THAI POLICY ON CHINESE REFUGEES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002431 SIPDIS GENEVA FOR RMA. DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/BCLTV, EAP/CM. SEOUL FOR AMBASSADOR HILL E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2015 TAGS: PREL PREF PHUM TH CH SUBJECT: THAI POLICY ON CHINESE REFUGEES REF: A. 12/17/04 BCLTV/ANDREW SHAW EMAIL ¶B. 12/17/04 PRM/NADEAU EMAIL Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE ALEX ARVIZU. REASON 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary. The Thai government continues to refuse UNHCR access to Chinese dissident Lu Decheng for a refugee status determination interview. In their handling of Lu, the Thai are balancing human rights concerns and U.S. and UNHCR pressure against their relations with China and a belief that Chinese dissident groups are taking advantage of Thailand,s humanitarianism. Lu,s case arose shortly after two other high-profile Chinese refugees cases in which the Thai struggled to find ways to allow the concerned persons to depart Thailand for third country resettlement. This likely led the Thai to think that they needed to stop a developing trend. Their approach on Lu is probably intended to head off serious complications in their China policy by deterring other prominent Chinese cases from thinking that Thailand is an easy transit route out of China to resettlement countries. At the same time, the Embassy knows of no cases where the Thai have deported Chinese asylum seekers to China, though the location of asylum seeker Zhao Wendong, who was picked up by Thai authorities at the same time as Lu, is currently uncertain. The UNHCR pipeline that quietly moves other, non-prominent Chinese refugees, as well as hundreds of refugees of other nationalities, out of Thailand to third countries remains open at the same time that it appears the pipeline out of Thailand for high-profile Chinese cases, such as that of Lu Decheng, is at least temporarily closed. End Summary. ¶2. (C) As background to the Lu Decheng case, it is important to remember that Thailand is a key asylum and transit point for thousands of refugees from numerous countries. Refugees from neighboring countries predominate -- the USG is in the process of resettling 15,500 Laotian Hmong and 2,900 urban Burmese out of Thailand. At the same time, UNHCR/Bangkok has also given refugee status, or is processing refugee status applications, for about 1,300 persons from over 40 different nationalities. Refugees from these other nationalities came to Thailand because of good transportation links, the UNHCR presence, and the laxness of Thai immigration laws and enforcement. While the Thai have stiffened visa issuance and enforcement since the end of 2003, it is still possible for refugees generally to survive in Thailand while awaiting resettlement, although their lives are difficult and they are subject at any time to arrest, detention, and possible deportation. ¶3. (C) Well-known dissident Lu Decheng is currently the most prominent Chinese refugee status seeker in Thailand. The Thai government continues to deny UNHCR access to him for a refugee status determination interview that would likely be the precursor to his resettlement in a third country. At the same time, however, UNHCR has access to and has granted or is considering refugee status for 101 other Chinese. Similar to its posture towards refugees from other non-Burmese and non-Lao nationalities, the Thai government has shown no particular interest or opposition to UNHCR,s processing of these other Chinese cases for resettlement. ¶4. (C) For example, UNHCR last week referred to the Embassy an urgent case for U.S. resettlement involving a Falun Gong practitioner who had been subjected to severe torture and violence in China. The three relatives of Zhang Rongliang, referred by UNHCR late last year and processed expeditiously by the Embassy for U.S. resettlement because of high-level USG interest, never came to the attention of Thai policymakers. There is no reason at this point to think the Thai will object to U.S. resettlement of the Falun Gong case if it is approved by DHS or that the general Thai approach to Chinese refugee cases will change. ¶5. (C) Over the past year, the Thai have demonstrated a willingness to permit third-country resettlement in two prominent Chinese dissident cases, and at least in one of the cases, to resist high-level Chinese government pressure for deportation of the concerned persons to China. In doing so, however, and apparently sensitive to China relations, they have struggled to find ways to move the persons out of Thailand quickly. The Thai allowed well-known dissident Yuan Bin to be interviewed by UNHCR and resettled in the United States late last year. However, this occurred only after the Embassy strongly weighed in on Yuan,s behalf. The Thai required, apparently at the personal direction of then Foreign Minister Surakiart Sathirathai, that UNHCR and the Embassy process Yuan,s case and move him out of the country in seven days. ¶6. (C) The second case involved Ao Bo and Duan Xinjun, two members of the mainland Chinese rock band, Pungu. These two individuals came to Thailand