to re-establish "Christian dominance" in Lebanon. The opposition -- extremely weak in terms of Shia support and potentially weak in terms of Sunni participation, if the Hariris adopt a standoffish attitude -- should build a movement on consensus. There is a consensus in Lebanon in support of Taif. Thus, it is far better to use Taif now, as a unifying call, and, after electoral success, then a new government and new Parliament can embrace UNSCR 1559 and push for its full implementation. 'LEAVE HIZBALLAH TO US' -------------- ¶11. (S) Lahoud brought up Hizballah: "We know that this is an important issue for you -- and it's an important issue for us." The Ambassador commented that disarming militias is a requirement of UNSCR 1559, and the subsequent report from the UNSYG made it clear that Hizballah is the most significant foreign-funded militia in Lebanon. Yes, Lahoud said, but "let us concentrate on Syria first. If we get Syria out, we can deal with Hizballah ourselves." The Ambassador noted that many GOL officials insist that only Syria could disarm Hizballah, so, by this rationale, the sequencing of Syria's departure must be carefully considered. His words echoed by nods around the table, Lahoud said that Hizballah Secretary General Nasrallah will move Hizballah away from armed activities and into the political mainstream if his Syrian overlords are kicked out of Lebanon. ¶12. (S) Above all, Lahoud said, Nasrallah wants to be a national politician. "He's not going to use arms against us; we can handle him." The Ambassador noted that Hizballah's armed activities extend beyond the blue line, and we insist that its international activities be stopped immediately. Emphasizing that the opposition firmly supported the principle that political parties not bear arms ("we learned that lesson the hard way, in the civil war"),Lahoud said again that the greater danger to Lebanese democracy and sovereignty was Syria, not Hizballah. Fix Syria, and the Lebanese can fix Hizballah. COMMENT -------------- ¶13. (C) As is clear from ref b, the Hariri family (the most dominant Sunni faction in the country) and the more closely aligned Druse-Christian opposition are thinking alike: while not explicitly calling for a postponement of spring legislative elections, they are clearly moving in that direction, unless we can force a Syrian withdrawal (or redeployment to the Biqa'a) prior to the April 17 commencement of elections. At this point, with a defined set of priorities and a groundswell of popular disgust against Syria, the opposition is, unusually, on the offensive. By contrast, Karami's cabinet and the Presidency seem almost to have evaporated into thin air. But we doubt that real underpinnings of Syria's domination of Lebanon -- SMI, the mukhabaret, etc. -- are in the same disarray as Karami's political ministers. And there is always the danger that Lebanon's confessional demons will come to the fore, driving wedges between the tenuously united opposition forces. As for the debate of Taif vs. 1559, we recommend not spending much time worrying about it: the opposition's desire to use Taif in order to build a broader alliance does not contradict or undermine our 1559 arguments (particularly as we know that, privately, most are with us on full implementation of UNSCR 1559). FELTMAN