SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: THAKSIN MISTAKES AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 005503 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS, INR NSC FOR MORROW PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO) E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER TH SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: THAKSIN MISTAKES AND UNDERSTANDING REF: A. BANGKOK 5455 ¶B. 5393 ¶C. 4946 ¶D. 4697 ¶E. 4653 ¶F. 4696 ¶G. 3203 ¶H. 2219 Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY/COMMENT: Prime Minister Thaksin's missteps and often heavy-handed responses to the unrest in far southern Thailand have clearly exacerbated a long-simmering conflict. However, while he has made mistakes, the Prime Minister has not paid a serious political price for his southern policy, as most Thais remain indifferent or even support a hard-line position. While the Prime Minister has undoubtedly made a bad situation worse, there are indications -- such as the creation of the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) -- that Thaksin appreciates the situation in the South is complex and defies easy and quick resolution. He now appears to be genuinely looking for viable approaches to the South. His upcoming meeting with the President is an excellent opportunity to raise our concerns about the situation in the South while encouraging Thaksin to continue with his reconciliation efforts -- the best current option for dealing with the decades-old insurgency. END SUMMARY/COMMENT. A SERIES OF MISTAKES MAKES A BAD SITUATION WORSE -------------- --- ¶2. (C) During the last year and a half we have witnessed a troubling increase in violence by anti-government Muslims in the far South - often followed by a heavy handed government response (refs). Violence in the South has been occurring in varying degrees since the Thais incorporated the Muslim Malay provinces into the Kingdom over 100 years ago. This is not a new issue for the Thais. But since the resurgence of violence in early 2004, Prime Minister Thaksin has made a series of decision which, in hindsight, have served to exacerbate the situation. Most notable among these was the decision early into his first term to dissolve the combined civilian-police-military task force which since the 1980s had successfully managed to contain the separatist-related violence. The Prime Minister was convinced that the southern insurgency had all but died out and thought that the task force was no longer necessary, an assessment that turned out to be drastically wrong. ¶3. (C) The loss of the coordinating body has increased the natural propensity of Thai bureaucracy to stovepipe information and not cooperate operationally. The problems caused by this lack of coordination have been compounded by the constant shifting of both the civilian leadership and uniformed commanders who have responsibility for the South. In addition, Thaksin has often set unrealistic deadlines for his deputies to "solve" the southern problem and has been inconsistent in his policy statements, creating a situation where the operational leadership has a weak mandate and lack of strategic focus. He has wavered back and forth between carrot and stick. On the one hand, he has reached out for hearts and minds, for example, through quick-fix economic incentives (subsidized food sales and funding to encourage sports). On the other hand, he enacted the controversial emergency decree (refs A,C,D,E). Despite the government's repeated public assurances that the decree will not lead to human rights abuses, the reaction from some of the Muslim community in the South was extremely negative, and the decree has provoked increased fear and suspicion of the government's intentions. A senior Thai MFA official (ref A) has also expressed serious concern about the decree, indicating that some Thai officials are also concerned that the edict was poorly conceived. POLICY MISSTEPS DO NOT HURT THAKSIN POLITICALLY -------------- -- ¶4. (C) Thaksin inherited a long-standing problem and made it worse. He faces serious criticism internationally and from some Thai NGOs and political opponents. However -- and while it may be counterintuitive -- Thaksin is not paying a serious political price domestically for his failing southern policy. Thaksin simply has not had the domestic political incentive to amend his policies, as many Thais, including Buddhist Thais in the South, actually want the government to take a harder line toward militants. The overall effect of these attacks on Thai institutions and civilians has often been to bring out strong nationalistic feelings among the Buddhist majority and strengthen the Prime Minister's political position as a tough leader willing to make hard decisions. THAKSIN BEGINS TO UNDERSTAND -------------- ¶5. (C) Against this background, we sense a growing realization within the government and from Thaksin himself that they are not making sufficient progress, and that policy changes are necessary. An advisor to the National Security Council (NSC) recently told us that the Prime Minister had developed a better understanding of the southern situation following a meeting with southern businessmen who were able to explain to the Prime Minister in economic terms -- the language Thaksin understands best -- the effect the insurgency is having on commercial interests in the South. His establishment of the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) in March 2005 led by Anand Panyarchun, one of the most highly respected figures in Thailand, was a serious and positive development. The NRC is working on proposals to address the underlying causes of the unrest. The Commission is composed of highly credible and representative members, and Anand will not let himself be manipulated by Thaksin. ENCOURAGEMENT AND ENGAGEMENT -------------- ¶6. (C) When considering how we approach the Prime Minister on the South we should remember that Thaksin dominates the Thai political scene as no other civilian prime minister has before him. Although his popularity has waned somewhat, according to recent opinion polls, he is still the confident, dominant leader of an overwhelming parliamentary majority. Additionally, Thaksin believes that he has established a personal relationship with the President, and often reminds visitors of their "common Texas roots." To the media, Thaksin has likened his upcoming meeting with the President to a conversation between personal friends. The meeting with the President therefore represents an excellent opportunity to raise our concerns about his sometimes erratic approach to dealing with the South while encouraging him to stay the present course as represented by the NRC, rather that the hardline approach embodied by the emergency decree. Coming from the President -- a leader the Prime Minister clearly admires -- rather than through impersonal public statements, which often provoke a negative and contrary reaction, this message should resonate. ¶7. (C) The Prime Minister told Ambassador he is eager to explain his southern policy and to rebut concerns that his measures are dictatorial and counterproductive. We suggest the following points in response: -- We recognize this is an internal Thai affair, but we are ready to cooperate to the extent we can, e.g., sharing intelligence, human rights training, and educational reform if the Thai side so desires. -- We appreciate the RTG's assurances that the emergency decree will not be used to justify human rights abuses in the South. If there are human rights violations by security forces in the region, it will only exacerbate the problem, and could have a negative impact on our overall bilateral security cooperation programs. We do not want that to happen. -- We are encouraged by the work of the National Reconciliation Commission; we are optimistic that this distinguished group will come up with good recommendations, and hope that the government will be able to work with them on implementation. BOYCE