SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: BANGKOK MUSLIMS TRY TO BRIDGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 007750

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2015
TAGS: PTER PREL PHUM TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: BANGKOK MUSLIMS TRY TO BRIDGE
THE GAP

REF: A) BANGKOK 002260 B) BANGKOK 007462

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRS ALEXANDER A. ARVIZU FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,
D)


1. (C) Summary. In separate meetings with poloffs,
officials from both the private Bangkok-based Islamic Center
of Thailand and the government-affiliated Central Islamic
Committee underscored their belief that the violence in the
South is not a religious conflict and outlined their efforts
to improve the government's policy in the restive South as
well as Buddhist-Muslim relations. Both sides were
diplomatic in their criticism of the government and took
pains to downplay any radical Islamic influence in the
violence or tensions between Buddhists and Muslims. We were
struck by their sanguine attitude. Their insistence that the
perpetrators of the violence are mostly drug-traffickers or
smugglers reflects the continuing disconnect between the
ethnic-Malay Muslims in the troubled South and the
well-integrated, ethnic-Thai Muslims in Bangkok. End Summary.

THE ISLAMIC CENTER OF THAILAND
--------------


2. (SBU) Poloffs met with Niti Hassan, President of the
Council of Muslim Organizations of Thailand, and Pakorn
Priyakorn, Secretary General of the Islamic Center of
Thailand on December 13 in Bangkok. (Note. The center is home
to the aforementioned council. End Note) Niti and Pakorn
explained that the Islamic Center is the locus of private
Muslim organizations in Thailand and also home to the largest
mosque in the country. Regular Friday services attract
approximately 2,000 worshipers, with holidays drawing up to
5,000. Muslims from Bangkok's international community,
including the diplomatic corps, are frequent guests; center
officials have been busy this month helping to plan the King
of Jordan's visit and planned speech at the center.


3. (C) The center also provides training for local Thai
Muslim leaders from the provincial Islamic committees and
helps provide construction and maintenance assistance to the
nearly 3,400 mosques in Thailand. Their own budget is
dependent on private donations, although the central Thai
government provided nearly half of the funds to construct the
center's mosque. Recently, the center has worked with the
Ministry of Interior to conduct a program that takes southern
Thai Muslims to visit peaceful (read, integrated and
ethnic-Thai, not Malay) Muslim communities in other parts of
the country.

DIPLOMATIC ON THE SOUTH
--------------


4. (C) Niti and Pakorn echoed the comments of many of our
interlocutors on the South by unequivocally stating that the
violence is "not a religious conflict." Aside from a few
right-wing Buddhists, interfaith relations are healthy. The
violence is the result of many factors and "misperceptions"
among the southern Thai; most southern Thai Muslims love the
King and do not support violence. According to Niti and
Pakorn, the national election earlier this year "proves" that
the majority of southerners are likewise uninterested in
separatism. Southerners voted against Thaksin, for sure, but
they still voted, signifying some support for the established
political process and the Thai state. Some southerners
remain concerned that central government involvement in the
local educational system is reminiscent of earlier attempts
to forcefully assimilate them, but this is a relatively minor
issue involving at most, "maybe 100 pondoks." The true source
of the violence is complicated, but driven by competing
"interest groups," such as narcotics traffickers, other
smugglers and local politicians.


5. (C) When asked how they, as Thai Muslims, thought of
Thaksin and his government, there was a short pause. Both
were quick to profess their personal support for the Thai
state and love for the monarchy in particular. More
specifically, Pakorn explained that Thaksin is a "smooth
politician" and Niti added that the center has "good
relations" with his government. As evidence of his support
for the Muslim community, the Prime Minister helped set up
the Islamic Bank of Thailand and employs Muslim advisers.


6. (C) That said, both Niti and Pakorn "want (Thaksin) to
listen more." The National Reconciliation Commission is a
step in the right direction, but only if the government
actually implements its recommendations. The people trust
the courts and broader justice system, but not the police.
As an example of the latter, Pakorn raised the case of
Somchai Neelapaijit, the prominent Muslim defense attorney
who "disappeared" in March 2004--many Thai believe at the
hands of the police. Pakorn added that he noticed that we
had mentioned Somchai in the Embassy's annual human rights
report last year, and appreciated it.
THE ISLAMIC VOICE IN GOVERNMENT
--------------


7. (SBU) Separately on December 15, Polcounselor and poloffs
met with the Central Islamic Committee's Somchai Jewangma,
spokesman for the official head of Thailand's Muslim
community, the Chularatchamontri. (Note. Ref A describes the
Ambassador's meeting with the Chularatchamontri in March. End
Note.) Somchai (not to be confused with the defense attorney
mentioned earlier),outlined the duties of the
Chularatchamontri's office: advising and educating government
officials, and serving as a central authority on religious
issues for Thailand's Muslims. The Chularatchamontri serves
as the head of the Central Islamic Committee (CIC),which is
comprised of 36 provincial members, 11 appointees and the
Chula.


8. (C) When asked about the South, Somchai quickly stated
that "this is not a religious problem." Most Muslims are
"good" and support the government, monarchy and constitution.
There are no serious problems between Buddhists and Muslims
and the resurgence of violence is due to several factors,
including the familiar narco-criminals, smugglers and local
politicians. It is not the duty of the Chularatchamontri to
solve this problem.


9. (C) That said, the Chula's office is actively engaged in
supporting government efforts to find a solution. Some
military and civilian personnel transferring to the South
attend a seminar on Islam run by the CIC. The Chula is also
involved in the Ministry of Defense's effort to train and
support a cadre of pro-government Islamic preachers, the "Da
I" (ref B). So far, the program has trained 200 teachers and
700 youth. Moreover, the Chula is in frequent contact with
senior Thai officials, who often consult with him on Islamic
and southern issues.


10. (C) When pressed on the issue of problems in the southern
educational system, Somchai (a native of Bangkok) evinced
some frustration, explaining that, with all of the attention
on the southern provinces, the schools in that region have a
wealth of resources that poor Muslim students in Bangkok will
never have. When asked if violence could spread outside of
the deep South, Somchai replied in the negative. Central
Thai Muslims are more "neutral" and assimilated than those in
the South. In an attempt to emphasize how different the
Bangkok and southern Muslim communities are, Somchai stated
(without appreciation for irony) that "southerners are close
minded."

COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) Bangkok's moderate Muslim leaders are seeking to play
a positive role in the troubled South, but their impact
likely will be limited. They lack the necessary influence
with the Thaksin government and are seen by many southerners
as more "Thai" (and beholden to the government) than they are
Muslim. For their part, some of Bangkok's Muslim leaders are
not entirely successful at hiding their disdain for their
poorer and less-well-integrated "cousins" in the South.


12. (C) It is also troubling that, some time after senior
government officials, including Thaksin, stopped blaming
local politicians and druglords for the violence and
acknowledged the underlying ethnic and cultural roots of the
conflict, these well-educated (and integrated) Thai Muslim
leaders still seem to be in some denial. Their downplaying
of rising Buddhist-Muslim tensions suggests either an
unfortunate lack of knowledge on the situation in the South,
or willful self-delusion. This misconception underscores the
serious disconnect between the ethnic-Malay Muslims of the
South and the ethnic-Thai Muslims in the rest of the country.
It also suggests the difficulty in trying to apply "lessons
learned" about non-ethnic Malay Muslims in Thailand to the
conflict in southern Thailand.


ARVIZU