MCNS MEETING 21 DECEMBER 2005: OFF-RAMP

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 005144

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2015
TAGS: MOPS PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: MCNS MEETING 21 DECEMBER 2005: OFF-RAMP
ANNOUNCEMENT, TRANSFER OF SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY, AVOIDING
A RESURGENCE OF VIOLENCE, AND HIGH VALUE DETAINEE RELEASES

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for Reasons 1.4 (A),(B),(D
),


1. (S) SUMMARY. During a December 21 MCNS meeting,
participants discussed four issues. The Iraqis agreed to the
scenario of announcing the off-ramp decision on Friday,
December 23. We would prepare the text of a statement to be
read publicly to the press at the end of a meeting with the
PM. We deferred a decision on how to proceed with the
document containing the conditions for transferring security
responsibility, but agreed on the need for a brief summary
statement for public release. The Iraqis debated ways to
avoid a resurgence of violence, focusing on developing
political steps and sustaining forceful security operations.
Finally, a rancorous discussion ensued regarding the release
of high value detainees. Ambassador stood firm on our
obligation to release the detainees in the absence of
evidence of any crime or security threat. He and General
Casey forcefully stated that we had not facilitated travel of
any detainee outside Iraq. The meeting concluded with the
idea of forming a group to draw lessons from this issue and
produce a joint public statement. END SUMMARY.

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OFF-RAMP ANNOUNCEMENT
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2. (S) MCNS met December 21. Iraqi representatives included
PM Jafari, NSA Rubaie, MOD Dulime, MOI Jabr, and PM advisor
Adnan Ali al-Kadhimi. Representation from the Coalition
included Ambassador Khalilzad, MNF-I CG Casey, MNF-I DCG
Houghton, UK Charge Torlot, and PolMilCouns Litt. CG Casey
had sought the meeting primarily to discuss the off-ramp
announcement. CG noted that we had discussed the issue with
the PM, MOD and MOI several weeks ago, but they had urged
MNF-I to delay the announcement of any decision until after
the elections. CG said the USG would like to make the
announcement on Friday during our DV visit. He reviewed the
rationale for our decision, particularly the progress of the
ISF on the ground, and he reaffirmed that this reduction in
our presence would in no way impact our solid commitment to
Iraq's security. CG also ran through the attendant risks of
reducing, and of not reducing, our presence, concluding that
now was the right time to take this step.


3. (S) Iraqi interlocutors firmly supported this initiative.
The PM initially tried to make the case that the off-ramp
should appear to be a joint decision and the result of the
Iraqi government's deliberation and approval. Ambassador
held firm to the position that adjustments in our force
structure were our decision alone. The GOI was of course
within its right to request the departure of all forces, but
could not approve force adjustments. Eventually, the PM
relented, and we agreed to craft language to be used in a
joint press availability following the Friday meeting with
the PM.

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TRANSFER OF SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY
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4. (S) A discussion ensued about the way ahead for the
committee to transfer security responsibility. Dr. Rubaie
said the joint committee's coordination of implementing
procedures had made great progress and they were in an
advanced stage. He noted that we agreed on the need to
prepare a brief statement (one or two pages) that summarized
for public release the document that contains the detailed
conditions and the measures of assessment for whether a given
province or provincial capital were ready for transfer. The
only open question was the status of the document itself --
should it be signed, and if so, by whom? He said the PM had
the authority to sign the document now, even though his
formal agreement to it was given before the elections.
Ambassador and General Casey said we would think over our
position on this last point and let the MCNS know.

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AVOIDING A RESURGENCE OF VIOLENCE
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5. (S) The Iraqi participants spent some time debating ways
to avoid a resurgence in violence after the pre-election
lull. They all agreed that violence had declined as a result
of Euphrates River Valley operations, returning the Syrian
border to Iraqi control, a successful political process
including international support (e.g., from the Arab League),
a political decision by insurgents to minimize acts of
violence, and a growing political opinion in the Sunni
population to give the political process a chance. The
question was how to sustain this momentum. In the end all
agreed on the need for undefined "political" steps to
strengthen trust in government and bring back pride, honor
and respect. The PM stressed that the government must focus
on worst-case scenarios as it prepares such measures.
Ministers Dulime and Jabr emphasized the need to continue
security operations relentlessly. Dulime argued that, before
the election, insurgents enjoyed support inside and outside
Iraq as the perceived "resistance" to occupation. Now, after
the elections, no one has an excuse to support insurgency.
Ambassador suggested that representatives from the relevant
organizations meet to outline specific suggestions on both
the political and security tracks.

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RELEASE OF HIGH VALUE DETAINEES
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6. (S) At the end of the meeting, the PM somewhat heatedly
plowed over old ground with respect to our release of high
value detainees. We reiterated that we were obligated to do
so since the detainees posed no security threat, and we had
found no evidence of criminal activities. The Iraqi legal
and political authorities had never presented us any valid
warrants backed by evidence -- after almost eighteen months
of ourakingrpeatedy for such evidence. The Ambassador
and CG Casey stressed that no detainee had been transported
outside Iraq by the Coalition, nor would be in the future.
The PM alleged that our actions were an infringement of
sovereignty and showed a lack of respect for Iraq. We
reiterated that we were only releasing these detainees
because according to international law we had no reason or
authority to hold them, or to turn them over to Iraqi
custody. The Iraqis were now free to arrest them if they had
proper evidence to do so.
KHALILZAD