in March 2004 fearful for their safety after performing at a February 2004 &Say Yes to Taiwan8 festival in Taipei at which they sang songs supportive of Taiwan independence. UNHCR Bangkok (strictly protect) reports that high-level Chinese officials subsequently requested Prime Minister Thaksin during a visit to Beijing to deport the pair to China. In early September 2004, a senior Thai government official informed UNHCR that the Thai authorities had agreed to cooperate with the request and had issued a directive to border authorities to arrest the two. However, at the same time the same official also indicated that the Thai government wanted UNHCR to provide protection and was willing to allow the two to leave Thailand prior to their arrest and deportation. The official said he would take steps to ensure that Thai border authorities did not intervene if the two were moved to Cambodia. An NGO thereupon assisted the pair to Phnom Penh where they were quickly and quietly resettled to Sweden. ¶7. (C) Lu Decheng,s case is special because he is another prominent Chinese dissident whose case has come to the attention of Thai policy level officials. It is not clear exactly how this happened. UNHCR has reported that the Chinese Embassy tipped the Thai off to Lu,s presence. However, there was also local press coverage of Lu,s case after news of his arrest by Thai police appeared on NGO websites in the United States. ¶8. (C) In discussions about Lu,s case, senior and working level Thai officials have told the Embassy that while they are mindful of humanitarian considerations, they are concerned that what they see as Thailand,s traditional willingness to provide refugee asylum could be abused by NGOs and other groups intent on pursuing their own objectives. Lu,s case came hard on the heels of the Yuan Bin case late last year and the Thai probably saw a trend of high-profile cases developing that could complicate relations with Beijing. The concern about the motives of NGOs is not unfounded. Refs noted that America-based activist Xu Wen Li, who was closely associated with Yuan Bin,s case, requested expedited processing of a U.S. refugee travel document for Yuan after his U.S. arrival so Yuan could return to Thailand as soon as possible and set up a conduit for persons to get out of China. ¶9. (C) It is not clear how much pressure the Chinese have put on the Thai over Lu,s case. On February 4, a Chinese Embassy law enforcement official sent a letter to the Thai Immigration Bureau requesting Lu,s repatriation to China. But the Thai MFA told the Embassy that this letter was not an official extradition request and would be ignored. The Embassy knows that the Thai have permitted access to Lu by Chinese Embassy officials and have pressured Lu to accept &voluntary8 deportation to a neighboring country. Lu has refused. NGOs and Lu,s friends continue to have access to him. ¶10. (C) The Embassy,s repeated and senior-level requests to the Thai MFA to permit UNHCR access to Lu for a refugee status determination interview have so far not worked. A Thai MFA official recently told the Embassy off-the-record that the U.S. and Thailand understand each other well in this matter, that is, Thailand's "predicament" and the U.S. concern that Lu's life could be endangered. He said that Thailand would do its best to make sure it proceeds according to its immigration law and takes steps not to put Lu in danger. ¶11. (C) Another Chinese asylum seeker, Zhao Wendong, was picked up last year with Lu Decheng. At the time, Zhao was appealing UNHCR,s refusal of his refugee status application. Zhao was kept until March 25 at the Thai Immigration Detention Center, the same location where Lu is being held. According to UNHCR, Thai immigration officials reported that the Chinese had leaned on them to deport Zhao to China. Immigration officials thereupon put pressure on Zhao to accept &soft8 deportation to the Burma border, warning that he might otherwise be turned over to the Chinese. &Soft8 deportation means a person is taken to a point on the border and released. No officials from the neighboring country are present and in most cases it is assumed that the person simply returns to Thailand. Zhao initially resisted the Thai pressure. But on March 25, Zhao was taken to the Mae Sai border area and released. UNHCR does not know whether the Thai moved Zhao forcibly. The Thai claim he agreed to soft deportation. A Thai immigration official told UNHCR that no Burmese authorities were involved and that he expected Zhao would receive help from the Chinese community in Chiang Rai and find his way back to Bangkok. However, as of April 5, no one has heard from Zhao. ¶12. (C) Comment. The Thai may hold Lu Decheng for some time to deter other high-profile Chinese dissidents from transiting Thailand, and as a practical matter, the pipeline out of Thailand for such cases may well be closed at least temporarily. At the same time, it is important to note that many other Chinese refugees, whose cases may not be as prominent but may be equally deserving, are flowing quietly through the Thailand pipeline. Embassy will continue to follow Lu,s case closely and urge UNHCR access. ARVIZU