THAI POLICY ON CHINESE REFUGEES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002431

SIPDIS

GENEVA FOR RMA. DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/BCLTV, EAP/CM.
SEOUL FOR AMBASSADOR HILL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2015
TAGS: PREL PREF PHUM TH CH
SUBJECT: THAI POLICY ON CHINESE REFUGEES

REF: A. 12/17/04 BCLTV/ANDREW SHAW EMAIL


B. 12/17/04 PRM/NADEAU EMAIL

Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE ALEX ARVIZU. REASON 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary. The Thai government continues to refuse
UNHCR access to Chinese dissident Lu Decheng for a refugee
status determination interview. In their handling of Lu, the
Thai are balancing human rights concerns and U.S. and UNHCR
pressure against their relations with China and a belief that
Chinese dissident groups are taking advantage of Thailand,s
humanitarianism. Lu,s case arose shortly after two other
high-profile Chinese refugees cases in which the Thai
struggled to find ways to allow the concerned persons to
depart Thailand for third country resettlement. This likely
led the Thai to think that they needed to stop a developing
trend. Their approach on Lu is probably intended to head off
serious complications in their China policy by deterring
other prominent Chinese cases from thinking that Thailand is
an easy transit route out of China to resettlement countries.
At the same time, the Embassy knows of no cases where the
Thai have deported Chinese asylum seekers to China, though
the location of asylum seeker Zhao Wendong, who was picked up
by Thai authorities at the same time as Lu, is currently
uncertain. The UNHCR pipeline that quietly moves other,
non-prominent Chinese refugees, as well as hundreds of
refugees of other nationalities, out of Thailand to third
countries remains open at the same time that it appears the
pipeline out of Thailand for high-profile Chinese cases, such
as that of Lu Decheng, is at least temporarily closed. End
Summary.


2. (C) As background to the Lu Decheng case, it is important
to remember that Thailand is a key asylum and transit point
for thousands of refugees from numerous countries. Refugees
from neighboring countries predominate -- the USG is in the
process of resettling 15,500 Laotian Hmong and 2,900 urban
Burmese out of Thailand. At the same time, UNHCR/Bangkok has
also given refugee status, or is processing refugee status
applications, for about 1,300 persons from over 40 different
nationalities. Refugees from these other nationalities came
to Thailand because of good transportation links, the UNHCR
presence, and the laxness of Thai immigration laws and
enforcement. While the Thai have stiffened visa issuance and
enforcement since the end of 2003, it is still possible for
refugees generally to survive in Thailand while awaiting
resettlement, although their lives are difficult and they are
subject at any time to arrest, detention, and possible
deportation.


3. (C) Well-known dissident Lu Decheng is currently the most
prominent Chinese refugee status seeker in Thailand. The
Thai government continues to deny UNHCR access to him for a
refugee status determination interview that would likely be
the precursor to his resettlement in a third country. At the
same time, however, UNHCR has access to and has granted or is
considering refugee status for 101 other Chinese. Similar to
its posture towards refugees from other non-Burmese and
non-Lao nationalities, the Thai government has shown no
particular interest or opposition to UNHCR,s processing of
these other Chinese cases for resettlement.


4. (C) For example, UNHCR last week referred to the Embassy
an urgent case for U.S. resettlement involving a Falun Gong
practitioner who had been subjected to severe torture and
violence in China. The three relatives of Zhang Rongliang,
referred by UNHCR late last year and processed expeditiously
by the Embassy for U.S. resettlement because of high-level
USG interest, never came to the attention of Thai
policymakers. There is no reason at this point to think the
Thai will object to U.S. resettlement of the Falun Gong case
if it is approved by DHS or that the general Thai approach to
Chinese refugee cases will change.


5. (C) Over the past year, the Thai have demonstrated a
willingness to permit third-country resettlement in two
prominent Chinese dissident cases, and at least in one of the
cases, to resist high-level Chinese government pressure for
deportation of the concerned persons to China. In doing so,
however, and apparently sensitive to China relations, they
have struggled to find ways to move the persons out of
Thailand quickly. The Thai allowed well-known dissident Yuan
Bin to be interviewed by UNHCR and resettled in the United
States late last year. However, this occurred only after the
Embassy strongly weighed in on Yuan,s behalf. The Thai
required, apparently at the personal direction of then
Foreign Minister Surakiart Sathirathai, that UNHCR and the
Embassy process Yuan,s case and move him out of the country
in seven days.


6. (C) The second case involved Ao Bo and Duan Xinjun, two
members of the mainland Chinese rock band, Pungu. These two
individuals came to Thailand in March 2004 fearful for their
safety after performing at a February 2004 &Say Yes to
Taiwan8 festival in Taipei at which they sang songs
supportive of Taiwan independence. UNHCR Bangkok (strictly
protect) reports that high-level Chinese officials
subsequently requested Prime Minister Thaksin during a visit
to Beijing to deport the pair to China. In early September
2004, a senior Thai government official informed UNHCR that
the Thai authorities had agreed to cooperate with the request
and had issued a directive to border authorities to arrest
the two. However, at the same time the same official also
indicated that the Thai government wanted UNHCR to provide
protection and was willing to allow the two to leave Thailand
prior to their arrest and deportation. The official said he
would take steps to ensure that Thai border authorities did
not intervene if the two were moved to Cambodia. An NGO
thereupon assisted the pair to Phnom Penh where they were
quickly and quietly resettled to Sweden.


7. (C) Lu Decheng,s case is special because he is another
prominent Chinese dissident whose case has come to the
attention of Thai policy level officials. It is not clear
exactly how this happened. UNHCR has reported that the
Chinese Embassy tipped the Thai off to Lu,s presence.
However, there was also local press coverage of Lu,s case
after news of his arrest by Thai police appeared on NGO
websites in the United States.


8. (C) In discussions about Lu,s case, senior and working
level Thai officials have told the Embassy that while they
are mindful of humanitarian considerations, they are
concerned that what they see as Thailand,s traditional
willingness to provide refugee asylum could be abused by NGOs
and other groups intent on pursuing their own objectives.
Lu,s case came hard on the heels of the Yuan Bin case late
last year and the Thai probably saw a trend of high-profile
cases developing that could complicate relations with
Beijing. The concern about the motives of NGOs is not
unfounded. Refs noted that America-based activist Xu Wen Li,
who was closely associated with Yuan Bin,s case, requested
expedited processing of a U.S. refugee travel document for
Yuan after his U.S. arrival so Yuan could return to Thailand
as soon as possible and set up a conduit for persons to get
out of China.


9. (C) It is not clear how much pressure the Chinese have put
on the Thai over Lu,s case. On February 4, a Chinese
Embassy law enforcement official sent a letter to the Thai
Immigration Bureau requesting Lu,s repatriation to China.
But the Thai MFA told the Embassy that this letter was not an
official extradition request and would be ignored. The
Embassy knows that the Thai have permitted access to Lu by
Chinese Embassy officials and have pressured Lu to accept
&voluntary8 deportation to a neighboring country. Lu has
refused. NGOs and Lu,s friends continue to have access to
him.


10. (C) The Embassy,s repeated and senior-level requests to
the Thai MFA to permit UNHCR access to Lu for a refugee
status determination interview have so far not worked. A
Thai MFA official recently told the Embassy off-the-record
that the U.S. and Thailand understand each other well in this
matter, that is, Thailand's "predicament" and the U.S.
concern that Lu's life could be endangered. He said that
Thailand would do its best to make sure it proceeds according
to its immigration law and takes steps not to put Lu in
danger.


11. (C) Another Chinese asylum seeker, Zhao Wendong, was
picked up last year with Lu Decheng. At the time, Zhao was
appealing UNHCR,s refusal of his refugee status application.
Zhao was kept until March 25 at the Thai Immigration
Detention Center, the same location where Lu is being held.
According to UNHCR, Thai immigration officials reported that
the Chinese had leaned on them to deport Zhao to China.
Immigration officials thereupon put pressure on Zhao to
accept &soft8 deportation to the Burma border, warning that
he might otherwise be turned over to the Chinese. &Soft8
deportation means a person is taken to a point on the border
and released. No officials from the neighboring country are
present and in most cases it is assumed that the person
simply returns to Thailand. Zhao initially resisted the Thai
pressure. But on March 25, Zhao was taken to the Mae Sai
border area and released. UNHCR does not know whether the
Thai moved Zhao forcibly. The Thai claim he agreed to soft
deportation. A Thai immigration official told UNHCR that no
Burmese authorities were involved and that he expected Zhao
would receive help from the Chinese community in Chiang Rai
and find his way back to Bangkok. However, as of April 5, no
one has heard from Zhao.


12. (C) Comment. The Thai may hold Lu Decheng for some time
to deter other high-profile Chinese dissidents from
transiting Thailand, and as a practical matter, the pipeline
out of Thailand for such cases may well be closed at least
temporarily. At the same time, it is important to note that
many other Chinese refugees, whose cases may not be as
prominent but may be equally deserving, are flowing quietly
through the Thailand pipeline. Embassy will continue to
follow Lu,s case closely and urge UNHCR access.
ARVIZU